The effects of computer assurance specialist competence and auditor accounting information system expertise on auditor planning judgments by Brazel, Joseph F.
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effects of Computer Assurance Specialist Competence and Auditor Accounting 
 
Information System Expertise on Auditor Planning Judgments 
 
 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Faculty 
of 
Drexel University 
by 
Joseph F. Brazel 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree  
of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
May 2004 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright 2004 
Joseph F. Brazel. All Rights Reserved.
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
ii
 
 
 
 
 
Dedications 
 
To my wife Kyla, whose constant love, strength, and support provide me with the 
courage to do things I am afraid to do. 
 
 
It was a high counsel that I once heard given to a young person, ‘Always do what you are 
afraid to do.’ 
 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
iii
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my appreciation to the members of my committee for their 
encouragement, insight, and guidance throughout the dissertation process. In particular, I 
would like to extend my gratitude to my chair Chris Agoglia. It was his doctoral seminar 
and enthusiasm for research that first sparked my interest in the experimental method and 
his constant mentoring has made me a much better researcher and writer. His many 
reviews and abundant suggestions have truly shaped this dissertation. I also thank Rick 
Hatfield, who recruited me into the Ph.D. program at Drexel University and whose 
experimental design expertise I relied upon throughout my doctoral studies. Lastly, I 
would like to thank Hank Jaenicke for challenging me to perform research important to 
the profession, Kevin Brown for offering insightful comments, and Tom McWilliams for 
providing me with my knowledge of statistical concepts. 
I thank my fellow doctoral students, especially Maria Sanchez and Li Dang for 
being a sounding board for my ideas and their companionship throughout the program. In 
addition, I gratefully acknowledge the support of my colleagues at North Carolina State 
University while I completed this dissertation in Raleigh, NC. I would also like to extend 
my sincere appreciation to the partners, administrative staff, and audit professionals that 
participated in this study. Their generosity allowed me to complete this dissertation. 
Finally, achieving this goal would not have been possible without the love and 
encouragement I have received from my family over the last five years. To my parents, 
Dr. Joseph and Barbara Brazel, I thank you for inspiring me to ask questions and to find a 
career where I can affect peoples’ lives in a positive way. To my mother- and father-in-
law, Roberta and Curly Daugherty, thanks for all of your love and support, and for 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
iv
 
 
 
 
 
allowing a soon-to-be poor doctoral student to marry your beautiful daughter. To my 
sisters Katherine and Elizabeth, thanks for always being there for your big brother. 
Lastly, and most importantly, I am forever indebted to my wife Kyla. Your continual 
strength, inspiration, sacrifice, friendship, and love constantly amaze me. You are 
responsible for all of the successes in my life and the one with the biggest smile when I 
accomplish them. I achieved this goal because of you. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
v
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES....................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................x 
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................. xi 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION..................................................................................1 
     1.1     Introduction.....................................................................................................1 
     1.2     Purpose of the Study and Proposed Research Questions................................2 
     1.3     The Audit Risk Model ....................................................................................3 
     1.4     ERP Systems and Auditor AIS Expertise .......................................................6 
     1.5     Computer Assurance Specialist Competence .................................................7 
     1.6     CAS Competence and Auditor AIS Expertise ................................................9 
     1.7     Overview of the Study ..................................................................................12 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW.....................................................................14 
     2.1     Introduction...................................................................................................14 
     2.2     The Audit Risk Model ..................................................................................14 
               2.2.1     Risk Assessment ..............................................................................17 
               2.2.2     Planned Substantive Procedures ......................................................22 
               2.2.3     New Auditing Standards ..................................................................28 
     2.3     ERP Systems and Auditor AIS Expertise .....................................................30 
               2.3.1     ERP Systems: Benefits, Complexities, and Risks ...........................30 
               2.3.2     Auditing ERP Systems.....................................................................34 
               2.3.3     Anchoring and Adjustment ..............................................................38 
     2.4     Computer Assurance Specialist Competence ...............................................43 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
vi
 
 
 
 
 
              2.4.1     Computer Assurance Specialists.......................................................44 
              2.4.2     Source Reliability..............................................................................45 
              2.4.3     Prior Source Competence Research..................................................46 
     2.5     Auditor Accounting Information System Expertise .....................................50 
              2.5.1     AIS Expertise Gap ............................................................................50 
              2.5.2     Judgment Quality and Effectiveness.................................................54 
CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY...........................................58 
     3.1     Introduction...................................................................................................58 
     3.2     Hypotheses....................................................................................................59 
               3.2.1     ERP Systems and Auditor AIS Expertise ........................................59 
               3.2.2     Computer Assurance Specialist Competence ..................................62 
               3.2.3     Auditor Accounting Information System Expertise ........................64 
     3.3     Methodology.................................................................................................66 
               3.3.1     Overview..........................................................................................66 
               3.3.2     Participants.......................................................................................67 
               3.3.3     Quasi-Experimental Task.................................................................68 
               3.3.4     Discussion of Manipulation and Measurement of the  
                            Independent Variables .....................................................................72 
 
                            3.3.4.1     Computer Assurance Specialist Competence ..................72 
                            3.3.4.2     Auditor AIS Expertise......................................................74 
                                             3.3.4.2.1     Development of Auditor AIS Expertise 
                                                                Measure........................................................74 
 
3.3.4.2.2    Assessment of Auditor AIS Expertise 
   Measure........................................................78 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
vii
 
 
 
 
 
               3.3.5     Dependent Variables........................................................................81 
                            3.3.5.1     Inherent and Control Risk Assessments ..........................81 
                            3.3.5.2     Evidence Reliability Judgment ........................................82 
                            3.3.5.3     Scope of Planned Substantive Procedures .......................83 
                            3.3.5.4     Quality of Risk Assessments and Effectiveness of  
                                            Substantive Procedures ....................................................84 
 
               3.3.6     Other Measured Variables and Manipulation Check.......................84 
               3.3.7     Conclusion .......................................................................................85 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS.............................................................................................86 
     4.1     Introduction...................................................................................................86 
     4.2     Description of Participants............................................................................86 
     4.3     Manipulation Check and Measurement of the Independent Variables.........87 
               4.3.1     Manipulation Check for CAS Competence .....................................87 
               4.3.2     Measurement of Auditor AIS Expertise ..........................................89 
     4.4     Testing of Statistical Assumptions................................................................93 
     4.5     Hypothesis Testing........................................................................................95 
               4.5.1     Introduction......................................................................................95 
               4.5.2     Relationship Between Auditor AIS Expertise and Auditor  
                            Planning Judgments (Hypothesis Set One)......................................95 
 
4.5.3  Relationship Between CAS Competence and Auditor Evidence 
    Reliability Judgments (Hypothesis Two).........................................99 
 
4.5.4  Relationship Between CAS Competence and Auditor Planning 
                            Judgments (Hypothesis Set Three) ................................................100 
 
4.5.5  The Interactive Effect of Auditor AIS Expertise and CAS 
    Competence on Auditor Planning Judgments (Hypothesis Set  
               Four)...............................................................................................102 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
viii
 
 
 
 
 
4.5.6  Relationship Between Auditor AIS Expertise and the Quality 
and Effectiveness of Auditor Planning Judgments (Hypothesis  
Set Five).........................................................................................104 
 
     4.6     Summary of Hypothesis Testing.................................................................108 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS.............110 
     5.1     Introduction.................................................................................................110 
     5.2     Conclusions.................................................................................................110 
     5.3     Limitations ..................................................................................................112 
     5.4     Implications.................................................................................................114 
LIST OF REFERENCES...........................................................................................116 
FIGURES...................................................................................................................128 
APPENDIX A: COMPUTER ASSURANCE SPECIALIST (CAS)  
COMPETENCE/AUDITOR RELATIONSHIP SURVEY .......................................131 
 
APPENDIX B: HYPOTHESES ................................................................................132 
APPENDIX C: QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT...................................135 
APPENDIX D: AUDITOR ACCOUNTING INFORMATION SYSTEM (AIS) 
 EXPERTISE MEASURE .........................................................................................169 
 
APPENDIX E: FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR PRE-TEST OF  
AUDITOR AIS EXPERTISE MEASURE................................................................170 
 
TABLES ....................................................................................................................173 
VITA..........................................................................................................................187 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
ix
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
1.      Participants by Group .......................................................................................173 
2.      Sample Demographic Data ...............................................................................174 
3.      Demographic Data by Group ............................................................................175 
4.      Manipulation Check..........................................................................................176 
5.      Spearman Correlation Matrix for AIS Expertise Measures and Audit  
         Experience.........................................................................................................177 
6.      Communalities for AIS Expertise Measures and Audit Experience.................178 
7.      Factor Components for AIS Expertise Measures and Audit Experience..........179 
8.      Component Matrix for AIS Expertise Measures and Audit Experience...........180 
9.      Frequency Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Mean AIS Expertise 
         Measure.............................................................................................................181 
 
10.    Testing of Hypothesis Set One .........................................................................182 
11.    Testing of Hypothesis Set Two.........................................................................183 
12.    Testing of Hypothesis Set Three.......................................................................184 
13.    Testing of Hypothesis Set Four ........................................................................185 
14.    Testing of Hypothesis Set Five .........................................................................186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
1.      Graph Depicting Computer Assurance Specialist (CAS) and Auditor  
         Accounting Information System (AIS) Expertise Interaction ..........................128 
2.      Diagram of the Quasi-Experimental Task ........................................................129 
3.      Experimental Groups ........................................................................................130 
4.      Summary of Testing..........................................................................................130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
xi
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Effects of Computer Assurance Specialist Competence and Auditor Accounting  
Information System Expertise on Auditor Planning Judgments 
Joseph F. Brazel 
Christopher P. Agoglia, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
While auditors’ interactions with complex accounting information systems (AIS) 
and computer assurance specialists (CAS) play a critical role in determining audit quality 
(POB 2000), little prior research has examined these topics. This study investigates the 
effects of CAS competence and auditor AIS expertise on auditor planning judgments in a 
complex AIS environment. The audit literature has typically examined auditors’ 
evaluations of evidence provided by sources with expertise structures similar to their 
own. However, the natural variation in knowledge structures that occurs between CAS 
and auditors likely results in a more complex relationship than those previously 
examined.  
Auditors were given a quasi-experimental case where the competence of the CAS 
was manipulated as high and low between auditors and auditor AIS expertise was 
measured. The case required auditors to evaluate evidence related to the audit of a 
complex AIS client to which a CAS had been assigned, assess current year inherent and 
control risks, and plan the nature, timing, and extent of substantive procedures for a 
transaction cycle.  
Results indicate that auditors possessing higher AIS expertise assessed both 
inherent and controls risks at higher levels and designed corresponding substantive tests 
that were greater in scope to mitigate those risks. For high AIS expertise auditors, both 
the quality of their risk assessments and the effectiveness of their scope of tests exceeded 
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those of low AIS expertise auditors. Auditors were also sensitive to the reliability of CAS 
as an evidence source and assessed control risk higher when provided with control testing 
evidence from a CAS with low competence. When planning substantive procedures, 
auditors’ AIS expertise levels moderated their reaction to CAS competence. Specifically, 
under conditions of low CAS competence, auditors with higher AIS expertise expanded 
the scope of their audit testing beyond the scope designed by auditors possessing lower 
AIS expertise. No such AIS expertise effect occurred under conditions of high CAS 
competence. These results suggest that auditor AIS expertise can play a significant role in 
complex AIS environments and in their ability to compensate for potential CAS 
competence deficiencies by increasing the scope of substantive tests. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has recently 
stated that financial statement auditors need to change their audit strategies in reaction to 
the all-encompassing changes in information technology (IT) at their clients (AICPA 
2001). IT applications, such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, have 
significantly changed the way companies operate their businesses. These complex and 
pervasive IT systems have allowed companies to better manage supply chains, perform 
business process reengineering, and re-organize their accounting processes along with 
providing numerous other functions (Brown 1997; Moore and Warrick 1998; Scheer and 
Habermann 2000). Changes brought about by ERP systems have also affected the ways 
in which auditors perform their duties (Helms 1999; POB 2000). For example, the 
implementation and utilization of ERP systems at many major corporations has increased 
audit-related risks such as business interruption, database security, process 
interdependency, and overall control risk (Hunton et al. 2001).  
The significant effect of IT advancements on the audit profession is evident in the 
release of two auditing standards that address the impact of technology on the audit. 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 80 (AICPA 1996) suggests that, with respect 
to clients that process a significant portion of their transactions electronically, auditors 
may not be able to reduce audit risk to an appropriate level via additional substantive 
procedures and may need to perform more control testing. SAS No. 94 (AICPA 2001) 
indicates that, in computer intensive environments, auditors should assign one or more 
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computer assurance specialists (CAS) to the engagement in order to appropriately 
determine the effect of IT on the audit, gain an understanding of controls, and design and 
perform tests of IT controls. Clearly, the increased complexities and pervasiveness of IT 
should affect auditor planning (e.g., the application of the audit risk model) and increase 
the role of CAS as a source of evidence within the audit engagement team.  
As technological developments continue, auditors will need to expand their 
technological knowledge and skills in order to perform effective and efficient audits 
(POB 2000; Kinney 2001). Recent research has shown that (a) auditors are not apt to 
recognize the heightened inherent and control risks present in ERP environments, and (b) 
there is an accounting information system (AIS) expertise gap between auditors and CAS 
(Hunton et al. 2001). Therefore, auditors’ AIS expertise levels may affect their planning 
judgments1 and their ability to appropriately evaluate the audit evidence provided by 
CAS.   
 
1.2       Purpose of the Study and Proposed Research Questions 
Expertise in the AIS domain may make auditors more cognizant of AIS-specific 
risks (Hunton et al. 2001) and provide them with the sophisticated audit skills required in 
such settings (Lilly 1997). This study investigates whether variation in auditors’ AIS 
expertise affects their ability to recognize inherent and control risks associated with 
                                                 
 
1 For the purposes of this paper, audit “judgments” will refer to evaluations/assessments of the current state 
of affairs or the forming of an opinion. Audit “decisions” will be defined as conclusions drawn with respect 
to the issue at hand and the resulting action to be taken (Bonner 1999; Peecher and Solomon 2001).  For 
example, assessments of inherent and control risks represent judgments, and the determination of the scope 
of substantive procedures (i.e., audit budgets and programs) denotes a decision. For the purposes of 
simplicity, when discussing the audit planning process in its entirety, the word “judgment” will be used to 
describe all judgments and decisions present in the process. 
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complex AIS. In addition, while CAS are expected to be an increasing source of evidence 
for auditors in these complex and pervasive AIS environments (AICPA 2001), prior 
research has not examined the CAS/auditor relationship. More importantly, prior studies 
have typically investigated scenarios where the source of audit evidence maintained a 
similar expertise structure as the auditor (e.g., audit staff, internal auditors, client 
accounting staff). Auditors and CAS typically have different expertise structures (Curtis 
and Viator 2000; Hunton et al. 2001), and these differences could make judgments 
related to CAS evidence difficult for auditors. For example, while auditors are typically 
able to compensate for low levels of subordinate auditor competence by employing 
additional procedures themselves, auditors with limited AIS expertise may not have the 
knowledge structure to compensate for low CAS competence levels. Therefore, the 
purpose of this study is to examine how auditor AIS expertise and CAS competence 
affect auditor planning judgments in a complex AIS environment. Specifically, the study 
is designed to address the following research questions: 
 
1. In complex AIS environments, does the level of auditor AIS expertise affect 
the form and effectiveness of auditor planning judgments? 
2. Does the level of CAS competence affect auditor evaluations of CAS 
evidence reliability and related auditor judgment processes? 
3. When confronted with CAS competence deficiencies, does the level of auditor 
AIS expertise affect the form of auditor planning judgments? 
 
 
1.3  The Audit Risk Model 
  SAS No. 47 (AICPA 1983) provides the conceptual underpinning for the audit 
risk model, and its concepts permeate Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) 
(POB 2000). The auditor applies the audit risk model during the planning phase of the 
audit by making judgments concerning client risks and the scope of audit tests. Audit risk 
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(AR) is the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his or her 
opinion on financial statements that are materially misstated. Audit risk is the product of 
the following interrelated factors: 
Inherent Risk (IR) = the risk that a financial statement assertion is susceptible to a 
material misstatement, assuming there are no related controls 
 
Control Risk (CR) = the risk that the entity’s internal control structure or 
procedures will not prevent or detect, in a timely manner, a material misstatement 
which could occur in a financial statement assertion 
 
Detection Risk (DR) = the risk that the auditor will not detect a material 
misstatement that exists in a financial statement assertion 
 
Thus, the mathematical depiction of the model is AR = IR x CR x DR, with each risk 
level assessed by the auditor as a percentage of 1.0 (e.g., IR = 40% or .40). Despite the 
precision implied by the mathematical model, in reality its application is a highly 
judgmental process (Anderson and Malletta 1994; POB 2000; Wright and Bedard 2000). 
The model is generally applied in practice as follows: AR is first set by the partner in-
charge of the audit engagement at an acceptably low level (e.g., 5%). Next, IR and CR 
are assessed via the auditor’s knowledge of client operations, testing of internal controls, 
prior history with the client, etc. Lastly, given the assessed levels of IR and CR, the scope 
of planned substantive procedures (i.e., the nature, timing, and extent of substantive 
testing procedures), or DR, is adjusted by the auditor to obtain the desired level of AR 
(DR = AR / (IR x CR)). Therefore, as IR and CR increase (decrease) the auditor is 
expected to compensate with substantive procedures that are greater (lesser) in           
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scope. 2   
Two recent SASs, among other factors, have affected the way in which the model 
is applied in advanced AIS environments. First, SAS No. 80 (AICPA 1996) states that, 
with the electronic processing of transactions and the reduced reliability associated with 
the resulting audit evidence, auditors may not be able to adequately reduce detection risk 
by increasing the scope of substantive procedures. In these types of environments, it is 
suggested that the auditor focus on internal controls to determine whether they are 
designed, and in use, to assure the accuracy and reliability of data in electronic form 
(AICPA 1996). This change in focus from detection risk to control risk may be 
troublesome for auditors as, in the past, they have been hesitant to test and rely on 
internal controls and have instead focused on substantive testing to maintain a desired 
level of audit risk (Waller 1993; Haskins and Dirsmith 1995; Davis 1996). Second, SAS 
No. 94 (AICPA 2001) indicates that the utilization of CAS as a source of audit evidence, 
especially in the testing of internal controls, should increase on audit engagements where 
AIS are advanced and pervasive. Given the differences in expertise structures between 
auditors and CAS, auditor evaluations of, and reactions to, CAS evidence may become 
more complex when auditor AIS expertise is low. Lastly, the implementation and 
utilization of advanced AIS has been found to expose clients to numerous risks (e.g., lack 
of segregation of duties, business interruption). An awareness of these AIS-related risk 
                                                 
 
2 For example, if AR, IR, and CR are assessed at 5%, 35%, and 60%, respectively, then the scope of 
planned substantive procedures is designed to reduce DR to 24% (.24 = .05 / (.35 x .60)). Increasing 
(decreasing) the scope of substantive testing procedures generally reduces (increases) DR. The scope of 
substantive testing is increased by increasing the number of substantive tests and the grade of labor used 
(nature), performing substantive tests at fiscal year-end rather than at an interim date (timing), and 
increasing the budget associated with substantive tests (extent). 
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factors might increase the inherent and control risk assessments of auditors (Hunton et al. 
2001). 
 
1.4  ERP Systems and Auditor AIS Expertise 
 ERP systems are defined as “information systems packages that integrate 
information and information-based processes within and across functional areas in an 
organization” (Kumar and Hillegersberg 2000, 22). The implementation and utilization of 
ERP systems by companies represents a radical change from the legacy systems of the 
past as business functions (e.g., accounting, sales, manufacturing, etc.) are integrally 
linked through workflow automation and relational databases. ERP systems represent the 
computing environment of choice among corporations of all sizes because they have the 
potential to provide real-time data, lower operating costs, shorten cycle times (e.g., 
inventory production, financial statement preparation), and increase customer satisfaction 
(Brown 1997; O’Leary 2000; Hunton et al. 2001).  
Despite all of the positive attributes associated with ERP systems, there are 
significant risks associated with their adoption (Wright and Wright 2002). The 
complexity, level of integration, and pervasiveness of these systems often lead to 
heightened risks caused by inappropriate access, incorrect input and output, poorly 
trained personnel, business interruption, inadequate internal controls, and implementation 
problems (O’Leary 2000; Scheer and Haberman 2000; Soh et al. 2000; Hunton et al. 
2001; Wright and Wright 2002).  In general, the pervasiveness of, and increased risks 
associated with ERP systems can lead to a greater potential for financial misstatements, 
misclassifications, and defalcations, especially in the periods immediately following their 
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implementation (Gibbs and Keating 1995; Helms 1999; Lilly 1997; Manello and Rocholl 
1997; Pfenning 1999; Turner 1999; Wah 2000). The effects of these risks should be of 
concern to auditors, as professional skepticism should be exercised to achieve reasonable 
assurance that material misstatements are detected (AICPA 1988a). 
As AIS, like the accounting-related modules of ERP systems, have become more 
dominant and complex, auditors’ abilities to “audit around” the system (e.g., perform 
their audits without evaluating the reliability of the AIS) have been significantly reduced 
(Ellis 1989; AICPA 1996; Bell at al. 1998, 16; Burnaby and Klein 2000; AICPA 2001). 
ERP systems require sophisticated auditing capabilities (Lilly 1997), and a recent study 
by Hunton et al. (2001) found that AIS knowledge increases auditors’ concerns for, and 
recognition of, audit risks in an ERP setting. This increased concern and recognition are 
likely to have implications for auditors’ risk assessments and substantive planning 
decisions. 
Based on the discussion above, it is reasonable to expect that, in ERP 
environments, auditors with greater AIS expertise will assess both inherent and control 
risks at higher levels than auditors with lower expertise. Given their higher risk 
assessment levels and their superior ability to design AIS-related substantive procedures, 
auditors with higher AIS expertise should also plan substantive procedures that are 
greater in scope than auditors with lower expertise. 
 
1.5  Computer Assurance Specialist Competence 
According to SAS No. 94 (AICPA 2001), in audit engagements where a client’s 
AIS is deemed to be dominant and/or complex, the auditor should obtain the assistance of 
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one or more computer assurance specialists (CAS). In practice, CAS are typically from 
the same firm as the auditor, are considered part of the engagement team, and play a large 
role in both gaining an understanding of, and testing, the internal controls of audit clients 
with advanced AIS (Ayers and Nagy 1998; Curtis and Viator 2000; Hunton et al. 2001; 
Wright and Wright 2002). Also, the role of CAS as a source of audit evidence will likely 
increase as clients with complex and pervasive AIS become more prevalent (POB 2000).3  
The inferential value or reliability of audit evidence must always be considered in 
light of the perceived competence of its source (Hirst 1994). While a number of source 
competence studies have been conducted in the audit environment (e.g., Bamber 1983; 
Schneider 1984; Rebele et al. 1988; Anderson et al. 1994; Hirst 1994), none have 
investigated the relationship between auditors and CAS. Prior research has found that 
auditors are typically sensitive to the competence of their evidence sources and these 
competence levels affect their judgment processes (e.g., Brown 1983; Schneider 1984; 
Margheim 1986).  
While not explicitly examined in the literature, it appears that in practice there is 
variability in CAS competence. To gain additional insight into auditors’ perceptions of 
CAS competence, a survey was completed by nine audit seniors and managers from four 
offices of an international public accounting firm (see Appendix A for survey). Eight of 
the nine auditors believed that the level of CAS competence had been an issue of concern 
on their audit engagements. In addition, Hunton et al. (2001) found that auditors were 
                                                 
 
3 As discussed in SAS No. 94 (AICPA 2001), CAS are a source of audit evidence for the auditor who 
evaluates and relies on their evidence during the control risk assessment process. Specifically, CAS 
evidence is a workpaper documenting the system controls of the client, CAS tests of those controls, and the 
result of that testing (e.g., AIS controls appear reliable). 
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unlikely to engage the services of CAS in ERP environments, thus concluding that 
“auditors do not appear to recognize and respect their skills” (Hunton et al. 2001, 27). 
Given the findings of prior source competence research, and that a major role of 
CAS is to provide the auditor with assurance in relation to internal controls, it is 
reasonable to expect that auditors will be sensitive to the competence of CAS when 
evaluating their evidence and adjust their risk assessments and scope of testing 
accordingly.4 Specifically, it is expected that auditors should judge evidence provided by 
CAS with higher (lower) competence as more (less) reliable. Further, given positive 
internal control testing evidence (i.e., AIS controls appear reliable) from a more (less) 
competent CAS, auditors should assess control risk at a lower (higher) level and, in turn, 
reduce (increase) the scope of planned substantive audit procedures. 
 
1.6  CAS Competence and Auditor AIS Expertise 
One aspect of the CAS/auditor relationship that differs from virtually all prior 
source competence studies is that CAS represent a source of audit evidence with a 
different expertise structure than auditors (Curtis and Viator 2000; Hunton et al. 2001).5 
                                                 
 
4 All participants in this study will receive positive testing results from a CAS (i.e., AIS controls appear 
reliable). Inadequately discounting negative control test results from a low competence CAS would be a 
failure to reduce the assessed level of control risk. Inadequately discounting positive control test results 
from a low competence CAS would be a failure to increase the assessed level of control risk. While 
inadequately discounting negative results when CAS competence is low may impact the efficiency or the 
profitability of the audit, inadequately discounting positive results under low CAS competence may lead to 
more deleterious conditions such as audit failure (Hirst 1994). In addition, audit guidance that promotes 
professional skepticism in the audit environment (e.g., AICPA 1988a) might mitigate the discounting of 
negative testing results even when CAS competence is perceived to be low.  
5 Hirst (1994) manipulated source competence by describing the evidence source as either a specialist in an 
industry related to the evidence (test of inventory obsolescence) or not. Participants were asked to evaluate 
the inferential value of evidence provided by the specialists, but were not asked to make related judgments 
that may have challenged the knowledge structures of the auditors (e.g., prepare an audit program). 
Therefore, the effects of any variation in auditor expertise on their related source competence judgments 
could not be identified. 
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The Public Oversight Board’s (POB) recent study on audit effectiveness stressed the 
importance of CAS/auditor interactions and the role of auditor AIS expertise in these 
relationships. The POB indicated that, in advanced AIS environments, CAS and auditors 
will need to “work as a team” and auditors will need to “expand their technological 
knowledge and skills,” as they “cannot cede all technological matters” to CAS (POB 
2000, 171).  
In prior source competence investigations, where the evidence source and the 
auditor maintain similar expertise structures (e.g., audit staff, internal audit, client 
accounting personnel), little variation is expected in auditors’ abilities to perform 
additional procedures when an evidence source with low competence is encountered. For 
example, the majority of senior auditors are aware of, and competent to perform, 
additional substantive testing to substitute for inadequate tests performed by an assistant 
with low competence. Given a specified level of CAS competence, the size of the 
expertise gap between the evidence source (CAS) and the evidence examiner (auditor) is 
dependent on the auditor’s level of AIS expertise. As the AIS gap between the CAS and 
the auditor widens (i.e., lower auditor AIS expertise), it becomes less likely that the 
auditor will have the ability to compensate for perceived CAS competence deficiencies 
(i.e., inadequate control testing).6 Auditors with low self-assessed AIS expertise may be 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
6 The strength of internal control tests should be affected by the competence of CAS (Bamber 1983; Hirst 
1994). Thus, the strength of internal control tests, one factor in determining the internal control risk 
assessment (Libby et al. 1985; Maletta and Kida 1993), will be manipulated between participants in this 
study via exposing them to either low or high CAS competence. The results of control tests (e.g., AIS 
controls appear reliable), an additional factor that affects internal control risk assessments (Libby et al. 
1985; Maletta and Kida 1993), will be kept constant between all groups (i.e., all participants will receive 
positive control testing results from CAS). See footnote 4 for further explanation. While prior research has 
shown that auditors are extremely sensitive to the results of internal controls tests (e.g., Dusenbury et al. 
2000), little is known about how auditors use information about strength of tests (Reimers et al. 1993).  
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more apt to rely on CAS evidence and not increase internal control risk assessment levels 
or expand the scope of planned substantive procedures. Auditors with higher AIS 
expertise, on the other hand, may be more likely to act on CAS competence deficiencies 
(i.e., increase control risk assessment levels and the scope of planned substantive 
procedures) because they are better able to plan and competently perform the additional 
audit procedures required to compensate for the deficiencies. In conditions where CAS 
competence is high, the positive effect of auditor AIS expertise on planning judgments is 
expected to lessen, as it is more appropriate to rely on CAS evidence in this condition 
(Bamber 1983; Hirst 1994). 
Within advanced AIS environments, auditors will find it necessary to fully 
understand the risks associated with these systems and the controls needed to respond to 
those risks (POB 2000). Prior auditor expertise research has shown that domain-specific 
expertise, determined by the nature of auditor experience and training, improves the 
domain-specific performances of auditors (Bonner 1990; Bonner and Lewis 1990). With 
respect to the domain of AIS expertise, Hunton et al. (2001) found that AIS knowledge 
positively affects auditors’ concerns for, and recognition of, audit risks in an ERP setting.  
The above discussion suggests an interaction between CAS competence and 
auditor AIS expertise. The differences between high AIS expertise auditors’ and low AIS 
expertise auditors’ control risk assessments will be greater when CAS competence is low 
than when it is high. Also, the differences between high AIS expertise auditors’ and low 
AIS expertise auditors’ scope of substantive tests will be greater when CAS competence 
is low than when it is high. See Figure 1 for a graph depicting this interaction. Also, in 
complex AIS settings (e.g., ERP systems), higher levels of auditor AIS expertise should 
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improve the quality of their risk assessments and, in turn, the effectiveness of their 
substantive planning decisions.   
 
1.7  Overview of the Study 
While auditors’ interactions with complex AIS and CAS play a critical role in 
determining the effectiveness of audits (POB 2000), little prior research has examined 
these topics. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of CAS competence and 
auditor AIS expertise on auditor planning judgments in an advanced AIS environment. 
Prior source competence studies have typically examined auditors’ evaluations of 
evidence reliability, and their related judgments, in response to evidence sources with 
similar expertise structures to those of auditors. Under such circumstances, compensating 
for source competence deficiencies is typically not a complex task for the auditor. Given 
a specified level of CAS competence, the size of the expertise gap between the CAS and 
the auditor is determined by the individual auditor’s level of AIS expertise. Variation in 
knowledge gaps between CAS and auditors likely results in a more complex relationship 
than those previously examined.  Additionally, while a number of studies have 
investigated the application of the audit risk model, none have examined this judgment 
process in a complex AIS environment where auditor AIS expertise may significantly 
affect this procedure.  
Through the use of a quasi-experimental case, auditors were placed in an 
environment where a complex AIS system related to a transaction cycle (sales and 
accounts receivable cycle) had been implemented in the current year. In the case, a CAS 
was assigned to assist the auditor in gaining an understanding of, and testing, the controls 
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related to the transaction cycle. The competence of the CAS was manipulated as high and 
low between auditors. Auditors’ self-reported AIS expertise levels were measured via a 
post-experimental questionnaire. The auditors were required to make several planning 
judgments based on the evidence provided in the case. Hypotheses were developed 
regarding the effects of both CAS competence and auditor AIS expertise on planning 
judgments in an advanced AIS environment. Possible implications of this study include 
the identification of AIS-related risks and auditor AIS expertise as important factors in 
explaining auditor planning judgments and the illustration of the complexities 
surrounding CAS/auditor interactions. 
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         CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter reviews several areas of literature to develop a framework for 
studying the effects of computer assurance specialist (CAS) competence and auditor 
accounting information system (AIS) expertise on auditor planning judgments. The 
second section of this chapter reviews the audit guidance related to the audit risk model 
and the relevant literature investigating its application. The third section examines the 
extant literature devoted to audit risks associated with enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems. The fourth and fifth sections discuss the role of CAS competence and auditor 
AIS expertise, respectively, within advanced AIS settings. 
 
2.2  The Audit Risk Model 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 47 (AICPA 1983) provides the 
conceptual underpinning for the audit risk model and its concepts permeate Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards, or GAAS (POB 2000). The model serves as the major 
conceptual framework for the audit process (Akresh et al. 1988; Cushing et al. 1995; 
Messier and Austen 2000), and a considerable amount of research has studied auditors’ 
applications of the model (e.g., Haskins and Dirsmith 1993; Mock and Wright 1993; 
Waller 1993; Davis 1996; Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997; Messier and Austen 2000; 
Wright and Bedard 2000). How auditors apply the audit risk model, through the 
assessment of client risks and the design of substantive testing procedures, substantially 
influences the effectiveness and efficiency of an audit (Mock and Wright 1993). In 
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addition, two relatively recent Statements on Auditing Standards, SAS No. 80 (AICPA 
1996) and No. 94 (AICPA 2001), have changed the ways in which the model is applied in 
advanced AIS environments. 
The audit risk model, as described in SAS No. 47 (AICPA 1983), operationalizes 
a risk-based approach to selecting the amount of substantive testing necessary for an 
audit to be effective and efficient (Dusenbury et al. 2000). The auditor applies the model 
during the planning/internal control evaluation phase of the audit (i.e., pre-substantive 
testing). Audit risk (AR) is the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately 
modify his or her opinion on financial statements that are materially misstated. Audit risk 
is the product of the following interrelated factors: 
Inherent Risk (IR) = the risk that a financial statement assertion is susceptible to a 
material misstatement, assuming there are no related controls 
 
Control Risk (CR) = the risk that the entity’s internal control structure or 
procedures will not prevent or detect, in a timely manner, a material misstatement 
which could occur in a financial statement assertion 
 
Detection Risk (DR) = the risk that the auditor will not detect a material 
misstatement that exists in a financial statement assertion 
 
Thus, the mathematical depiction of the model is AR = IR x CR x DR, with each 
risk level assessed by the auditor as a percentage of 1.0 (e.g., IR = 40% or .40). The 
model is applied in practice by the auditor first setting AR at an acceptably low level 
(e.g., 5%). Next, IR and CR are assessed via the auditor’s knowledge of client operations, 
testing of internal controls, prior history with the client, etc. Lastly, given the assessed 
levels of IR and CR, DR or the scope of planned substantive procedures is adjusted by 
the auditor to obtain the desired level of AR (i.e., DR = AR / (IR x CR)). For example, if 
AR, IR, and CR are assessed at 5%, 35%, and 60%, respectively, then the scope of 
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planned substantive procedures is designed to reduce DR to 24% (i.e., .24 = .05 / (.35 x 
.60)). Increasing (Decreasing) the scope of substantive testing procedures generally 
reduces (increases) DR. Therefore, as IR and CR increase (decrease) the auditor is 
expected to compensate with substantive procedures that are greater (lesser) in scope 
(POB 2000).7 
Despite the precision implied by the mathematical model, in reality its application 
is a highly judgmental process (Anderson and Malletta 1994; POB 2000; Wright and 
Bedard 2000). The Public Oversight Board’s (POB) recent study on audit effectiveness 
provides some insight as to how the audit risk model is applied in practice (POB 2000). 
The objective of the POB’s Panel on Audit Effectiveness (Panel) was to review and 
evaluate the way actual audits are performed. According to the Panel’s report, prior to 
SAS No. 47 (AICPA 1983), many auditors employed some of the audit risk model in 
practice despite the lack of an explicit model embedded in GAAS. Still, audits tended to 
be conducted with a focus on substantive tests with less reliance on risk judgments. After 
the issuance of SAS No. 47, the Panel found evidence that many audits continued to use a 
substantive testing approach, while “defaulting” to an assumption that risks were at a 
maximum level (POB 2000, 178). As indicated in the discussion of SAS No. 80 (AICPA 
1996) and No. 94 (AICPA 2001) below, such a lack of consideration given to the risk 
assessment process may be insufficient in environments where the electronic processing 
of transactions may reduce the reliability of evidence used in substantive tests. The 
Panel’s report suggests that some firms are making changes in their audit methodologies 
                                                 
 
7 For example, if control risk associated with the sales/accounts receivable cycle is assessed at a higher 
level in the current year in comparison to the prior year, ceteris paribus, the auditor may consider increasing 
the number of accounts receivable confirmations tested in the current year over that of the prior year (POB 
2000). 
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to more sufficiently incorporate risk. Overall, the Panel concluded that the audit risk 
model was appropriate, although they perceived that it might need to be enhanced, 
updated, and implemented by auditors more consistently.  
 Academic research has examined the application of the audit risk model through 
the use of archival, survey, and experimental methods. In addition, and with few 
exceptions, these descriptive studies have either focused on auditors’ assessments of 
inherent and control risks or preparations of audit programs and budgets (i.e., planned 
substantive procedures). This literature has also typically attempted to gain an 
understanding of the factors that affect auditors’ applications of the audit risk model. This 
study examines the application of the audit risk model from risk assessment to the 
planning of substantive tests in a complex AIS environment.  
2.2.1  Risk Assessment  
 There has been a limited amount of research that has investigated auditors’ risk 
assessments utilizing either archival or survey methods. Houghton and Fogarty (1991), 
through the results of an error survey of 480 audits, analyzed the relationship between 
inherent risk assessments and auditor financial statement adjustments. The objective of 
the study was to determine the environmental characteristics and other factors that would 
enable auditors to properly identify areas of high inherent risk during the planning 
process. The results of the study provide evidence that non-systematically processed 
transactions have a greater likelihood of error than systematically processed transactions. 
Also, auditors with a greater knowledge of their client’s operations were more likely to 
identify inherent risks in those audit areas having the greatest risk of error. This second 
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finding represents the first empirical support for the positive effect of domain-specific 
expertise on auditors’ risk assessment processes.  
Similar to Houghton and Fogarty (1991), Wallace and Kreutzfeldt (1995) 
measured client attributes tied to inherent and control risks and then evaluated the 
effectiveness of these attributes in explaining audit adjustments. Client attribute data was 
obtained via survey, while adjustment data was acquired from actual workpapers. The 
results of this study were consistent with that of Houghton and Fogarty, showing support 
for a significant joint effect of inherent and control risks on client error rates. 
 Waller (1993) represents an empirical study that examined applications of the 
audit risk model in field settings. The paper reports the results from a statistical analysis 
of auditors’ inherent and control risk assessments drawn from actual audit workpapers. 
Contrary to expectations suggested by a priori research that inherent and control risk 
assessments are statistically dependent on one-another (e.g., Cushing and Loebbecke 
1983), Waller found that the empirical evidence supported an insignificant association 
between these risk assessments in practice. The data also provides a description of the 
form of auditors’ risk assessments. On average, auditors assessed inherent risk at 
moderate levels while control risks were generally assessed as high (more than 80 percent 
of the sample placed no reliance on controls).   
 While the results of Waller (1993) support the belief that the assessments of 
inherent and control risk are statistically independent judgments made by the auditor, the 
findings of Haskins and Dirsmith (1995) suggest that auditors use the same 
environmental factors in both risk assessments. Haskins and Dirsmith surveyed auditors 
with respect to the relevance of 48 client attributes to both their inherent and control risk 
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assessments. Contrary to the definition of inherent risk which assumes the existence of no 
related controls (AICPA 1983), several of the top-ranked control risk factors were also 
noted as highly relevant to the assessment of inherent risk by the survey participants. 
Similar to Waller, Haskins and Dirsmith found auditors to often place an insufficient 
reliance on risk assessments (i.e., over-reliance on substantive testing). Their survey 
suggested that while auditors were predominately sensitive to unfavorable control 
conditions, they were unlikely to reduce the scope of planned audit procedures when 
provided with favorable inherent and control risk information. 
 Unlike the limited amount of studies that have used archival or survey data to 
examine the risk assessment process, many researchers have used experimental methods 
to study this process. Colbert (1988) was the first study designed to examine auditor risk 
judgments, specifically the assessment of inherent risk. Prior research relating risk factors 
to financial statement errors had shown the identification of inherent risk factors to be a 
difficult task (e.g., Willingham and Wright 1984; Ham et al. 1985). Colbert manipulated 
four risk factors as high and low to determine their effects on auditor inherent risk 
assessments. All four risk factors (turnover of the controller, financing pressure, 
accounting system complexity, and quality of accounting personnel) were important to 
auditors when providing inherent risk assessments, with the quality of accounting 
personnel having the most significant effect. 
 Reimers et al. (1993) investigated whether the form of the control risk assessment 
itself, either linguistic or numerical, affects the assessments of auditors provided with the 
same environmental risk factors. While SAS No. 47 (AICPA 1983) treats the two 
response modes as equivalents, the results of this experiment did not support this 
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premise. Specifically, auditors utilizing a numerical scale provided lower assessments 
than those using a linguistic scale, and there was a higher level of consensus (a surrogate 
for accuracy in this study) among auditors who used the linguistic scale. This finding was 
consistent across both high and low risk environments. The implication of this finding is 
that the level and accuracy of risk assessments, regardless of risk level, may be dependent 
on the form of the assessment measure. 
 Building on the source reliability literature (e.g., Brown 1983; Schneider 1984; 
Margheim 1986), Maletta (1993) examined the impact of inherent risk on auditors’ 
decisions to use internal auditors. This study’s results showed that auditors combine 
inherent risk levels and the source objectivity (reliability) of the internal auditor when 
deciding whether to use the internal auditor. Such processing was consistent with the 
findings of Brown and Solomon (1990) who found the presence of configural decision-
making in a control risk assessment task. Maletta ascertained that when inherent risk 
levels were high, auditors were appropriately sensitive to the objectivity of internal 
auditors (i.e., more likely to use a high objectivity source of audit evidence). On the other 
hand, when inherent risk conditions were low, the objectivity level of the internal 
auditors did not impact the amount of reliance auditors placed on this evidence source.  
Maletta and Kida (1993) continued this stream of research, investigating the joint 
effect of inherent and control risk levels on auditors’ source reliability judgments (i.e., 
reliance on internal audit to reduce planned audit work). Similar to Maletta (1993), 
Maletta and Kida documented that auditors’ source reliability judgments can be quite 
complex when elements of the risk environment are explicitly considered. Their results 
indicated that inherent and control risk levels interact to affect auditors’ decisions to rely 
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on internal auditors. Under high inherent risk conditions, auditors were more likely (less 
likely) to use internal audit if control risk levels were low (high). Under low inherent risk 
conditions, the decision to use internal audit was unaffected by the control risk level. In 
addition, under both higher inherent and control risk conditions, auditors were more apt 
to consider all of the components of source reliability provided to them (i.e., objectivity, 
competence, and work performed). The results of Maletta (1993) and Maletta and Kida 
(1993) provide evidence that auditors are sensitive to the reliability of their evidence 
sources during the planning phase of the audit, and their sensitivity increases in higher 
risk scenarios. 
 Anderson and Maletta (1994) studied whether experience played a role in 
auditors’ control risk assessments. They found that experience affected auditor 
attendance to information during the control risk assessment process, with less 
experienced auditors attending to more negative information. Interestingly, while the less 
experienced auditors (audit staff vs. audit seniors) attended to more negative information, 
their control risk assessments did not differ from the more experienced group. Davis 
(1996) also investigated how experience affects the control risk assessment process. The 
findings of this study demonstrated that greater experience might lead to a higher level of 
selective attention to relevant information, but not to greater assessment accuracy. In 
Davis’ experiment, regardless of information cues provided, both the experienced and the 
inexperienced tended to not (a) rely on controls and (b) audit through the computer. 
Nevertheless, the results of these two studies do suggest that experience or expertise may 
play a significant role in auditors’ applications of the audit risk model. 
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 The research question investigated by both Anderson and Maletta (1999) and 
Monroe and Ng (2000) was whether auditors’ applications of the audit risk model are 
subject to order effects. Anderson and Maletta found auditors to be susceptible to order 
effects, specifically primacy effects, when preparing budgets only under low inherent risk 
conditions. Higher inherent risk conditions appeared to increase auditor effort, thus 
mitigating the effect of these biases. In their study of inherent risk assessments, Monroe 
and Ng found that the judgment was not affected by the order of information provided to 
the auditors. In addition, and similar to other studies (e.g., Davis 1996), Monroe and Ng 
noted that their results suggest that auditors’ judgments of risk may be biased towards 
conservatism (i.e., higher risk assessment levels). 
 The existence of a conditional dependency between inherent and control risks has 
been the subject of both archival and survey research (Waller 1993; Haskins and 
Dirsmith 1995). This prior research has found evidence to both support and reject such a 
conditional relationship. Both Messier and Austen (2000) and Dusenbury et al. (2000) 
attempted to investigate this research question utilizing experimental methods and found 
evidence to support the dependence assumption. The auditors in Messier and Austen’s 
experiment used both pervasive and account-specific inherent and control risk factors in 
both their inherent and control risk assessments. The results of that study also indicated a 
significant positive correlation between the auditors’ inherent and control risk 
assessments. Similarly, Dusenbury et al. found conditional dependencies between 
auditors’ inherent and control assessments. Specifically, audit risk model judgments 
explained “down stream” or subsequent judgments (e.g., inherent risk levels explained 
control risk levels, control risk levels explained substantive planning decisions, etc.). 
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2.2.2  Planned Substantive Procedures 
  Much like the research devoted to gaining a greater understanding of the risk 
assessment process, researchers have used archival, survey, and experimental measures to 
investigate the planning of substantive procedures.  After assessing audit, inherent, and 
control risk levels, auditors attempt to formulate an appropriate, cost-effective substantive 
testing strategy for a particular client via program planning and budgeting (Libby et al. 
1985; Kaplan 1985; Mock and Wright 1993). Mock and Wright’s (1993) exploratory 
study examined the relationship between assessed risks and substantive planning 
decisions and provided a great deal of insight into this process. Utilizing risk 
assessments, audit programs, and budgets extracted from actual workpapers, the data 
revealed moderate cross-sectional risk variation accompanied with little change in the 
nature of evidence gathered (e.g., types of substantive tests). Instead, the extent of tests 
(e.g., preparing a smaller or larger budget for a substantive test) appeared to be the 
primary mechanism used to mitigate variation in risk. Additional findings of this study 
included a significant reliance by auditors on prior year risk assessments (i.e., anchoring) 
when performing current year assessments and, for 41% of the engagements in the 
sample, a change of information system was associated with a shift in risk assessment. 
 Via a survey of audit partners in-charge of a sample of 1,000 audits, O’Keefe et 
al. (1994) examined the empirical relationship between client characteristics and the 
nature and mix of labor resources used on audits (i.e., the number of hours required and 
the rank of employee performing the audit procedures). Results of the study indicated that 
client size, complexity, and business/inherent risks explained approximately 80% of the 
cross-sectional variation in audit hours. Client size and the risk measures were also 
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associated with significant changes in the mix of labor inputs (e.g., level of staff used for 
specific substantive tests). Lastly, auditor reliance on client controls seemed to have no 
systematic effects on either the level or mix of audit labor inputs. Utilizing similar 
methods to those of O’Keefe et al., Hackenbrack and Kneckel (1997) found that client 
size, complexity, and risk were generally positively associated with both the amount of 
audit hours and the grade of labor used in audits. Positive relationships between the 
above client characteristics and the nature of audit testing performed were also noted in 
the study. In addition, their results pointed to no association between control reliance and 
audit effort. The findings of these studies indicate the importance of measuring audit 
programs/budgets that are disaggregated by substantive test and the rank of auditor 
assigned to the task. Also, and contrary to the guidance set forth by SAS No. 47 (AICPA 
1983), auditors appeared to not adjust detection risk appropriately (i.e., reduce the scope 
of substantive procedures) when a control reliance strategy was adopted. 
 Gist and Davidson (1999) provide an excellent summary of the literature devoted 
to the study of audit budgets. According to the researchers, prior studies have shown that 
the factors that impact audit budgets can be classified into four categories: client, audit 
firm, environmental, and individual auditor. The size, complexity, and risk associated 
with a client have been shown to have a major, positive effect on the number of hours 
needed to complete audits (O’Keefe et al, 1994; Davidson and Gist 1996). Audit firm 
factors include such variables as size of firm (Francis 1984) and the type and level of 
audit technology used (McDaniel 1990; Gist 1994). Budgets have also been shown to be 
influenced by such environmental factors as the economy (Kaplan 1985) and competition 
(Marxen 1990; Maher et al. 1992). Lastly, the characteristics of the individual auditor that 
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appear to influence budgets include their experience and expertise (Bedard 1991) and 
attitude toward risk (Poneman 1992). Clearly, prior research has provided ample 
evidence that the preparation of audit budgets is a complex and multi-faceted activity. 
 The objective of Gist and Davidson’s (1999) archival study, which used data from 
actual workpapers of several international accounting firms, was to investigate the effect 
of client factors on the achievement of audit budgets. Similar to research studying 
planned and actual audit hours (e.g., Davidson and Gist 1996; O’Keefe et al, 1994), 
results indicated that the client characteristics of size, complexity, and risk appeared to 
positively explain deviations of actual audit hours from audit time budgets. The authors 
also point to the interesting finding that the audit budgets in their sample seemed to be 
relatively inaccurate when compared to actual hours recorded. This latter result suggests 
that effective budget setting is a difficult task in the audit environment and, as 
documented by Bedard (1991), auditor expertise may play a significant role in this 
process. 
 Experimental research has investigated research questions relating to both the 
audit program and budget preparation processes of auditors. Margheim (1986) examined 
auditors’ reactions to the source reliability levels of internal auditors by measuring the 
nature and extent of planned substantive procedures. Auditors reduced planned audit 
hours if the internal auditor had a high level of competence, but they did not alter their 
tests in response to changes in the degree of internal auditor objectivity. Thus, variation 
in the source competence of an evidence provider may impact the budgets of auditors 
utilizing that evidence source.  
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 Houston (1999) experimentally examined the joint effects of fee pressure and 
client risk on auditors’ risk assessments and audit budgets. Consistent with hypotheses, 
these two factors interacted, with auditors being less responsive (e.g., fewer budgeted 
hours) to increased client risk in the face of fee pressure. Contrary to audit guidance 
(AICPA 1983), this result documents evidence that the application of the audit risk model 
is often a function of non-risk factors. 
 Utilizing verbal protocol, Wright and Bedard (2000) investigated how variation in 
inherent risk factors affected auditors’ inherent risk assessments and their development of 
audit programs. Their paper was motivated by the lack of studies investigating the entire 
planning process: from risk analysis, through risk assessments, and finally to the planning 
of substantive procedures. Some prior research had unexpectedly found little to no 
association between risk factors and auditors’ planning judgments (e.g., Wright and 
Wright 1997; Zimbleman 1997). The authors also wanted to examine the variation in 
auditors’ awareness of risks, interpretation of risks, and abilities to appropriately adapt 
the audit plan found in prior studies. Wright and Bedard tested the effect of domain-
specific expertise on the strength of the link between risk factors and planning judgments. 
The researchers used verbal protocol methods on a small sample of auditors to explore 
these issues. Overall, results supported significant links among the planning stages of risk 
recognition, risk assessment, and substantive planning. The findings of the study suggest 
a positive effect of domain-specific expertise on the effectiveness of auditors’ planning 
judgments. For example, more experienced auditors incorporated the high complexity 
and judgmental nature of an accounting system into their planning judgments, while less 
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experienced auditors failed to do so. In addition, increased risk factors were found to 
affect the nature of planned tests, but not the extent.  
 Because auditor planning judgments are often made under ambiguous 
circumstances, Guess et al. (2000) attempted to study the role of ambiguity on auditors’ 
consideration of risk factors and their subsequent determinations of audit budgets. The 
results revealed that both risk and ambiguity have a significant effect on auditors’ 
budgets, but the effect of ambiguity was limited to scenarios with lower control and 
inherent risk levels. According to the authors, the effect of ambiguity is possibly 
mitigated in high risk scenarios because of the conservative bias found among auditors in 
prior research (e.g., Smith and Kida 1991; McMillan and White 1993). One other unique 
attribute of this study is that one of the inherent/control risk factors manipulated was the 
effect of new client accounting software on client operations. Given the significant, direct 
effect of risk factors on audit budgets, their study provides some evidence that auditors 
are sensitive to the risk factors associated with changing accounting information systems.  
 Bierstaker and Wright (2000) point to other factors that may affect auditors’ 
application of the audit risk model. In their experiment, these researchers manipulated 
partner preferences between audit effectiveness and efficiency in a high-risk client 
environment and examined their effects on the budgeting and program decisions of 
auditors. Consistent with expectations, auditors budgeted more (fewer) hours in response 
to a partner preference for effectiveness (efficiency). In addition, there was a significant 
interaction between auditors’ risk assessments and partner preferences. Analysis of the 
interaction suggests that that a positive relationship between risk assessments and 
planned substantive procedures existed only in the condition when there was a partner 
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preference for effectiveness. The results of this study provide further evidence that 
factors not explicitly documented in SAS No. 47 (AICPA 1983) may affect auditors’ 
applications of the audit risk model. 
 In summary, prior research investigating the audit risk model has provided some 
descriptive evidence of auditors applying the model in accordance with the guidance set 
forth by SAS No.47 (AICPA 1983). More importantly, a review of this literature also 
shows that, when assessing risks and planning substantive procedures, factors excluded 
from the audit risk model appear to affect auditors’ planning judgments. In addition, there 
is a dearth of research that has investigated the entire risk model application: from risk 
analysis, through risk assessment, and to the planning of substantive procedures. Prior 
research has typically studied either the beginning or the end of this process. Lastly, this 
research stream has yet to fully consider the impact of complex, computerized, and 
pervasive AIS on the risk model application process. As described below, recent audit 
guidance has attempted to provide direction to auditors in advanced AIS environments. 
2.2.3  New Auditing Standards 
 Two recent Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) have affected the ways in 
which the audit risk model is applied in advanced AIS environments. First, SAS No. 80 
(AICPA 1996), which amended SAS No. 31 (1980), changes the way in which risk is 
handled in an electronic environment.  Specifically, SAS No. 80 states that with the 
electronic processing of transactions and the reduced reliability associated with the 
resulting audit evidence, auditors may not be able to reduce detection risk adequately by 
increasing the scope of substantive procedures. Most of the auditors’ work in forming an 
opinion on financial statements consists of obtaining and evaluating evidential matter. In 
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advanced AIS settings, it is suggested that the auditor should focus on internal controls to 
determine whether they are designed, and in use, to assure the accuracy and reliability of 
data in electronic form. This change in focus from detection risk to control risk may be 
troublesome for auditors as, in the past, they have been hesitant to test and rely on 
internal controls and have instead focused on substantive testing to maintain a desired 
level of audit risk (e.g., Waller 1993; Haskins and Dirsmith 1995; Davis 1996). Also, 
SAS No. 80 requires auditors to consider the time during which electronic (vs. hard copy) 
information exists or is available when determining the nature, timing, and extent of 
substantive testing. 
Second, SAS No. 94 (AICPA 2001), which amended SAS No. 55 (AICPA 
1988b), indicates that the utilization of computer assurance specialists (CAS) as a source 
of audit evidence should increase on audit engagements where AIS are complex and 
pervasive. These specialists should be used by the auditor to gain an understanding of, 
and test, AIS-related controls. An auditor who uses such a specialist should follow the 
supervision guidance set forth by SAS No. 22 (AICPA 1978). As members of the 
engagement team, CAS require the same degree of supervision and review as any 
assistant. However, unlike auditors and their assistants, prior research has documented 
differences in expertise structures between auditors and CAS (Curtis and Viator 2000; 
Hunton et al. 2001). These differences could make judgments related to CAS evidence 
difficult for auditors. For example, while auditors are typically able to compensate for 
low levels of subordinate auditor competence by employing additional procedures 
themselves, auditors with limited AIS expertise may not have the knowledge structure to 
compensate for low CAS competence levels. Similar to SAS No. 80, this SAS requires 
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the auditor to consider the possible ineffectiveness of an audit strategy that assesses 
control risk at maximum and performs only substantive tests in advanced AIS settings.   
 
2.3  ERP Systems and Auditor AIS Expertise 
 Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems are defined as “information systems 
packages that integrate information and information-based processes within and across 
functional areas in an organization” (Kumar and Hillegersberg 2000, 22). These systems 
have become the information technology of choice among companies of all sizes because 
they have the potential to provide real-time data, lower operating costs, shorten cycle 
times (e.g., inventory production, financial statement preparation), and increase customer 
satisfaction (Brown 1997; O’Leary 2000; Hunton et al. 2001). Over the past decade, 
corporations have experienced both successful and disastrous ERP implementations and 
the benefits, complexities, and risks of ERP systems have been documented in the 
popular press (Wright 2001). Also, a limited amount of academic research has 
investigated the effects of ERP systems on issues of concern to auditors (e.g., internal 
controls). This research suggests that the level of auditor accounting information system 
(AIS) expertise may significantly influence their planning judgments in ERP 
environments (e.g., Hunton et al. 2001). Lastly, ERP systems may induce auditors to rely 
on the heuristic of anchoring and adjustment to cope with the complexities of these 
systems. The utilization of this heuristic during planning judgments may also be 
dependent on the auditor’s level of AIS expertise (Joyce and Biddle 1981; Monroe and 
Ng 2000). 
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2.3.1  ERP Systems: Benefits, Complexities, and Risks 
 “ERP systems are computer-based systems designed to process an organization’s 
transactions and facilitate integrated and real-time planning, production and customer 
response” (O’Leary 2000, 27). These systems are composed of various types of 
application modules (e.g., accounting, materials management, sales and distribution, 
etc.), with the objective of optimizing business functions by connecting business 
processes and technology (Helms 1999). Other characteristics of ERP systems include 
their ability to facilitate process reengineering, process accounting transactions, and 
automate manufacturing processes (Brown 1997; Moore and Warrick 1998; O’Leary 
2000).  
The major vendors of ERP systems are SAP, Oracle, PeopleSoft, and JD Edwards 
(Brown 1997). ERP systems represent a significant change from the legacy systems of 
the past, and are typically implemented and customized to companies’ business processes 
over a one to five year period with the assistance of consultants (Brown 1997; Scheer and 
Haberman 2000; Hanseth et al. 2001). The costs of such implementations represent one 
of the most expensive capital outlays for corporations, with the combined cost of the 
system and its implementation sometimes exceeding $100 million (Brown 1997). In 
1999, 70% of the Fortune 1000 firms had either implemented or planned to implement 
ERP systems in the near future (Cerullo and Cerullo 2000). Also, large corporations are 
not the only organizations implementing ERP systems. Midmarket companies, with 
annual revenues between $50 to $500 million, have gravitated towards ERP systems to 
plan and manage their operations (Stein and Carrillo 1998; Stein 1998). 
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The recent explosion in the number of ERP adoptions has been a result of the 
numerous benefits these systems provide to the companies that implement them.8 
Hammer’s (1990) highly influential article on reengineering sparked the corporate 
world’s interest in obliterating existing processes and replacing them with more efficient 
processes. ERP systems provide the primary tool for guiding these efforts (O’Leary 
2000). Hammer (1997) has stated that “ERP systems equal forced reengineering” and 
Gendron (1996) calls ERP systems the “electronic embodiment of reengineering.” Under 
legacy systems, the production of some system data and reports took days or weeks. ERP 
systems offer the advantage of providing and disseminating information online and in 
real time. ERP systems allow for simultaneous access to data across business functions 
via the use of a single database, with data entered only once at the transaction source. For 
example, shipping transactions are entered by the shipping department when goods are 
shipped (Cerullo and Cerullo 2000; O’Leary 2000). These systems thus allow for a more 
timely analysis of information and, as a result, more effective decision-making (Wagle 
1998). ERP systems also incorporate best practices or the best ways of performing 
processes. For example, SAP’s R/3 system includes over one thousand of these practices. 
ERP vendors obtain these best practices from prior implementation experiences and 
learning from the best ways their clients manage their processes. Thus, as new best 
practices are found and embedded each year, current/later adopters of ERP systems 
benefit from this wealth of stored knowledge (O’Leary 2000). 
                                                 
 
8 O’Leary (2000) provides a more detailed and exhaustive summary of the benefits of ERP implementation. 
These other benefits include, but are not limited to: being the first dominant corporate application of client-
server computing, integrating firm activities, standardizing the organization, eliminating information 
asymmetries, and facilitating intra and inter-organizational communication and collaboration.  
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While offering many benefits, ERP systems are extremely complex (Hunton 
2002), needing teams of consultants to implement and maintain them (Brown 1997). 
According to Soh et al. (2000), the complexities of ERP implementations include cross-
module integrations, data standardization, adoption of best practices, compressed 
implementation schedules, and the involvement of a large number of stakeholders (e.g., 
consultants, IT personnel, internal and external auditors). As such, ERP systems require 
extensive training and expertise from those involved with their use (Torode 1998). With 
respect to auditors who service clients with ERP systems, the complexities of these 
systems currently represent a challenge to their knowledge structures, as sophisticated 
audit skills are required in these settings (Lilly 1997). For example, the change from a 
paper to an electronic audit trail may require the auditor to use computer-assisted audit 
methods (Helms 1999). Auditors will need to expand their technological knowledge and 
skills in order to perform effective and efficient audits in such advanced AIS 
environments (POB 2000; Kinney 2001). 
The pervasiveness of, and increased risks associated with ERP systems can lead 
to a greater potential for financial misstatements, misclassifications, defalcations, and 
internal control problems, especially in the periods immediately following their 
implementation (Gibbs and Keating 1995; Helms 1999; Lilly 1997; Manello and Rocholl 
1997; Pfenning 1999; Turner 1999; Cerullo and Cerullo 2000; Wah 2000). The effects of 
these risks should be of concern to auditors, as professional skepticism should be 
exercised to achieve reasonable assurance that material misstatements are detected during 
their audits (AICPA 1988). ERP-specific inherent and control risks that have been 
documented in the popular press and the research literature include a decreased level of 
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system security requiring the implementation/integration of additional internal control 
packages (Turner 1999). Also, a recent longitudinal survey indicated substantial increases 
in the use of computer technology by businesses between 1988 and 1998, but the lack of 
a corresponding increase in the amount of internal auditor time devoted to system design 
and controls (Burnaby and Klein 2000). These integrated and automated systems also 
remove traditional internal controls such as segregation of duties and supervisory review 
(Moore and Warrick 1998; Weinberg 1998). Lastly, there are increased possibilities of 
material misstatements being entered into the system as lack of employee training is a 
significant issue in ERP settings (Glover et al. 1999; O’Leary 2000; Ferrando 2001).9 In 
summary, while providing many benefits, ERP implementations are fraught with risk. 
Given the complexities of these systems, one might expect that the level of auditor AIS 
expertise may play a role in their risk analyses and assessments.  
2.3.2  Auditing ERP Systems 
 There has been a limited amount of academic literature that has studied the effects 
of ERP systems on various aspects of financial statement audits. Wright and Wright 
(2002) represents an exploratory study that attempted to gain an understanding of the 
unique audit risks associated with the implementation and operation of ERP systems. 
This investigation was motivated by the study of Bell et al. (1998), which found 
significant variations in the frequency and causes of error in computerized AIS versus 
                                                 
 
9 A more comprehensive list of ERP-related risks would include: implementation failures/problems (Scheer 
and Habermann 2000; Girard and Farmer 1999; Greenemeier 2001; Glover et al. 1999), an electronic audit 
trail (Helms 1999), inadequate testing of systems, reduction in internal controls (Cerullo and Cerullo 2000), 
integration of systems (Hanseth et al. 2001; Romeo 2001), improper transferal of legacy files to the ERP 
system (Turek 1998), outsourcing ERP services (Greenemeier 2001), the use of implementation consultants 
unaware of client reporting/control issues (Cameron and Meyer 1998; Glover et al. 1999), the risk exposure 
due to the linking of systems with suppliers and customers (Helms and Mancino 1999), and the lack of 
internal audit involvement in the implementation process (Glover et al. 1999). 
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manual systems. Wright and Wright used semi-structured interviews with experienced 
information systems auditors (i.e., CAS) to examine risk issues in ERP environments. 
The results of the interviews indicated that the “implementation process of ERP systems 
has an important impact on system reliability” (Wright and Wright 2002, 2). In addition, 
several implementation risks were explicitly cited by the specialists including improperly 
trained personnel, compromised controls (e.g., inadequate access controls), and poorly 
executed data conversions/interfaces with legacy systems. The authors conclude that ERP 
implementations, if not performed properly, avail themselves to heightened risks that are 
of concern to auditors (i.e., inherent and control risks). Given the exploratory nature of 
this study, the authors also note additional research is needed to evaluate the impact of 
ERP utilization on audit services.  
 In a recent study, Grabski et al. (2002) investigated the relationships between 
risks, controls, and the success of ERP implementations. The paper examined whether 
groups of complementary controls, versus single/substitutable modes of control, need to 
be employed when implementing ERP systems. Chief information officers and internal 
auditors were surveyed to obtain data on controls used and the perceived success of the 
implementation. Consistent with their hypothesis that complementary controls lead to 
more successful ERP implementation than substitutable controls, the results revealed a 
positive interaction between all five control factors identified in the study and perceived 
implementation success. This need for a mix of overlapping and redundant control 
mechanisms provides support for the understanding that ERP implementations are often 
complex, difficult, and risky processes for organizations (e.g., Cameron and Meyer 1998; 
Davenport 1998; Deutsch 1998; O’Leary 2000).  
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 Given the number of highly publicized, troubled ERP implementations in the 
recent past (e.g., Whirlpool, Hershey’s, Waste Management), Wright (2001) studied the 
link between manager and worker resistance to technology and ERP failure. The author 
used the technology acceptance model and a survey of thirty ERP specialists to research 
this relationship. Analysis of the survey data indicated managers were less likely to use 
ERP systems as its perceived usefulness decreases. Factors reducing perceived usefulness 
included lack of involvement in system design and problems with information provided 
by the system. Workers, or those that gather data and process transactions, were more 
likely to resist the system if perceived ease of use was low. Process reengineering, system 
design, and lack of worker training were found to reduce the ease of system use for 
workers. As part of the study, the survey asked the ERP specialists to provide the biggest 
problems/issues frequently faced when implementing ERP. Lack of user involvement in 
the system design and inadequate training were noted by 70% and 50% of the 
respondents, respectively. These issues should cause auditors, who are cognizant of such 
potential problems, to consider the possibilities of increased inherent and control risks 
associated with client ERP adoptions.  
 Hunton et al. (2001) examined the extent to which auditors, with differing levels 
of AIS expertise, recognize differences in the nature and extent of unique business risks 
associated with ERP systems. The researchers used a quasi-experiment to investigate 
their research question, manipulating the system type between auditor participants (ERP 
and non-ERP) and employing two types of auditors as participants: information system 
auditors (i.e., CAS) and financial statement auditors (auditors). The participants were 
provided with a case study which, among other things, (a) informed them of the type of 
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system used by the client, (b) contained a seeded control weakness, and (c) measured the 
participants perceptions with respect to risk. Results indicated that, relative to auditors, 
CAS were significantly more aware of, and concerned with, the following risks in an 
ERP setting: business interruption, network security, database security, application 
security, process interdependency, and overall control risk. It should be noted that these 
risk factors were not actively manipulated or explicitly noted in the case study, rather 
simply the manipulation of system type caused CAS to note these heightened risk factors 
in ERP settings. The auditors also failed to recognize a seeded control weakness in both 
the ERP and non-ERP system conditions. These results have three important implications 
for future research. First, given the auditors poor performance, future research should 
investigate auditors’ risk assessment processes in ERP settings. Second, there appears to 
be a significant knowledge gap between CAS and auditors with respect to AIS. Further 
research is needed to determine if this gap affects their interactions during the course of 
the audit. And third, with respect to auditors in general (i.e., CAS and auditors), the 
results of this study suggest that increases in AIS expertise should affect the level and 
quality of auditor risk assessments.  
As previously stated, Hunton et al. (2001) reported that CAS perceived higher 
risks in an ERP setting versus a non-ERP setting. This expert perception supports prior 
research and statements in the popular press (as discussed above) that inherent and 
control risks increase within ERP environments. In addition, Hunton et al. (2001) found 
that auditors were unlikely to engage the services of CAS in ERP environments, 
suggesting that auditors may question the value CAS provide to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their engagements. One reason auditors may underutilize CAS in ERP 
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settings is that they question their competence levels. Further research is needed to 
investigate how auditors react to variations in CAS competence. 
In summary, the ERP-related literature generally indicates that inherent and 
control risks are heightened in ERP environments, especially in the periods immediately 
following their implementation. Also, given the complexities of ERP systems, it appears 
that auditor AIS expertise may influence the risk assessment processes of auditors. These 
complexities may also cause auditors with less AIS expertise to view risk assessment as a 
significantly difficult task. Prior research indicates that auditors often use the heuristic of 
anchoring and adjustment when confronted with such tasks (e.g., Joyce and Biddle 1981; 
Brazel et al. 2004). With respect to planning judgments affected by AIS, this suggests 
that auditors with less AIS expertise may be more likely to rely on prior year workpapers 
as an anchor. 
2.3.3  Anchoring and Adjustment 
Prior research investigating human behavior provides evidence that humans have 
limited information-processing capacity (Miller 1956; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971; 
Newell and Simon 1972), and the type of task that a person is presented with plays a 
large role in determining the judgment strategies employed by the individual (Edwards 
1971; Simon and Newell 1971; Payne 1976; Slovic et al. 1977; Einhorn and Hogarth 
1981). This literature suggests that when humans are confronted with a complex/difficult 
judgment they resort to cognitively tractable decision strategies known as heuristics 
(Joyce and Biddle 1981). In other words, humans tend to use heuristics, or rules of 
thumb, to reduce complex inference tasks to manageable proportions (Libby 1981). 
While the use of heuristics is sometimes highly economical and effective, they often lead 
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to systematic judgment errors (biases) that can provide significantly less than optimal 
outcomes (Kahneman et al. 1982). Heuristics lead to biased judgments that often imply 
fundamentally different cognitive activity than normative models (e.g., Bayes’ Theorem). 
Variables present in normative models are often ignored in heuristically-based judgments 
and vice versa (Joyce and Biddle 1981).   
 In many tasks, individuals are responsible for evaluating a sequence of new 
information. When evaluating such information, an initial value or starting point (anchor) 
is sometimes used by judges as a reference point for processing all new information. 
After processing the new information, this anchor is adjusted to account for the new 
information or to make a judgment. This adjustment is typically in the normatively 
appropriate direction, but generally not of sufficient magnitude (Joyce and Biddle 1981). 
That is, different starting points yield different outcomes, which are biased towards their 
starting points (Kahneman et al. 1982). This phenomenon is generally referred to as the 
anchoring heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).  
 Judges involved in a similar task may use the same anchor for a given judgment. 
For example, auditors often use prior year risk assessments, programs, and budgets 
during the planning/internal control phase of a current year audit (Libby 1981). Prior 
research indicates that auditors often rely or anchor on the contents of prior year 
workpapers during the course of their current year audits. 
Joyce and Biddle (1981) was the first study of anchoring in the audit environment. 
They found that when auditors were presented with a judgment regarding the extent of 
current year substantive tests, their reactions to current year internal control information 
were affected by the prior year’s assessments of internal controls at the client (the 
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anchor). Therefore, auditor adjustments to certain current year information depended on 
certain conditions in the prior year. This evidence suggests that the use of anchors in an 
audit setting may not be a highly effective strategy (e.g., it may promote under-auditing). 
In addition, this investigation showed that experienced auditors could be influenced by 
anchoring in the same manner as the naïve subjects in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) 
original study of the anchoring heuristic.10            
The experimental study by Kinney and Ueker (1982) revealed that auditors were 
susceptible to the anchoring heuristic when performing analytical reviews and 
compliance sampling (two commonly performed duties during an auditing engagement). 
They also extended the findings of Biddle and Joyce (1981), in that they found that the 
anchoring effect did not always occur. These results suggested that the magnitude of the 
anchoring effect might be moderated by other factors. While the study did not identify 
any specific moderating factors, this finding provides evidence that the anchoring effect 
may vary between individuals and tasks. Butler (1986) continued this stream of research 
and found that auditors used the anchoring heuristic when performing their substantive 
tests of details.   
 SAS No. 47 (AICPA 1983) requires auditors to assess the risks associated with a 
current year audit and to incorporate these risks into their planned substantive procedures. 
Monroe and Ng (2000) view these current year planning judgments as belief revision 
tasks with the auditor’s prior year assessments, audit programs, etc. serving as anchors 
                                                 
 
10 Tversky and Kahneman (1974) used students as subjects performing tasks with which they maintained 
little to no experience or expertise (e.g., estimating the percentage of African countries in the United 
Nations based on an arbitrary starting point). Evidence supporting the use of heuristics by experienced  
auditors should be of little surprise, given the belief held by researchers in the field of psychology that 
anchoring is common to naïve and sophisticated subjects (Kahneman et al. 1982). 
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that are revised, often insufficiently, by succeeding pieces of evidence or information 
(e.g., current year implementation of an ERP module). The Belief Adjustment Model 
(Hogarth and Einhorn 1992), which predicts that the belief revision process will be 
affected by the judge’s sensitivity towards the evidence and utilization of heuristics, will 
be used in this study to predict auditor planning judgments. Auditors’ AIS expertise 
levels and CAS competence (see section 2.4) are expected to influence their reactions to 
audit evidence, while the effect of the anchoring heuristic on their planning judgments is 
explicitly considered. While prior research has used other models to predict auditors’ 
belief revisions (e.g., Cascaded Inference Theory (Schum and DuCharme 1971)), a study 
by Krishnamoorthy et al. (1999) found that the Belief Adjustment Model best predicted 
auditor belief revision in a planning judgment.   
            Prior research has found that auditors use the anchoring heuristic when making 
planning judgments. For example, in their analysis of actual audit workpapers, Mock and 
Wright (1993) observed little variation in risk assessments for clients over time. Similar 
results were found for the extent of substantive tests, as they were strongly related to 
actual hours expended in the prior year. Mock and Wright suggest that these findings 
indicate an anchoring and adjustment strategy “that may not be sufficiently adaptive” 
(Mock and Wright 1993, 49).11 Wright and Bedard (2000) found, via experimental 
methods, that auditors anchored their budgeting decisions on prior year audit hours and 
did not sufficiently adjust for differences in risks. Protocol analysis revealed that all 
                                                 
 
11 SAS No. 22 (AICPA 1978) requires that all workpapers be reviewed by a more senior auditor. Thus, the 
finding of an anchoring and adjustment strategy in actual workpapers indicates that the utilization of 
anchoring or other heuristics among auditors may not always be mitigated by the review process as 
suggested by prior research (e.g., Kennedy 1993, Tan 1995). This utilization of the anchoring heuristic by 
auditors, despite the anticipation of a review, is also supported by the experimental results of Brazel et al. 
(2004). 
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auditors in the high-risk condition evaluated prior year figures before developing their 
current year budget.  
As stated previously, heuristics research suggests that the influence of a heuristic 
on a judgment is positively related to the complexity of the judgment. Therefore, the 
influence of a particular anchor (e.g., prior year workpapers) on a given judgment may be 
dependent on the judge’s own perceptions of task or judgment complexity. Reliance on 
prior year workpapers appears to be an effort-reducing process used by auditors (Brazel 
et al. 2004). For an auditor, the decision to rely on prior year workpapers may also 
depend on the trade-off between (a) the costs of exerting effort to reduce reliance on prior 
year workpapers and (b) the benefits obtained from such effort (Beach and Mitchell 
1978; Payne 1982). In advanced AIS environments (e.g., ERP systems), both the 
perceived complexity of auditor judgments related to the system and the cost/benefit 
tradeoff of anchoring to prior year workpapers may be influenced by the auditor’s self-
perceptions of AIS expertise.  
Bell et al. (1998) state that that while auditors may understand many control 
concepts in traditional information systems, this understanding may be lacking when 
applied to technology-based information systems, since controls are implemented much 
differently in such an environment. The evolution of information technology will require 
auditors to upgrade their ability to evaluate systems as the systems themselves become 
more complicated (Elliot 1997; POB 2000). Therefore, as auditor AIS expertise 
increases, perceptions of task complexity may decrease in areas affected by AIS. This 
reduction in task complexity should lead to lower perceived costs (effort) associated with 
reducing reliance on prior year workpapers. Auditors with higher AIS expertise may also 
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believe that this additional effort will produce greater benefits, as they will be able to use 
their knowledge base to increase audit effectiveness. Thus, it is expected that auditors 
with greater AIS expertise will have a lower reliance on prior year workpapers that will 
allow them to more fully incorporate the heightened risks associated with advanced AIS 
(as described in section 2.3.1) into their planning judgments (e.g., increase inherent risk 
assessments). For auditors with lower self-perceived AIS expertise, it is expected that 
they will view planning judgments affected by AIS as being more complex and thus rely 
more on prior year planning judgments. Given their limited AIS expertise set, these 
auditors may perceive that the effort (cost) required to reduce reliance on prior year 
workpapers exceeds the limited benefits that any additional effort may produce. 
 
2.4  Computer Assurance Specialist Competence 
 The goal of any audit of a client’s financial statements is to determine whether the 
financial statements fairly present the results of operations and the financial position of 
the entity in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). During 
the course of their audits, standard guidance in the profession requires auditors to gather 
sufficient, competent evidential matter to support their opinion regarding the financial 
statements under audit (AICPA 1988a). Evidence is defined as any information used by 
the auditor to determine whether the financial statements being audited are in accordance 
with GAAP (Arens et al. 2003). The ability of the auditor to gather and evaluate this 
evidence will, in turn, play a role in determining both the overall effectiveness and 
efficiency of an audit (American Accounting Association 1973; Hirst 1994). Along with 
the gathering and evaluating of evidence that occurs within audit engagement teams 
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consisting of auditors (e.g., evidence from management, subordinate auditors, internal 
auditors), auditors often rely on other professional or specialist opinions when examining 
the financial statements of a client (Brown 1983). For example, an auditor may rely on 
the opinion of an attorney when evaluating the reasonableness of a client’s contingent 
liability estimate. Prior literature has demonstrated that the perceived reliability or 
inferential value of such evidence is typically dependent on the reliability of its source, 
and these perceptions affect related auditor judgments (e.g., Bamber 1983; Brown 1983; 
Margheim 1986). 
2.4.1  Computer Assurance Specialists 
According to SAS No. 94 (AICPA 2001), in audit engagements where client 
accounting information systems (AIS) are deemed to be dominant and/or complex, one or 
more computer assurance specialists (CAS) should be used on the engagement. In 
practice, CAS are typically from the same firm as the auditor, are considered part of the 
engagement team, and play a large role in both gaining an understanding of, and testing, 
the internal controls of clients with advanced AIS (Ayers and Nagy 1998; Curtis and 
Viator 2000; Hunton et al. 2001; Wright and Wright 2002). Also, the role of CAS as a 
source of audit evidence will likely increase as clients with complex and pervasive AIS 
become more prevalent (POB 2000).  
Unlike other specialists whose opinions relate to the reasonableness of specific 
client assertions (e.g., an actuary’s opinion with respect to a client’s fiscal year end 
pension liability), the quality of CAS work affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
audit in relation to all areas that are affected by the client’s AIS. As discussed in section 
2.3 above, advanced AIS (e.g., ERP systems) have become so dominant that typically all 
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account balances/transactions are affected by the reliability of the AIS. As AIS have 
become more dominant and complex, auditors’ abilities to “audit around” the system 
have been significantly reduced (Ellis 1989; Bell et al. 1998, 16). Therefore, the use of 
CAS and the evaluation of their evidence has become an imperative activity for auditors 
during the planning and internal control evaluation phases of their audits (POB 2000).  
Auditor interactions with specialists who are external to the audit firm (e.g., 
actuaries, appraisers) are governed by SAS No. 73 (AICPA 1994), which addresses using 
the work of a specialist in an audit. SAS No. 73 places limited requirements on the 
auditor with respect to the supervision and review of the external specialists. As CAS are 
generally within-firm specialists and considered part of the engagement team, SAS No. 
94 (AICPA 2001) states that auditors who use such a specialist should follow the 
supervision and review guidance set forth by SAS No. 22 (AICPA 1978). SAS No. 22 
dictates that CAS require the same degree of supervision and review as audit assistants. 
As such, research is needed to investigate how auditors interact with CAS.  
2.4.2    Source Reliability 
 As stated earlier, one of the essential responsibilities of an auditor is the 
evaluation of audit evidence (e.g., management provided calculations, CAS internal 
control testing workpapers). Indeed, generally accepted auditing standards, such as SAS 
No. 53 (AICPA 1988a), require auditors to exercise a proper degree of professional 
skepticism when evaluating evidence. A major dimension of the process of evaluating 
audit evidence is assessing its reliability (Rebele et al. 1988). According to Mautz (1958), 
one characteristic of evidence that can affect its reliability is the reliability of the source 
from which the evidence is obtained (e.g., client management, CAS). Therefore, the 
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auditor must assess the source reliability of audit evidence, in conjunction with other 
issues,12  before it can be accepted in support of an audit opinion. If an auditor does not 
appropriately consider source reliability, the efficiency or effectiveness of an engagement 
may be reduced. If unreliable evidence is overweighted, underauditing can ensue. Placing 
undue reliance on unreliable evidence could increase the risk of audit failure (Hirst 1994). 
Source reliability is generally viewed as being a function of the source’s 
objectivity and competence (Margheim 1986; Rebele et al. 1988; Hirst 1994; Anderson et 
al.; Peecher 1996; Haynes 1999). Auditors obtain evidence from a variety of sources 
during the course of an audit engagement. Often the source of audit evidence or 
information is a subordinate member of the engagement team (e.g., a CAS provides the 
auditor in-charge of audit fieldwork with internal control testing workpapers). When 
auditors review such evidence, the competence of the subordinate (source) is evaluated to 
determine the extent to which their work can be relied on by the auditor when making his 
or her own judgments (Bamber 1983).13 Within an engagement team, source objectivity 
is generally considered a less relevant component of a source’s reliability, as members of 
the audit engagement team should be independent of the client. 
2.4.3    Prior Source Competence Research 
Competence is defined as “the state or quality of being adequately qualified; 
ability” (The American Heritage College Dictionary 1997, 284). Prior research has 
shown that auditors are sensitive to the competence of their evidence sources and these 
                                                 
 
12 For example, the materiality of the item being audited may affect the process of evidence evaluation. 
13 An audit is usually conducted by an audit team that is characterized by a hierarchical structure and a 
division of labor (Bamber 1983). Thus, the representations or conclusions of subordinates are often relied 
on when their superiors make judgments.  For example, an audit manager relies on an audit senior’s sales 
cut-off testing when making judgments with respect to the reasonableness of the sales account or whether 
an audit adjustment may be necessary. 
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competence levels affect auditors’ judgments in relation to the audit evidence.  Bamber 
(1983) examined auditor sensitivity to the competency of their own staff, specifically 
audit manager evaluations of evidence provided by senior auditors.  Results indicated that 
auditors were sensitive to experimental manipulations of source competence. Audit 
managers discounted the inferential value of evidence provided by a less competent 
senior.  
 Brown (1983), Schneider (1984), and Margheim (1986) all studied auditor 
evaluations of the source competence levels of internal auditors. Brown (1983) found that 
internal auditor competence was positively related to the degree of reliability placed on 
the internal audit function by auditors. The objective of Schneider’s (1984) investigation 
was to develop a descriptive model of the way auditors use information regarding internal 
auditor competence, objectivity, and prior year performance when evaluating the strength 
of internal audit. An additive model was determined to be most appropriate, with all three 
factors having a positive and significant impact on auditor perceptions of internal audit 
strength. Margheim (1986) examined whether auditors adjust the scope of their audit 
procedures in reaction to variation in the source competence of internal auditors. The 
results of the study indicated that auditors reduced planned audit hours when confronted 
with higher levels of internal auditor competence.   
Auditors often rely on representations or evidence provided by client management 
or accounting personnel. Rebele et al. (1988) and Anderson et al. (1994) both 
documented that auditor reliance on management representations was positively affected 
by the competence level of management. When forming their judgments of the true value 
of a client’s uncollectable receivables, auditors placed more reliance on evidence 
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obtained from client personnel with greater expertise (Rebele et al. 1988). Auditors 
obtaining explanations for unexpected account fluctuations were also found to be 
sensitive to the competence of management (Anderson et al. 1994). Explanations 
received from a client manager possessing high competence were judged to be more 
reliable by auditors. However, and contrary to expectations, auditor reliability judgments 
were not dependent on when the competence information was received by the auditor. 
Haynes (1999) used the cascaded-inference (i.e., multi-level) paradigm to investigate 
how auditors evaluate evidence received during management inquiry. Contrary to 
predictions made by cascaded-inference theory, auditors were more sensitive to 
variations in source reliability (i.e., first level of inference) than variation in evidence 
uncertainty (i.e., second level of inference).  
Hirst (1994) asked audit seniors to judge the inferential value of evidence related 
to an inventory balance. The evidence was provided by a specialist who was either highly 
or not highly competent with respect to the specific type of inventory presented in the 
case. The results of Hirst’s study were consistent with prior source competence research, 
in that evidence reported by a more competent specialist was considered more diagnostic 
than evidence obtained from a less competent specialist. 
While not explicitly examined in the literature, it appears that in practice there is 
variability in CAS competence. To gain additional insight into auditors’ perceptions of 
CAS competence, nine auditors at either the senior or manager level completed a survey 
(see Appendix A for the survey). Eight of the nine auditors believed that the level of CAS 
competence had been an issue of concern on their audit engagements. The results of this 
survey indicate that variation in CAS competence exists and auditors appear to be 
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sensitive to that variation. In addition, Hunton et al. (2001) found that auditors were 
unlikely to engage the services of CAS in ERP environments, suggesting that auditors 
may question the value CAS provide with respect  to the effectiveness and efficiency of 
their engagements.  
The findings of prior source competence studies indicate that auditor judgment 
processes, evidence reliability judgments, and related planning judgments are all affected 
by the competence of evidence sources (e.g., Brown 1983; Schneider 1984; Margheim 
1986). As stated above, CAS represent a significant source of internal control testing 
evidence in advanced AIS environments and auditors have reported variation in CAS 
competence.14 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that variation in CAS competence 
should affect the internal control-related judgments of auditors. Specifically, as CAS 
competence levels increase, auditors’ perceptions regarding the reliability of their internal 
control testing evidence should increase. Also, control risk assessment levels should be 
decreased in reaction to increased test strength (Libby et al. 1985; Maletta and Kida 
1993). It is therefore expected that auditors should perceive the tests of a more competent 
CAS to be stronger, and thus assess control risk at lower levels than auditors interacting 
with a less competent CAS. Lastly, as CAS competence increases, auditors should plan 
audit procedures that are smaller in scope, because auditors utilizing a CAS with low 
competence should mitigate higher control risk assessments via additional substantive 
procedures (AICPA 1983; Margheim 1986).  
                                                 
 
14 Unless provided with evidence to the contrary, audit guidance states that auditors are to assess risk levels 
at maximum levels (AICPA 1983). As discussed in detail in footnote 4, CAS evidence in this study will be 
positive in nature (i.e., AIS internal controls appear reliable). Thus, positive CAS evidence provides  
auditors with support to reduce their control risk assessment levels below maximum (consistent with the 
prior year’s assessment).  
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2.5  Auditor Accounting Information System Expertise 
 One aspect of the CAS/auditor relationship that differs from virtually all prior 
source competence studies is that CAS represent a source of audit evidence with a 
different expertise structure than that of auditors (Curtis and Viator 2000; Hunton et al. 
2001). Given a specified level of CAS competence, the size of the AIS expertise gap 
between the evidence source (CAS) and the evidence examiner (auditor) depends on the 
level of expertise the auditor maintains in the AIS domain (POB 2000). As the AIS gap 
between the CAS and the auditor widens (i.e., lower auditor AIS expertise), it may 
become less likely that the auditor will have the ability to compensate for CAS 
competence deficiencies (i.e., weak control testing). Also, prior audit expertise research 
has shown that domain-specific expertise, determined by the nature of auditor experience 
and training, improves the domain-specific performances of auditors (Bonner 1990; 
Bonner and Lewis 1990; Hunton et al. 2002). These findings suggest that, in complex 
AIS settings (e.g., ERP systems), higher levels of auditor AIS expertise may improve the 
quality of their risk assessments, and in turn, the effectiveness of their substantive 
planning decisions. 
2.5.1  AIS Expertise Gap  
Prior source competence studies have typically examined scenarios where the 
evidence source and the auditor maintain similar expertise structures. For example, 
Bamber (1983) and Rebele et al. (1988) studied auditor sensitivity to changes in the 
competence of audit seniors and client accounting personnel, respectively. With these 
studies, little variation is expected in auditors’ abilities to perform additional procedures 
or mitigate risks when evidence sources with low competence are encountered. For 
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example, the majority of senior auditors are aware of, and competent to perform, 
additional substantive testing to substitute for inadequate tests performed by an assistant 
with low competence. Indeed, a review of the source competence literature offers no 
evidence of variation in the performances of auditors when confronted with less 
competent evidence sources. 
Hirst (1994) represents the only source competence study that used specialists as 
the source of evidence. In the study, source competence was manipulated by describing 
the evidence source as either a specialist in an industry related to the evidence (test of 
inventory account) or not. Participants were asked to evaluate the inferential value of 
evidence provided by the specialists, but were not asked to provide judgments that might 
have challenged their knowledge structures (e.g., make and document risk assessments, 
prepare an audit program). Therefore, the effects of any variation in auditor expertise on 
their related source competence judgments could not be identified. In addition, Hirst’s 
task was the evaluation of an inventory obsolescence account, a task where auditors are 
generally uniformly educated/trained. Variation in inventory-related expertise between 
auditors may not have been significant enough to moderate their source competence 
reactions. Lastly, in Hirst’s study the evidence provided to subjects was a report 
examining an unexpected fluctuation in inventory. Participants were informed that the 
evidence source was either a specialist in the retail industry (high competence) or a 
specialist in the banking and insurance industry (low competence). Specialists in banking 
and insurance industry generally have little competence beyond the typical auditor with 
respect to inventory, as these industries do not produce or sell inventory as their main line 
of business. Therefore, while Hirst did manipulate the competence or technical ability of 
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the evidence source, it is possible that the participants in his study did not perceive the 
banking and insurance specialist to be a specialist in relation to the evidence provided. In 
this study, the appropriate specialist (CAS) was assigned to the task of evaluating AIS 
internal controls in all experimental conditions. Source competence was manipulated 
between participants by providing them with information regarding the competence level 
of the CAS. 
   As stated previously, CAS represent a source of audit evidence with a different 
expertise structure than that of auditors (Curtis and Viator 2000; Hunton et al. 2001). The 
experience and training of CAS focuses on AIS processes, controls, etc., while auditors 
devote more resources to improving their knowledge of generally accepted accounting 
principles, auditing standards, etc. Given these divergent expertise structures, it is 
reasonable to assume that there is an AIS expertise gap between CAS and auditors. The 
Public Oversight Board’s (POB) recent study on audit effectiveness stressed the 
importance of auditor AIS expertise as a key determinant of the successfulness of 
CAS/auditor interactions. The POB indicated that, in advanced AIS environments, CAS 
and auditors will need to “work as a team” and auditors will need to “expand their 
technological knowledge and skills,” as they “cannot cede all technological matters” to 
CAS (POB 2000, 171).  
Given a specified level of CAS competence (e.g., high or low), the size of the 
expertise gap between the evidence source (CAS) and the evidence examiner (auditor) is 
dependent on the level of AIS expertise possessed by the auditor. Sophisticated audit 
skills are required in advanced AIS settings (Lilly 1997; Hunton et al. 2001). Thus, as the 
size of the expertise gap widens (i.e., auditor AIS expertise decreases), it becomes less 
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likely that the auditor will compensate for any perceived CAS competence deficiencies 
(i.e., inadequate control testing). First, auditors possessing low AIS expertise may not 
have the abilities or confidence to design and perform additional/alternative procedures to 
mitigate the risks induced by low CAS competence. This expectation is consistent with 
the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1985, 1987) and Bandura’s (1977, 1982) 
compatible concept of perceived self-efficacy. Under these theories, perceived behavioral 
control or self-efficacy beliefs can influence: choice of activities, preparation for an 
activity, effort expended during performance, and thought patterns. Prior studies 
(Bandura et al. 1977; Bandura et al. 1980) have shown that “people’s behavior is strongly 
influenced by their confidence in their ability to perform” the behavior (Ajzen 1991). 
Secondly, as auditor AIS expertise decreases, the difficulty of assessing control 
risk and planning the scope of substantive procedures increases (see section 2.3 for a 
more detailed discussion of this topic). In such scenarios, auditors with lower AIS 
expertise may be more apt to rely (anchor) on prior year control risk assessments, audit 
programs, and budgets (as discussed in section 2.3). Auditors with higher levels of AIS 
expertise, on the other hand, may be more likely to act on CAS competence deficiencies 
(i.e., increase control risk assessment levels and the scope of planned substantive 
procedures) because they are better able to plan and competently perform the additional 
audit procedures required to compensate for a lack of CAS competence. The above 
discussion suggests that the level of auditor AIS expertise may affect the magnitude of an 
auditor’s reactions (i.e., control risk assessment levels and the scope of planned 
substantive procedures) to low CAS competence. In conditions where CAS competence 
is high, the effect of auditor AIS expertise on planning judgments is expected to be 
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reduced as it is more appropriate to rely on CAS evidence in this condition (Bamber 
1983; Hirst 1994).    
2.5.2  Judgment Quality and Effectiveness 
Within advanced AIS environments, auditors will find it necessary to fully 
understand the risks associated with these systems and the controls needed to respond to 
those risks (POB 2000). Chi et al. (1982, 8) define expertise as “the possession of a large 
body of knowledge and procedural skill.” Given the significant risks and complexities 
associated with ERP systems, AIS expertise may be an important factor in planning 
effective and efficient audits in such settings (Wright and Wright 2002; Guess et al. 
2000). Prior research has shown that increased levels of expertise in specific domains can 
improve the domain specific performances of auditors (Bonner 1990; Bonner and Lewis 
1990; Hunton et al. 2001).  
Expertise studies in auditing have “mainly used the contrastive cross-sectional 
approach, where groups of experts and novices are compared on various dimensions” 
(Bedard and Chi 1993, 23). While these studies are useful in identifying the differences 
between more and less experienced auditors, they offer little explanation for the causes of 
these differences (Bedard and Chi 1993) and do not examine why variation exists in the 
performances of auditors with same level of general audit expertise.  
Bonner (1990) examined whether task/domain-specific knowledge aids the 
performances of auditors. The study noted the importance of investigating domain-
specific expertise (vs. general audit experience) when attempting to explain differences in 
task performance in environments that challenge specific forms of knowledge (e.g., the 
role of auditor AIS expertise in ERP settings). Bonner compared the performances of 
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experienced and inexperienced auditors in two tasks: analytical risk assessment and 
control risk assessment. The paper documents that the domain-specific expertise gap 
between experienced and inexperienced auditors should be larger in the analytical risk 
assessment and smaller in the control risk assessment, provided their respective 
experiences and training. Given these differences, the study hypothesized that the 
differential performance between more and less experienced auditors would be greatest in 
the analytical risk assessment. Consistent with this hypothesis, results indicated that 
domain-specific knowledge aided the performance of experienced auditors in both cue 
selection and cue weighting in the analytical risk assessment. In other words, experience 
interacted with task to affect auditor performance. These results indicate that researchers 
should consider the characteristics of a given task to determine the form of domain-
specific expertise most responsible for variation in performance. 
Bonner and Lewis (1990) attempted to distinguish between the effects of general 
audit experience and domain-specific expertise on auditor performance in information-
processing tasks. Specifically, the study used various types of knowledge and ability 
measures to explain cross-sectional variation in auditors’ performance in several audit 
tasks. These results were then compared to the explanatory power of general audit 
expertise. The data revealed that, while the more experienced auditors outperformed less 
experienced auditors, domain-specific knowledge provided a more powerful explanation 
of auditor performance. Given the study’s findings, the authors “suggest that researchers 
pay more attention to the criteria used to designate subjects as experts, either directly by 
the use of objective performance measures or indirectly by the use of well-specified 
measures of knowledge and ability” (Bonner and Lewis 1990, 2). 
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Presently, no prior research studies have attempted to investigate if variation in 
auditors’ AIS expertise (a form of domain expertise) explains differences in their 
performance levels in complex AIS environments. While not an exception to this 
premise, Hunton et al. (2001) do provide some evidence that auditor AIS expertise levels 
may affect their performance in AIS-related tasks. Their study examined the extent to 
which different types of auditors, CAS and financial statement auditors, recognize 
differences in the nature and extent of unique business risks associated with ERP 
systems. The authors hypothesized that knowledge differences between these two types 
of auditors would affect their risk recognition performance. Results indicated that, 
relative to auditors, CAS were significantly more aware of, and concerned with the 
following risk risks in an ERP setting: business interruption, network security, database 
security, application security, process interdependency, and overall control risk. Unlike 
CAS, auditors also failed to recognize a seeded control weakness in the ERP system. 
While not explicitly examining the effect of AIS expertise between auditors of financial 
statements, this study does suggest that, as AIS expertise increases, performance in AIS-
related audit tasks should improve.  
Prior research has shown that domain-specific expertise should improve domain-
specific performance. Given the significant risks and complexities associated with ERP 
systems, auditor AIS expertise (a form of domain-specific knowledge) should be an 
important factor in planning effective and efficient audits in such settings (Wright and 
Wright 2002). Therefore, it is expected that, as auditor AIS expertise increases, 
performance in AIS-related planning judgments should improve. First, as auditor AIS 
expertise increases, so should the quality of their risk assessments. Second, auditors 
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equipped with higher levels of AIS expertise should have more of the knowledge base 
required to prepare effective audit programs and budgets in advanced AIS settings. Also, 
the audit risk model (AICPA 1983) states that substantive planning decisions should be 
affected by the risk assessments of auditors (see section 2.2). Thus, since auditors with 
higher levels of AIS expertise are predicted to make higher quality risk assessments, their 
substantive planning judgments should also be more effective. 
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study examines the effects of computer assurance specialist (CAS) 
competence and auditor accounting information system (AIS) expertise on auditor 
planning judgments in a complex AIS environment. Both the form (e.g., level of the 
inherent risk assessment) and the effectiveness (e.g., quality of the inherent risk 
assessment) of auditors’ planning judgments are investigated. Hypotheses are developed 
in this chapter. Tests for these effects involved a quasi-experimental auditing case that 
placed audit practitioners (participants) in the planning/internal control phase of a client 
audit with a computer-dominated accounting system.  
Participants were informed that an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system 
module (Sales and Distribution) was implemented in the current year. After receiving 
planning materials related to the transaction cycle affected by the ERP module 
implementation (sales and accounts receivable), participants were asked to assess the 
preliminary inherent risk level associated with the cycle. In addition, participants were 
told that a CAS was assigned to the engagement to assist the auditor in obtaining an 
understanding of the system and testing the internal controls of the cycle. The 
competence of the CAS as a source of audit evidence was manipulated between 
participants as high and low. After receiving internal control testing evidence from the 
CAS and learning about the competence of the CAS, participants’ perceptions regarding 
the reliability of CAS evidence were measured. Next, they assessed the preliminary 
control risk level for the transaction cycle and prepared audit programs and budgets for 
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substantive tests.15 Lastly, participants’ self-assessed accounting information system 
(AIS) expertise, along with other variables, were measured via a post-experimental 
questionnaire. 
The quality of the participants’ risk assessments and the effectiveness of their 
scope of planned substantive procedures were determined by two groups of audit experts. 
Each expert group reviewed the case under one of the two CAS competence conditions 
(i.e., high or low). Participants’ risk assessment quality was measured via their absolute 
deviation from the mean assessments of the experts assigned to their case and the 
effectiveness of participants’ planned substantive procedures was evaluated individually 
by the group of experts that reviewed and completed their respective case (i.e., high or 
low CAS competence).  
 
3.2 Hypotheses 
3.2.1    ERP Systems and Auditor AIS Expertise 
While the positive aspects of enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems (e.g., 
real time data, shortened cycle times) have made them the computing environment of 
choice among many corporations (Brown 1997; O’Leary 2000; Hunton et al. 2001), there 
are significant risks associated with their implementation (Wright and Wright 2002). 
Inherent risks are heightened in the periods immediately following ERP implementations 
as issues such as inadequately trained personnel, improper data input, and 
interdependencies among business processes can lead to an increased potential for 
                                                 
 
15 Separate, rather than joint, assessments of inherent and control risk were made by the participants in this 
study. In a recent examination of inherent and control risk assessments, Messier and Austen (2000) found 
that seventy-five percent of their subject pool of Big 6 auditors indicated that their firm made separate 
assessments of inherent and control risks.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
60
 
 
 
 
 
financial statement misstatements, misclassifications, and defalcations (e.g., Gibbs and 
Keating 1995; Helms 1999; Lilly 1997; Manello and Rocholl 1997; Pfenning 1999; 
Turner 1999; O’Leary 2000; Soh et al. 2000; Wah 2000; Hunton et al. 2001). ERP 
implementations have also been found to increase control risk, as the focus shifts from 
segregation of duties to greater access. Also, minimal supervisory review is performed, 
and supplemental internal control applications are often not properly integrated with the 
ERP system (Turner 1999; Wright and Wright 2002). These increased inherent and 
control risks associated with ERP systems are expected to be greatest in the periods 
immediately following implementation as, over time, companies are more likely to 
address these issues. Audit guidance prescribes (and prior research suggests) that auditors 
typically do react to increased risks by increasing risk assessments and the scope of 
planned substantive procedures (AICPA 1983; Houston 1999; Wright and Bedard 2000). 
However, in advanced AIS environments, the magnitude of these planning judgments 
(e.g., level of the inherent risk assessment) may be dependent on the auditor’s level of 
AIS expertise. 
Monroe and Ng (2000) view the auditor risk assessment process as a belief 
revision task, with the individual’s prior year assessment serving as an anchor. This 
anchor is then revised, often insufficiently, by succeeding pieces of evidence or 
information (e.g., current year implementation of an ERP module) to create a current year 
assessment. For auditors, reliance on prior year assessments as an anchor tends to  
increase as task difficulty increases (Joyce and Biddle 1981).16  
                                                 
 
16 The Belief Adjustment Model (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992), which predicts that the belief revision 
process will be affected by the judge’s sensitivity towards the evidence and use of heuristics, is used in this 
study’s development of Hypotheses 1-5. Auditors’ AIS expertise levels and CAS competence (see section 
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 Auditors with low self-assessed AIS expertise may feel that the task of increasing 
or changing current year risk assessments from those of the prior year is beyond their 
knowledge base/abilities (Ajzen 1991). These auditors may therefore be more prone to 
rely on the prior assessments as an anchor. On the other hand, high AIS expertise auditors 
should assess current year risks as higher than low AIS expertise auditors. Auditors with 
high expertise are expected to be more aware of the possible risks associated with a 
current year ERP system implementation. Hunton et al. (2001) found that auditors with 
higher levels of AIS expertise were more cognizant of risks related to ERP systems. This 
increased awareness of risks among high AIS expertise auditors should typically lead to 
higher assessed preliminary risk levels, as professional skepticism should be exercised to 
achieve reasonable assurance that material misstatements are detected (AICPA 1988a).17  
Auditors with higher AIS expertise will follow the audit risk model guidance and 
therefore increase the scope of planned audit procedures beyond that of low AIS 
expertise auditors to mitigate their higher risk assessments (AICPA 1983). In addition to 
following the model’s guidance, it is expected that auditors with greater AIS expertise 
will have the knowledge to plan and competently perform expanded audit procedures to 
effectively mitigate such risks. Low AIS expertise auditors, on the other hand, may 
                                                                                                                                                 
3.3.4.1 for a discussion of CAS competence) are expected to influence their reactions to audit evidence, 
while the effect of the anchoring heuristic on their planning judgments is explicitly considered in the 
development of hypotheses. While prior research has used this and a variety of other models to predict 
auditor belief revision (e.g., Cascaded Inference Theory (Schum and DuCharme 1971)), a study by 
Krishnamoorthy et al. (1999) found that the Belief Adjustment Model best predicted auditor belief revision 
in a planning judgment.   
17 One of the primary purposes of this study is to investigate how auditor AIS expertise influences their 
awareness and reactions to possible risks associated with an ERP system implementation. As such, no 
explicit list of possible inherent and control risks related to the current year implementation was provided 
to participants. Auditors were asked to provide preliminary assessments of inherent and control risk and to 
document specific risk issues to be further investigated or that support their assessment. As auditor AIS 
expertise should increase auditor awareness of ERP risks, it is predicted that as auditor AIS expertise 
increases the preliminary risk assessments of auditors should increase. For ease of presentation, these 
preliminary assessments are sometimes referred to as “assessments.”  
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perceive that expanding substantive tests will only decrease audit efficiency. For 
example, increasing the budget of a substantive test, which does not increase the audit’s 
effectiveness in an advanced AIS setting, would lead to a decrease in audit efficiency. 
The above discussion suggests that auditors with greater AIS expertise will assess 
both inherent and control risks at higher levels than auditors with lower AIS expertise in 
advanced AIS environments. Auditors with higher AIS expertise should also increase the 
scope of planned substantive audit procedures beyond that of low AIS expertise auditors. 
Thus, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H1a: Auditors with high AIS expertise will assess inherent risk at a higher level 
than auditors with low AIS expertise.  
 
H1b: Auditors with high AIS expertise will assess control risk at a higher level 
than auditors with low AIS expertise.  
 
H1c: Auditors with high AIS expertise will plan substantive audit procedures that 
are greater in scope than auditors with low AIS expertise.  
 
3.2.2 Computer Assurance Specialist Competence 
 
Prior research has consistently found auditors to be sensitive to the perceived 
competence of their evidence sources. This literature has shown that auditors discount the 
inferential value/reliability of evidence received from sources of lower competence (e.g., 
Bamber 1983; Brown 1983; Anderson et al. 1994; Hirst 1994). Given their tendency to be 
sensitive to source competence, auditors are likely to consider CAS competence when 
evaluating evidence provided by CAS. Specifically, auditors should judge evidence from 
a more (less) competent CAS as more (less) reliable. Consequently, the following 
hypothesis is investigated: 
H2: Auditors will judge evidence from a CAS with high competence as more 
reliable than evidence from a CAS with low competence.  
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CAS primarily test, and provide evidence regarding the reliability of, internal 
controls for computer-dominant audit clients (AICPA 2001). Prior research has described 
the control risk assessment as consisting of: (1) client control strength, (2) auditor test 
strength, and (3) auditor test results (Libby et al. 1985; Maletta and Kida 1993). SAS No. 
47 (AICPA 1983) advises auditors that, absent contradictory evidence, risk levels should 
be assessed at their maximum. Also, prior research suggests that auditors will likely 
perceive tests of internal controls (i.e., auditor test strength) performed by a CAS of 
higher competence to be stronger than those of a less competent CAS (Bamber 1983; 
Hirst 1994). Thus, when provided with evidence from a CAS which specifies the system 
controls are reliable, an increase in the perceived level of CAS competence should lead to 
larger reductions of control risk by auditors (Arens et al. 2003).18 Specifically, when CAS 
competence is higher, auditors may perceive CAS control test strength as stronger and, 
given CAS tests that support a reduction of control risk below maximum, decrease the 
level of control risk accordingly. On the other hand, similar positive evidence obtained 
from CAS with low competence is likely to result in less reliance on that evidence and, in 
turn, control risk assessments that are higher or closer to the maximum level. It is also 
proposed that as CAS competence increases, the scope of planned substantive procedures 
should be decreased, as auditors should decrease procedures to compensate for lower 
control risk levels (AICPA 1983). Therefore, the following hypotheses are examined:  
                                                 
 
18 As described in footnote 4, the results of CAS tests of controls were positive and kept constant between 
subjects (i.e., AIS controls appear reliable). Therefore, Hypothesis Sets 3 and 4 were developed given that 
the results of CAS tests of controls should warrant an assessment of control risk below the maximum level 
(i.e., 100 percent). Also, the prior year control risk assessment was set at 40% or indicated a reduction of 
control risk from the maximum level. Thus, the positive current year control testing results from the CAS 
should justify an auditor control risk assessment that is below the maximum level and relatively consistent 
with the prior year. 
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H3a: Auditors using positive evidence from a CAS with high competence will 
assess control risk at a lower level than auditors using positive evidence from a 
CAS with low competence. 
  
H3b: Auditors using positive evidence from a CAS with high competence will 
plan substantive audit procedures that are lesser in scope than auditors using 
positive evidence from a CAS with low competence.  
 
3.2.3  Auditor Accounting Information System Expertise 
While it is expected that auditors will be sensitive and react to variation in CAS 
competence, the magnitude of auditors’ reactions to CAS may not be homogenous. CAS 
and auditors maintain different expertise structures (Curtis and Viator 2000; Hunton et al. 
2001), and the size of the AIS expertise gap between CAS of low competence and 
auditors may affect auditors’ planning judgments. Under conditions of low CAS 
competence, auditors possessing high AIS expertise may be more likely to assess control 
risk near the maximum level because they have the ability and confidence to plan and 
perform additional substantive procedures to compensate for CAS competence 
deficiencies/higher control risk levels (Ajzen 1991). Under the same condition, auditors 
with low AIS expertise may be more apt to rely on CAS evidence and not change control 
risk assessments and substantive procedures from that of the prior year indicating 
moderate risk, since compensating for CAS competence deficiencies represents a 
significantly more difficult task for them. The anchoring and adjustment literature 
suggests that these auditors will be more likely to rely on prior year control risk 
assessment levels and planned substantive tests rather than increasing their levels and 
testing, respectively (e.g., Joyce and Biddle 1981). In contrast, auditor AIS expertise 
effects on their control risk assessments and scope of tests are expected to be reduced 
when CAS competence is high, as it is more appropriate to rely on the favorable CAS 
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control testing evidence (Bamber 1993; Hirst 1994). The above discussion suggests that 
CAS competence and auditor AIS expertise may interact to affect auditor planning 
judgments (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the expected interaction). Thus, the 
following hypotheses are investigated: 
H4a: The difference between high AIS expertise auditors’ and low AIS expertise 
auditors’ control risk assessments will be greater when CAS competence is low 
than when it is high.  
 
H4b: The difference between high AIS expertise auditors’ and low AIS expertise 
auditors’ scope of planned substantive audit procedures will be greater when CAS 
competence is low than when it is high. 
 
Research investigating auditor expertise has found that domain-specific expertise 
improves auditor performance. Among auditors with the same level of general audit 
experience, the nature of their experience and training has been shown to differentiate 
their domain-specific performances (Bonner 1990; Bonner and Lewis 1990). Given the 
significant risks and complexities associated with ERP systems, AIS expertise (a form of 
domain-specific expertise) should be an important factor in planning effective and 
efficient audits in such settings (Wright and Wright 2002). For example, Hunton et al. 
(2001) found that higher levels of AIS expertise increased auditor risk recognition 
performance in an ERP system environment. Auditors with greater AIS expertise were 
more likely to recognize a seeded control risk in the study’s experimental case. As a 
result, it is expected that auditor AIS expertise should positively affect the judgment 
quality of their risk assessments and, in accordance with the audit risk model (AICPA 
1983), the effectiveness of their scope decisions. The following hypotheses are therefore  
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tested:19 
H5a: The quality of inherent risk assessments will be greater for auditors with 
high AIS expertise than auditors with low AIS expertise.  
 
H5b: The quality of control risk assessments will be greater for auditors with high 
AIS expertise than auditors with low AIS expertise. 
 
H5c: Auditors with high AIS expertise will plan more effective substantive audit 
procedures than auditors with low AIS expertise.  
 
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
3.3.1  Overview 
The hypotheses of this study were tested via a quasi-experiment using practicing 
auditors as participants. The task placed the participants in the planning phase of an audit 
where the client had implemented an ERP system module (Sales and Distribution) in the 
current year. Participants were provided with instructions, a portion of the audit risk 
model guidance, background information on the client, prior year and current year 
workpapers, and information regarding the current year module implementation. After 
reviewing this information, they were asked to provide a preliminary assessment of 
inherent risk associated with the transaction cycle (sales and accounts receivable) that 
was affected by the ERP implementation. Participants were then informed that a CAS 
was assigned to the engagement team to assist in the understanding and testing of internal 
controls related to the ERP system. While the types of CAS tests and the final results of 
those tests were kept constant between subjects (e.g., AIS controls appear reliable, see 
footnote 4), the competence of the CAS was manipulated between subjects as high and 
                                                 
 
19 See Figure 4 for a matrix summarizing the hypotheses tested in this study. Appendix B models the 
hypotheses of this study. 
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low. After receiving internal control testing evidence from the CAS and learning about 
the competence of the CAS, participants’ perceptions regarding the reliability of CAS 
evidence were measured. Lastly, they assessed the preliminary control risk level for the 
transaction cycle and prepared audit programs and budgets for substantive tests.  
After the completion of the task, a post-experimental questionnaire was used to 
measure participants’ perceptions of their own AIS expertise, the competence of the CAS 
(i.e., a manipulation check), and several other variables. The quality of the participants’ 
risk assessments and the effectiveness of their scope of planned substantive procedures 
were determined by two groups of audit experts (each consisting of three senior 
managers/partners) who completed the case under one of the two CAS competence 
conditions (i.e., high or low).  
3.3.2  Participants 
Practicing auditors from large, international and national public accounting firms 
served as participants for this study. Participants were audit seniors (auditors in-charge of 
audit fieldwork). Discussions with several audit managers revealed that this is the level of 
staff typically responsible for interacting with CAS assigned to test internal controls. In 
addition, seniors’ duties include the evaluation of inherent and control risks, as well as 
the preparation of audit budgets and programs (Messier and Austen 2000; Houston 1999). 
Lastly, seniors from large, international and national public accounting firms were used 
because their client base generally consists of companies that perform the type of ERP 
implementation that is described in the quasi-experimental task. 
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3.3.3 Quasi-Experimental Task 
The audit seniors (participants) were provided with a cover letter and an 
experimental instrument by the experimenter (see Appendix C for the quasi-experimental 
instrument). The cover letter provided a brief description of what the experiment would 
require of participants. The instrument required approximately 20 to 30 minutes of the 
participants’ time. The experimental instrument contained client background data, the 
task objective, audit guidance, client financial statements, prior and current year 
workpapers, current year information, and a post-experimental questionnaire. These 
materials were created with the assistance of audit practitioners and pilot tested with audit 
seniors to enhance the clarity of the instructions, ensure the proper manipulation and 
measurement of variables, and increase the perceived realism of the case.  
The background and task objective sections included a brief description of the 
client and the experimental task. Specifically, the participants were told to assume they 
were the audit senior assigned to the year-end audit engagement of a mid-sized 
manufacturing client that their firm has audited for over ten years. A manufacturing client 
was used because auditors are most likely to be familiar with the manufacturing industry 
(Colbert 1988). They were also informed that past audits have always resulted in 
unqualified audit opinions for the financial statements of the client. In addition, and 
similar to the prior year, the partner in-charge of the engagement had set audit risk at a 
low level (i.e., .05). Lastly, participants were told that their task objective was to assess 
the current year risks and plan the scope of substantive testing for the client’s sales and 
accounts receivable cycle. 
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A short description of the audit risk model, adapted from SAS No. 47 (1983), was 
supplied to all participants to assist their understanding of the terminology used in the 
case (Colbert 1988). Additional client background data provided to the participants at this 
time included the audited financial statements for the two prior years, plus unaudited 
financial statements for the current year. The only difference between the financial 
statements was a reasonable line item increase of 5%, on average, to account for 
inflation. While providing some additional realism to the experimental setting, the stable 
nature of the financial statements presented should not influence participants’ risk 
assessments and audit scope decisions in the current year (Colbert 1988). In addition to 
the financial statements, participants were provided with monetary precision figures (i.e., 
tolerable error) for the prior and current years. These figures reflected the average 5% 
increase that occurred in the financial statements. All of the financial statement and 
monetary precision information were included in an appendix to the case study. 
Prior year workpapers for the sales and accounts receivable cycle (the transaction 
cycle affected by the current year module implementation) indicated that the prior year 
inherent and control risk assessments were moderate, and substantive testing programs 
and budgets reflected these moderate assessments. The provision of prior year 
workpapers is consistent with practice, as auditors use prior year workpapers when 
preparing current year workpapers (Libby 1981; Wright 1988). Prior year risk 
assessments, audit programs, and budgets reflected moderate conditions to allow 
participants the opportunity to either reduce or increase their risk assessments and scope 
of substantive procedures in the current year. 
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Participants were provided with a current year planning workpaper that conveyed 
information regarding the current year implementation of an enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) system module by the client. A client environment depicting a current year system 
change was chosen because in periods where no system change occurs, the role of CAS 
within the audit team is reduced and auditors become less reliant on their own AIS 
expertise. Participants were informed that the client was currently in the second year of a 
planned four-year implementation of an ERP system. Further, participants learned that 
the client implemented both the Financial Accounting and Materials Management 
modules of the system in the prior year and that the Sales and Distribution module was 
implemented in the current year.20 Audit engagement management (the audit partner and 
manager) had concluded that the transaction cycle affected by the current year module 
implementation was the sales and accounts receivable cycle and that cycle had been 
deemed to be “computer dominant and complex” for the first time in the current year. 
The conclusion reached by this workpaper is that audit staff would be used to test the 
manual internal controls of the system, while a CAS from the firm would be used to test 
the system controls. After reviewing the planning workpaper, participants were asked to 
assess and document a preliminary inherent risk level associated with the sales and 
accounts receivable cycle. 
After making their inherent risk assessments, participants were provided with the 
CAS competence manipulation (See section 3.3.4.1 below) and the internal control 
                                                 
 
20 In the initial year of ERP implementations, the majority of companies implement the Financial 
Accounting module that directly affects every transaction cycle (O’Leary 2000). The investigation of such 
an implementation is beyond the scope of this study. The second year of a planned four-year, phased 
implementation was chosen because modules that directly affect specific transaction cycles are often 
implemented at this time (e.g., Sales and Distribution) and risks are greater in the earlier, rather than latter, 
phases of implementations (O’Leary 2000). 
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testing workpaper prepared by the CAS. With respect to the testing of manual controls, 
all participants were told that the audit staff assistant who performed the manual control 
testing was competent and the results of those tests indicated that manual controls for the 
cycle were reliable. The CAS’s internal control workpaper indicated the types of controls 
tested in relation to the sales and accounts receivable cycle as well as the results of those 
tests.21 The workpaper also concluded system controls to be “reliable.” After receiving 
the CAS competence information and CAS workpaper, participants’ perceptions of CAS 
evidence reliability were measured. Participants were then asked to assess and document 
a preliminary control risk level associated with the sales and accounts receivable cycle. 
After the completion of their risk assessments, participants prepared two audit 
programs: one for the substantive testing of the sales account and one for accounts 
receivable. Participants also provided a budget for each substantive procedure within the 
two programs. The audit programs and budgets allowed participants to determine the 
nature (i.e., procedures performed and staff level used), timing (i.e., interim or final 
testing), and extent (i.e., budget) of substantive procedures related to the accounts. As in 
practice, participants had prior year workpapers available when providing both their 
current year risk assessments and substantive testing decisions.  
When participants finished their audit programs and budgets, they completed a 
post-experimental questionnaire. First, a CAS competence manipulation check was 
measured along with some participant perceptions regarding aspects of the case. Next, 
participants completed a series of questions that measured the independent variable of 
AIS expertise (see section 3.3.4.2 below). Lastly, participants responded to questions that 
                                                 
 
21 Prior research has described control risk as consisting of (1) control strength, (2) test strength, and (3) test 
results (Libby et al. 1985; Maletta and Kida 1993). 
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measured demographic and control variables (e.g., experience levels with: ERP 
implementations, assessing risks, etc.). See Figure 2 for a diagram of the quasi-
experimental task. 
3.3.4 Discussion of Manipulation and Measurement of the Independent Variables 
3.3.4.1 Computer Assurance Specialist Competence       
 The construct of source competence has been operationalized by prior audit 
research in many different ways. Participants (auditors) in these experiments were 
exposed to sources of audit evidence that varied in their technical ability, prior work 
evaluations received, previous year’s audit performance, training, supervision, years of 
experience, knowledge of the client, education, and defined responsibilities (Bamber 
1983; Brown 1983; Schneider 1984; Margheim 1986; Rebele et al. 1988; Anderson et 
al.1994; Hirst 1994). While the format of the source competence manipulations have 
typically differed in prior studies, manipulations of this variable were always high and 
low competence. A high and low manipulation of source competence was used in this 
study in order to facilitate comparison of its results to those of the prior literature. 
 In order to determine how to manipulate the conditions of high and low CAS 
competence, a survey was developed with the assistance of an audit senior and manager 
as suggested by Brown (1983) and Joyce (1979) (see Appendix A for the survey). Three 
seniors and six newly promoted managers from three offices of an international 
accounting firm completed the survey. After some demographic and CAS interaction 
questions, the survey asked the participants to provide the indicators that most influenced 
their perceptions of CAS competence. Survey participants were provided with factors 
used in prior source competence studies along with some additional indicators unique to 
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the CAS context. The survey then asked the auditors to supply any additional areas in 
which CAS competence is evaluated in order to ensure that factors excluded from the 
survey were considered. All of the respondents had experience interacting with CAS and 
evaluating their audit evidence. From the results of the survey it was clear that one aspect 
of the CAS/auditor relationship significantly affects auditors’ perceptions of CAS 
competence. Eight of the nine auditors responded that CAS experience in auditing 
systems (in years) was an indicator of CAS competence.  
The identification of experience as an indicator of general source competence is 
consistent with prior research (Schneider 1984; Rebele et al. 1988; Anderson et al. 1994). 
Given the context of this study and the nature of prior source competence manipulations, 
follow-up discussions with the survey respondents indicated that CAS training with 
complex AIS and prior CAS job performance would also influence their competence 
perceptions. The use of training and prior performance as indicators of competence is 
consistent with prior source competence studies in the audit environment (Bamber 1983; 
Brown 1983; Margheim 1986; Rebele et al. 1988; Anderson et al. 1994). Since the 
majority of the respondents considered all three indicators of CAS competence 
(experience, training, and prior job performance) during the course of their engagements, 
it is unclear which of the three aspects of CAS competence are most important to auditor 
judgments. Accordingly, the manipulation of CAS competence in this study made use of 
all three facets of the construct as suggested by Kadous and Magro (2001). These three 
indicators were manipulated, concurrently, as either high or low between subjects. To 
gain further insight into which facets are most important to auditor perceptions of CAS 
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competence, participants were asked in a post-experimental questionnaire the importance 
of each facet to their CAS competence judgment.   
 From further discussions with practicing auditors and a review of source 
competence manipulations found in the literature, it was determined how each of these 
three factors would be manipulated as either high or low. CAS experience was 
manipulated by informing participants of the year(s) of experience the CAS had in testing 
the reliability of system controls (Schneider 1984; Rebele et al. 1988).  For the high and 
low CAS competence groups the experience was four years and eight months, 
respectively.22 Consistent with other studies that have used training as an indicator of 
competence (e.g., Anderson et al. 1994), the high (low) competence group was told that 
the CAS had received (had yet to receive) training in relation to the specific AIS 
implemented by the client in the current year. Lastly, similar to the source competence 
manipulation by Bamber (1983), the CAS’s prior performance on another audit was 
conveyed to participants. The high (low) CAS competence group was informed that a 
fellow senior received strong (weak) tests of controls from the CAS in a previous audit.  
3.3.4.2 Auditor AIS Expertise 
3.3.4.2.1 Development of Auditor AIS Expertise Measure 
 
 While the level of CAS competence is a trait associated with the audit 
engagement, auditor AIS expertise is a trait associated with the individual auditor. 
Similar to other domains of audit expertise (Abdolmohammadi and Shanteau 1992), an 
objective standard or observable measure of AIS expertise either does not exist or would 
be infeasible to measure. Also, in this study it is predicted that as auditor self-assessments 
                                                 
 
22 In their study of ERP system risks, Wright and Wright (2002) used experienced CAS in their semi-
structured interviews. The mean experience level (in years with their firm) of these CAS was 3.97 years.  
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of AIS expertise increase, perceptions of self-efficacy with respect to planning judgments 
affected by the AIS will increase. Ajzen (1991) suggests that when self-efficacy 
perceptions are expected to affect behavior, one must directly measure the construct that 
determines the level of self-efficacy. Thus, since one cannot readily manipulate factors 
such as forms of intelligence (Peecher and Solomon 2001) and an observable measure of 
AIS would be very difficult to obtain, similar to Bonner and Lewis (1990), auditors’ self-
assessments of their AIS expertise were measured via a post-experimental questionnaire.  
Given that no measure of auditor AIS expertise exists in the literature, prior 
research examining the construct of expertise, along with Ajzen’s studies of self-efficacy, 
were reviewed to create a multiple-item scale designed to assess auditors’ self-
perceptions of AIS expertise. Additional measurement items suggested from surveys with 
accounting students were added to the scale to complement the items indicated by prior 
research. Lastly, the multiple-item scale created for the purposes of this study was pre-
tested for internal consistency (reliability) and construct validity with 45 practicing audit 
seniors. 
Prior research has focused on the role that domain-specific experience plays in 
expertise (e.g., Bonner 1990; Bonner and Lewis 1990; Ashton 1991; Mauldin and 
Ruchala 1999). Experience is presumably the basis for obtaining the knowledge needed 
to become an expert (Abdolmohammadi and Shanteau 1992). As such, included in the 
multiple-item scale were measures of auditor’s perceptions of their experience levels with 
auditing AIS, their time spent auditing AIS, and how early in their careers they began 
auditing AIS. Training in a given domain is expected to combine with experience to 
increase domain-specific expertise levels (Bonner and Lewis 1990; Bedard and Chi 
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1993). Therefore, the level of perceived AIS training of auditors, both formal and 
informal, was measured.  
As discussed previously, Ajzen (1991) suggests that when self-efficacy 
perceptions are expected to affect behavior, one must directly measure the construct that 
determines the level of self-efficacy. Thus, in addition, auditor perceptions of AIS 
expertise were directly measured. Lastly, from surveys with accounting students, four 
other measures of AIS expertise were found to both converge with the aforementioned 
measures of perceived AIS expertise and reliably measure the construct. These additional 
items were: their perceived comfort with auditing AIS, their enjoyment received from 
auditing AIS, the role of AIS in their future careers, and the importance of AIS in their 
day-to-day audit activities.23  
Auditors were asked to evaluate their AIS expertise relative to other audit seniors 
(in-charges). This reference point is appropriate given that the effects of auditor AIS 
expertise were measured between participants. It is also most applicable to seniors 
because their skills or expertise are rated against their fellow seniors during the 
promotion and compensation process. Thus, seniors are generally informed with regard to 
their expertise levels in relation to those of their peers. The nine questions and the eight-
point Likert scale that were used to measure auditor self-assessments of AIS expertise are 
provided in Appendix D.  
The AIS expertise score of each participant was their average score from the nine 
responses. The participants in this study were partitioned in half as possessing high and 
low AIS expertise via the median auditor AIS expertise score. Due to the subjectiveness 
                                                 
 
23 In the pre-tests with accounting students, the word “computer” was used instead of “auditing” and “AIS” 
(e.g., the importance of computers in their day-to-day activities).   
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of the construct, the median score of the sample was used, as it is impossible to declare 
with certainty the exact point at which an auditor has or has not achieved high AIS 
expertise (Baron and Kenny 1986).  
After the sample of participants was (a) randomly assigned to CAS competence 
treatments of high and low and (b) post-experimentally split in half as possessing high 
and low AIS expertise, this study contained four groups or cells (see Figure 3). 
Measuring participant AIS expertise pre-experimentally and then assigning participants 
to CAS competence conditions based on their AIS expertise level would ensure 
approximately equal cell sizes, but constraints on participant access make such a method 
impractical. In addition, while splitting the two CAS competence groups in half via the 
median AIS expertise score in each of these two groups may ensure relatively equal cell 
sizes, such a split may cause participants’ AIS expertise classifications (high or low) to 
be a factor of which CAS competence treatment they were assigned. Therefore, the AIS 
expertise split did not occur within CAS competence groups, but rather at the participant 
level as described in the previous paragraph. Provided that participants are randomly 
assigned to CAS competence groups, such a split should assure approximately equal cell 
sizes. Section 3.3.4.2.2 offers a discussion and statistical analysis of such a 
dichotomization of the pre-test AIS expertise data. Lastly, additional analyses were 
performed (see footnote 32) that studied the effects of auditor AIS expertise as a 
continuous, rather than dichotomous, independent variable (i.e., mean participant score 
from questionnaire). 
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3.3.4.2.2 Assessment of Auditor AIS Expertise Measure 
 
As indicated above, the nine-item scale used to measure auditor AIS expertise 
was pre-tested with 45 practicing senior auditors. The results from this pre-test indicate 
the nine-item scale does possess significantly high levels of both internal consistency 
(reliability) and construct validity. Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to assess the internal 
consistency of the nine-item scale. Results from the pre-test provide an alpha level of 
0.9404, well above the generally accepted threshold of 0.70 recommended by Nunnally 
(1978).  
The assessment of construct validity (i.e., convergent and discriminant validity) 
for the nine-item measure of auditor AIS expertise was performed via exploratory factor 
analysis. Pre-test participants’ general audit experience levels, both in months of 
experience and year/level within firm, were included in the analysis to determine whether 
or not AIS expertise and general audit experience appear to measure the same factor (i.e., 
discriminant validity). Exploratory factor analysis via the Principle Components Analysis 
method was performed on the pre-test data (see Appendix E). 
First, a correlation matrix was produced for all eleven measures. Panel 1 of 
Appendix E contains the Spearman correlation matrix. Panel 1 depicts that all nine items 
intended to measure AIS expertise are significantly positively correlated at the alpha = 
.05 level. In addition, with the exception of the correlation between audit experience 
(AUDITEXP) and auditors’ perceptions of the role AIS will play in their career in the 
future (AISROLE), all correlations between the nine AIS items and the two general audit 
experience items are negative and not significant at the alpha = .05 level. The negative 
and significant correlation between AUDITEXP and AISROLE suggests that less 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
79
 
 
 
 
 
experienced auditors perceive that AIS will play a larger role in their career in the future. 
Next, factors (components) were extracted for all eleven items via Principal Components 
Analysis. See Panels 2 – 4 for the results of the factor extraction. Panel 2 provides the 
communalities of the eleven items. None of the extraction communalities for the items 
can be considered low or less than .50 (Gardner 2001); thus the factor analysis appears to 
account for much of the variance associated with these items. The eigenvalues and 
variance explained by each factor is presented in Panel 3. Utilizing Kaiser’s (1960) 
eigenvalue-one criterion, Panel 3 shows that 2 factors were extracted from the data (i.e., 
the results show two components have eigenvalues exceeding one). Panel 4 contains the 
principal components factor matrix, which presents how each of the eleven items loaded 
on the two factors identified in Panel 3. Inspection of Panel 4 reveals that Factor 
(Component) One loadings for all nine items intended to measure AIS expertise were 
satisfactorily greater than the commonly used threshold of .50 (Nunnally 1978). Panel 4 
also depicts that the two measures of audit experience, AUDITEXP and YEARINFI, had 
satisfactory loadings greater than .50 on Factor Two. Lastly, and not documented in 
Appendix E, orthogonal (Varimax) and oblique (Direct Oblimin) rotations of the factors 
do not qualitatively change the results depicted in Panel 4.  
 Section 3.3.4.2.1 discusses how the sample of participants was partitioned in half 
as possessing high and low AIS expertise via the median participant AIS expertise score. 
Such a split was performed on the pre-test data and the data was analyzed. As indicated 
above, the pre-test used the nine scales listed in Appendix D, but the scales were six, 
rather than eight, point. Similar to the scales noted in Appendix D, the six-point scales 
ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Participant scores were measured 
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as their average response to the nine, six-point scales (i.e., average AIS expertise score). 
The mean and median scores of the pre-test sample were 3.291 and 3.111, respectively. 
The sample was then split in half, with participants scoring below and above 3.111 being 
classified as low and high AIS expertise, respectively. Next, a one-tailed independent-
samples t test was performed to determine whether the mean for the high AIS expertise 
group was significantly greater than the mean of the low AIS group. The mean for the 
high AIS expertise group was significantly greater than that of the low AIS expertise 
group (means = 4.061 and 2.556, respectively, p <.001). Also, the group means indicate 
that, on average, the high AIS expertise group “agreed” that their AIS expertise exceeded 
other in-charge auditors, while the low AIS expertise “disagreed” with such an 
assessment. These differences between the high and low AIS expertise groups obtained 
from the pre-test data provide evidence that the auditor AIS expertise measure should 
supply two groups that maintain significantly different perceptions with respect to their 
own AIS expertise level. 
In summary, the results of the pre-test of the nine-item scale developed to 
measure auditors’ self-assessments of AIS expertise show that the measure does have a 
high level of internal consistency and construct validity (i.e., convergent and discriminant 
validity). The Cronbach’s alpha associated with the items was found to be satisfactory 
and all nine items loaded heavily on one factor. Given that the nine items were designed 
to measure auditor self-assessments of AIS expertise, this factor will be labeled “auditor 
AIS expertise” for the purposes of this study. In addition, the pre-test results suggest that 
self-assessments of AIS expertise are a unique and separate domain of expertise from that 
of general audit experience (i.e., evidence of discriminant validity). In fact, Panel 1 
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depicts that the correlation between audit experience and self-assessments of AIS 
expertise were generally insignificant and negative for the auditors participating in the 
pre-test. Lastly, additional analysis of the pre-test data indicates that the auditor AIS 
expertise measure should supply two groups that maintain significantly different 
perceptions with respect to their own AIS expertise level. 
 After participants have been randomly assigned to high and low CAS 
competence conditions and post-experimentally classified as possessing either high or 
low AIS expertise, this study contained four experimental groups or treatments. See 
Figure 3 for a depiction of these groups. 
3.3.5 Dependent Variables 
3.3.5.1 Inherent and Control Risk Assessments 
Each participant provided a preliminary inherent risk assessment for the sales and 
accounts receivable cycle after receiving all planning information related to the cycle, but 
before receiving the CAS competence manipulation and internal control testing 
workpapers. As discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, while the competence of CAS should 
affect the strength of internal control tests/control risk assessments, the competence of 
CAS should have no effect on inherent risk assessments. After being provided with the 
CAS competence manipulation and all internal control testing information, participants 
assessed preliminary control risk for the cycle. SAS No. 47 (1983) requires auditors to 
consider risks at the either the account-balance or class-of-transactions (cycle) level. 
Consistent with other audit risk assessment studies (e.g., Anderson and Maletta 1994; 
Davis 1996; Messier and Austen 2000), a transaction cycle, rather than an account-
balance, was chosen for examination. Additionally, cycle assessments were chosen 
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because (a) ERP systems are customized to, and thus affect, companies’ business cycles 
and (b) discussions with practitioners indicated that cycle assessments are commonly 
performed in practice.  
Prior research concerning auditor application of the audit risk model has 
measured inherent and control risk assessments via separate scales (e.g., Reimers et al. 
1993; Anderson and Maletta 1994; Dusenbury et al. 2000; Messier and Austen 2000). 
While the qualitative descriptions of scales in these studies have differed in presentation, 
these scales have generally had endpoints indicating “low risk” and “high risk.” This 
study adopted the scales used by Messier and Austen (2000) because the qualitative 
descriptions and percentages used in the scales are similar to the types of response 
mechanisms employed in practice (POB 2000). The scales ranged from 0 to 100 percent, 
with percentages labeled in increments of 10. Also, 0, 50, and 100 percent were labeled 
“low risk,” “moderate risk,” and “high risk,” respectively. Participants responded to the 
scale by inputting any whole number between 0 and 100 on a line below the scale. After 
providing each risk assessment, participants were asked to document their assessment 
levels as required by SAS No. 47 (1983) and SAS 55 (1988b). Because participants 
provided preliminary (versus final) risk assessments, they were asked to document 
possible risk issues or items requiring further examination (e.g., a review of employee 
turnover, training related to the ERP system implementation). 
3.3.5.2 Evidence Reliability Judgment 
After receiving the CAS competence manipulation and the current year internal 
control workpaper, each participant provided a judgment regarding the perceived 
reliability of the CAS audit evidence (i.e., CAS testing of system-related controls).  The 
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judgment was made on a scale adapted from Brown (1983) that ranges from 1 (“not 
reliable”) to 10 (“very reliable”).  
3.3.5.3 Scope of Planned Substantive Procedures 
After completing their risk assessments, participants were asked to prepare two 
audit programs for the substantive testing of the sales and accounts receivable accounts 
and a budget for each substantive procedure. As described by SAS No. 47 (1983), the 
audit program and budget allowed participants to design the nature (i.e., procedures 
performed and staff level used), timing (i.e., interim or final testing), and extent (i.e., 
budget) of substantive procedures related to the accounts. The “nature” of participants’ 
scope decisions was measured in two ways: (1) as the total number of procedures planned 
(Procedures) similar to Low (2004), and (2) as the total number of procedures assigned to 
a more senior-level auditor than staff assistant (Labor) as suggested by O’Keefe et al. 
(1994) and Low (2004). Consistent with SAS No. 47 (1983), the “timing” of participants’ 
scope decisions (Timing) was computed as the total number of procedures to be tested at 
fiscal year-end (versus interim), and the “extent” of their decisions (Extent) refers to the 
total number of budgeted audit hours (Mock and Wright 1993). With respect to the four 
variables used to measure “scope,” more planned procedures, more procedures assigned 
to senior-level auditors, more procedures tested at fiscal year-end, or more budgeted 
hours indicate audit procedures that are greater in scope (e.g., AICPA 1983; Mock and 
Wright 1993). As in practice, participants had prior year workpapers available when 
providing both their current year risk assessments and substantive testing decisions.24   
                                                 
 
24 In the case provided to participants, all prior year substantive tests of sales and accounts receivable were 
assigned to a staff assistant (see Appendix C). Assigning current year substantive tests to an auditor who is 
more experienced than a staff assistant (e.g., an audit senior) indicates an expansion of audit scope. Also, 
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3.3.5.4 Quality of Risk Assessments and Effectiveness of Substantive Procedures 
 Two groups, each with three expert auditors, reviewed the entire experimental 
case under one of the two CAS competence conditions (i.e., high or low). These experts 
then each assessed the inherent and control risk levels associated with the sales and 
accounts receivable cycle, along with providing justification for their assessments. 
Similar to Tan (1995), the mean assessments of the experts served as the criteria for 
measuring the judgment quality of the participants. The quality of a participant’s inherent 
risk assessments was calculated as the absolute deviation of their assessment from the 
mean inherent risk assessment of all six experts (i.e., CAS competence is not 
hypothesized to affect inherent risk). Control risk assessment quality was measured as the 
absolute deviation of the participant’s risk assessment from the mean assessment of the 
experts assigned to the same CAS competence condition. After providing their risk 
assessments, like Low (2004), the experts individually evaluated the effectiveness of the 
planned substantive procedures (i.e., programs and budgets) of each participant assigned 
to their condition. Experts provided their effectiveness evaluations via a 10-point Likert 
scale with endpoints of 1 and 10 labeled “very low” and “very high,” respectively. The 
mean score from the three experts assigned to their condition was used as an 
effectiveness measure for the participants. 
3.3.6 Other Measured Variables and Manipulation Check 
Several variables were measured in the post-experimental questionnaire for the 
purposes of determining their effects on the dependent variables of this study. 
Participants answered questions including their: amount of interaction with CAS, amount 
                                                                                                                                                 
eight of twelve prior year substantive tests were performed at interim. Planning the performance of 
substantive tests at fiscal year-end indicates an expansion of audit scope (AICPA 1983). 
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of audit work performed in ERP environments, experience with assessing risk and 
substantive planning decisions, perceptions of the likelihood that ERP implementations 
lead to increased inherent and control risks, confidence levels in their inherent and 
control risk assessments, perceptions of control strength, perceptions of test results, 
participant motivation, perceptions of the effect of financial statement changes on their 
planning judgments, and perceptions of the existence of CAS competence variation in 
practice. Demographic variables that were measured included participant experience, 
level/year in firm, and experience auditing manufacturing clients. Lastly, a manipulation 
check of CAS competence levels was performed by measuring participant perceptions of 
CAS competence via a scale with endpoints of 1 (“very low”) and 10 (“very high”). 
3.3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter developed the hypotheses of this study and the quasi-experimental 
method that was used to test those hypotheses. The next chapter will present and discuss 
the results of the data analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
4.1       Introduction 
Chapter 3 developed the hypotheses and discussed the design of the study. The 
research methodology was designed to evaluate the main and interactive effects of 
computer assurance specialist (CAS) competence and auditor accounting information 
system (AIS) expertise on auditor planning judgments in a complex AIS environment.  
This chapter provides the results of the study and a discussion of the findings. 
This chapter is organized as follows: a description of the participants is provided, 
various aspects of the quasi-experimental materials are analyzed, the hypotheses are 
tested, and the results are summarized. 
 
4.2 Description of Participants  
A total of one hundred-fourteen experimental packets were provided to firm 
liaisons at two national and four international public accounting firms. The offices of the 
firms that participated in the study were located in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, 
Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and West regions of the United States. Firm liaisons 
were instructed to distribute the packets to senior-level auditors; responses were returned 
directly to Drexel University.  Seventy-three usable responses were received.25 The 
responses by cell/group are included in Table 1. 
                                                 
 
25 Reliable information could not be obtained from the firm liaisons as to how many of the 114 
experimental packets were actually distributed to potential participants. It is known, however, that not all of 
the 114 packets were distributed. Also, the estimated minimal response rate for this study (64%) was 
similar to other investigations of auditor judgment processes that have distributed experimental materials in 
an analogous fashion (e.g., Ayers and Nagy 1998; Messier and Austen 2000; Taylor 2000). 
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Participants’ total years of public accounting experience ranged from 1.00 to 
10.92 years. Mean total years of public accounting experience equaled 3.68 years (44.21 
months). Chapter 3 identified the appropriate participants as senior auditors (auditors 
with typically two to five years of audit experience) from national and international 
accounting firms. Based upon the participants’ mean experience levels and rank, the 
sample appears to be appropriate for the study.  
Tables 2 and 3 present a summary of the demographic backgrounds of the 
participants and the results of the statistical analyses of the demographic information, 
respectively. To examine whether there were pre-existing differences between the groups 
in terms of their demographic characteristics, a one-way ANOVA was performed for 
each of the following demographic variables: (1) audit experience, (2) experience 
interacting with CAS, (3) experience assessing risks, (4) experience planning substantive 
procedures, (5) experience with clients that have implemented enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) systems, (6) likelihood of being assigned to a similar audit engagement 
as the case study, and (7) manufacturing industry experience. None of the demographic 
variables were found to be significantly different between groups, indicating that any 
statistically significant results related to the hypotheses of this study are not likely to be 
attributable to these demographic variables. 
 
4.3      Manipulation Check and Measurement of the Independent Variables 
4.3.1 Manipulation Check for CAS Competence 
As noted in section 3.3.4.1, participants were randomly assigned to low and high 
CAS competence conditions. After completion of the case study, participants were asked 
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to respond, on a ten-point Likert-type scale, to the statement: “The competence (ability) 
level of the computer assurance specialist (CAS) Chris Smith assigned to the Madison 
Inc. audit engagement was,” with 1 being “very low” and 10 being “very high.”  The 
independent-samples t test results are documented in Table 4. For the low and high 
competence groups, the mean responses were 3.77 and 7.91, respectively. These means 
were statistically significant (p < .001) and in the expected direction, with participants in 
the low CAS competence group perceiving significantly lower CAS competence levels 
than participants in the high CAS competence group. Thus, it appears that the participants 
attended to and understood the intended manipulation.   
This study used three factors to manipulate CAS competence and additional 
information regarding the manipulation is contained in section 3.3.4.1. Participants were 
provided with information concerning the CAS’s experience, training, and prior job 
performance (see section 3.3.4.1 for further information regarding how these factors were 
manipulated between the low and high CAS competence groups). Post-experimentally, 
participants were asked on a scale from 1 (“not important”) to 10 (“very important”) the 
importance of these factors when evaluating the competence of the CAS in the case 
study. Non-tabulated results indicate that all three factors were deemed to be relatively 
important by the participants with sample means of 7.12, 7.70, and 7.92 for experience, 
training, and prior job performance, respectively. In addition, the importance of the three 
factors were not significantly different between the low and high CAS competence 
groups (all p’s > .150). These results indicate that each factor, at both its high and low 
levels, served as a functional determinant of CAS competence. 
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To evaluate the realism of the low and high CAS competence manipulations, 
participants were asked to respond to the following two post-experimental questions: (a) 
“CAS similar to the CAS described in the case study exist at my firm” on a scale from 1 
(“disagree”) to 10 (“agree”) and (b) “the likelihood that a CAS similar to the CAS 
described in this case study could be assigned to an audit engagement is” on a scale from 
1 (“very low”) to 10 (“very high”). Non-tabulated results provide evidence that sample 
participants felt that the CAS presented in both the low and high conditions were similar 
to CAS at their respective firms. Mean responses for the low and high conditions for 
question (a) were 7.85 and 7.26, respectively, and for question (b) 6.90 and 6.62, 
respectively. All differences between low and high CAS competence groups were 
insignificant (all p’s > .150). Given the high mean responses to both of the questions and 
the lack of significant differences between the low and high CAS competence conditions, 
it appears the manipulation of CAS competence was equally realistic in both its low and 
high conditions. 
4.3.2   Measurement of Auditor AIS Expertise 
 Nine items were used to measure auditor AIS expertise. Participants recorded 
their responses to these items on eight-point scales (see Appendix D for scale questions). 
Section 3.3.4.2 provides information regarding the development of the AIS expertise 
measure. Reliability and factor analysis results indicate that the nine-item measure does 
possess significantly high levels of both internal consistency (reliability) and construct 
validity. Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to assess the internal consistency of the 
measure. Results from the sample provide an alpha level of 0.9649, well above the 
generally accepted threshold of 0.70 recommended by Nunnally (1978).  
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The assessment of construct validity (i.e., convergent and discriminant validity) 
for the nine-item measure of auditor AIS expertise was performed via exploratory factor 
analysis. Participants’ general audit experience, in months, was also included in the 
analysis to determine whether or not AIS expertise and general audit experience appear to 
measure the same factor (i.e., discriminant validity). Exploratory factor analysis via the 
Principle Components Analysis method was performed on the sample data (see Tables 5 
through 8). 
First, a correlation matrix was produced for all ten measures (i.e., nine AIS 
expertise measures and one general audit experience measure). Table 5 contains the 
Spearman correlation matrix. Table 5 depicts that all nine items intended to measure AIS 
expertise were significantly positively correlated (all p’s < .001). In addition, none of the 
nine AIS expertise items were significantly correlated with the general audit experience 
item (all p’s > .25). The lack of correlation between the AIS expertise items and the 
measure of general audit experience suggests that auditor AIS expertise is a distinct 
domain of expertise maintained by auditors and not simply a by-product of general audit 
experience. 
Next, factors (components) were extracted for all ten items via Principal 
Components Analysis. See Tables 6 through 8 for the results of the factor extraction. 
Table 6 provides the communalities of the ten items (i.e., measures of how much variance 
the items have in common with all the other items in the analysis). All of the extraction 
communalities for the items are well above the generally used threshold of .50 (Gardner 
2001); thus the factor analysis illustrated in Tables 7 and 8 appears to account for a 
majority of the variance associated with these items. The eigenvalues and variance 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
91
 
 
 
 
 
explained by each component/factor are presented in Table 7. Utilizing Kaiser’s (1960) 
eigenvalue-one criterion, Table 7 shows that two factors were extracted from the data 
(i.e., the results show two components have eigenvalues exceeding one). Table 8 presents 
the principal components factor matrix, which indicates how each of the ten items loaded 
on the two factors identified in Table 7. Inspection of Table 8 reveals that Factor 
(Component) One loadings for all nine items intended to measure AIS expertise were 
satisfactorily greater than the commonly used threshold of .50 (Nunnally 1978). Table 8 
also depicts that the measure of audit experience (AUDEXP) had satisfactory loadings 
greater than .50 on Factor Two. Lastly, and not tabulated, orthogonal (Varimax) and 
oblique (Direct Oblimin) rotations of the factors do not qualitatively change the results 
depicted in Table 8.  
 Section 3.3.4.2.1 discusses how the sample of participants was partitioned into 
two groups possessing high or low AIS expertise via the median participant AIS expertise 
score. Such a split was performed on the sample data and the data was analyzed. 
Participants’ mean AIS expertise scores were measured as their mean response to the 
nine items listed in Appendix D. Table 9 contains descriptive statistics and the frequency 
distribution for the mean AIS expertise scores. The mean and median scores of the 
sample were 3.513 and 3.222, respectively. In addition, the sample’s mean AIS expertise 
scores appear to be well distributed.  
The sample was then split into two groups, with participants scoring below and 
above 3.222 being classified as possessing low and high AIS expertise, respectively.26 A 
                                                 
 
26Two participants provided mean AIS expertise scores equal to the sample median of 3.222.  One of these 
two participants was randomly assigned to the low AIS expertise group and the other was randomly 
assigned to the high AIS expertise group. A reversal of assignment or exclusion of these two participants 
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one-tailed independent-samples t test (results not tabulated) was performed to determine 
whether the mean for the high AIS expertise group was significantly greater than the 
mean of the low AIS group, which was the case (means = 5.052 and 2.015, respectively, 
p < .001). Based on the scale labels for AIS expertise measurement items, responses of 5 
and 2 indicate that participants “mildly agreed” and “mostly disagreed” that their AIS 
expertise exceeded other in-charge auditors, respectively (see Appendix D for the nine 
items and the relevant eight-point response scales). These differences between the high 
and low AIS expertise groups indicate that participants in the two groups maintained 
significantly different perceptions of their own AIS expertise levels. 
In summary, test results of the nine items developed to measure auditor AIS 
expertise show that the measure does have a high level of internal consistency and 
construct validity (i.e., convergent and discriminant validity). The Cronbach’s alpha 
associated with the items was found to be satisfactory, and all nine AIS expertise 
measurement items loaded heavily on one factor. Given that the nine items were designed 
to measure auditor self-assessments of AIS expertise, this factor was labeled “auditor AIS 
expertise” for the purposes of this study. In addition, the results suggest that auditor AIS 
expertise is a unique and separate domain of expertise from that of general audit 
experience (i.e., evidence of discriminant validity). This study’s random assignment of 
participants to high and low CAS competence conditions and post-experimental 
classification of participants into high or low AIS expertise groups provides four 
experimental groups or treatments (see Table 1).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
from the analyses below does not qualitatively affect the conclusions drawn with respect to hypothesis 
testing in section 4.5 below.   
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4.4  Testing of Statistical Assumptions 
As will be discussed in section 4.5 below, ANOVA and independent-samples t 
tests were used to test the hypotheses of this study. Three assumptions underlie these 
statistical analyses: (1) independence of dependent variables within and between 
treatment groups, (2) normal distribution of treatment populations, and (3) homogeneity 
of variances between treatment populations (Keppel 1991; Gardner 2001). The first 
assumption is that the observations must be independent.  As the subjects were randomly 
assigned to CAS competence groups and the assignment of participants to auditor AIS 
expertise groups was not substantially dependent upon the membership of any other 
participant in their group or any other group, this assumption is met (Keppel 1991; 
Gardner 2001). 
 The second assumption is that the treatment populations are normally distributed. 
This assumption was tested by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Ryan-Joiner tests of 
normality. Normality tests were performed for each of the hypothesized dependent 
variables for each of the four groups (see Table 1 for a depiction of the four groups). 
Nontabulated results indicate violations of the normality assumption (p’s < .05) for all of 
the hypothesized dependent variables within some of the groups, with the exception of 
the inherent risk assessment (Hypothesis 1a). However, it has been shown that ANOVA 
and independent-samples t tests are robust with respect to violations of this assumption 
(Glass et al. 1972). Violations of the normality assumption do not appreciably influence 
Type I or Type II error, especially when cell sizes are greater than 12 and approximately 
equal (Keppel 1991; Gardner 2001).   
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The third assumption concerns the homogeneity of variances between treatment 
populations.  This assumption was assessed by Levene’s test of homogeneity of 
variances. Levene tests were performed for each of the hypothesized dependent variables 
for each of the four groups. Nontabulated results specify no violations of this assumption 
(all p’s > .150), with the exception of the “evidence reliability” variable (i.e., the 
dependent variable of Hypothesis 2) with a p = .033. According to Wilcox (1987) and 
Keppel (1991), the absolute value of the independent-samples t statistic becomes biased 
in the positive direction (i.e., increasing the likelihood of a Type I error) when the largest 
within group variance divided by the smallest within group variance is 9 or greater. In 
order to evaluate the effects of heterogeneity of variances for the “evidence reliability” 
variable, such a calculation was performed with a result equaling 2.79. Thus, it appears 
the independent-samples t test for the “evidence reliability” variable will be relatively 
insensitive to the heterogeneity of variances present between groups.  
In summary, while the sample data does, at times, violate the ANOVA and 
independent-samples t test assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variances, it 
appears that statistical analyses will be robust to these departures. Thus, all data analysis 
in section 4.5 below will use ANOVA and independent-samples t tests (parametric tests). 
However, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test was also used for all of the hypothesis 
testing performed in section 4.5 due to the assumption violations noted above. The Mann-
Whitney test does not require that the above assumptions be met by the sample data. The 
results of this nonparametric testing (not tabulated) are not qualitatively different from 
the results of parametric tests reported in section 4.5. 
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4.5 Hypothesis Testing 
4.5.1  Introduction 
The remainder of this chapter contains the results of hypotheses testing. These 
tests examine the effects of auditor AIS expertise and/or CAS competence on auditor 
planning judgments (e.g., inherent risk assessments, planned budgets, etc.). All 
hypotheses in chapter 3 depict relationships between one or two dichotomous 
independent variables and a single dependent variable. As such, hypothesis testing for 
this study was generally conducted within a 2X2 ANOVA framework or, where 
appropriate, independent-samples t tests were used.  
4.5.2  Relationship Between Auditor AIS Expertise and Auditor Planning 
Judgments (Hypothesis Set One) 
 Hypothesis Set One predicts the effect of auditor AIS expertise on auditor 
inherent assessments, control risk assessments, and planned substantive audit procedures. 
Hypothesis Set One, in the alternative form, states: 
H1a: Auditors with high AIS expertise will assess inherent risk at a higher level 
than auditors with low AIS expertise.  
 
H1b: Auditors with high AIS expertise will assess control risk at a higher level 
than auditors with low AIS expertise.  
 
H1c: Auditors with high AIS expertise will plan substantive audit procedures that 
are greater in scope than auditors with low AIS expertise.  
 
Each participant provided separate preliminary inherent and control risk 
assessments for the sales and accounts receivable cycle after evaluating all planning 
information related to the cycle. The risk scales ranged from 0 to 100 percent, with 
percentages labeled in increments of 10. Also, 0, 50, and 100 percent were labeled “low 
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risk,” “moderate risk,” and “high risk,” respectively. Participants responded to the scale 
by inputting any whole number between 0 and 100 on a line below the scale.27 
After completing their risk assessments, participants were asked to prepare two 
audit programs, one each for the substantive testing of the sales and accounts receivable 
accounts, along with a budget for each substantive procedure. The audit programs and 
budgets allowed participants to design the nature (i.e., procedures performed and staff 
level used), timing (i.e., interim or final testing), and extent (i.e., budget) of substantive 
procedures related to the accounts.28 The “nature” of participants’ scope decisions was 
measured in two ways: (1) the total number of procedures planned and (2) the number of 
procedures assigned to a more senior level auditor than staff assistant. The “timing” of 
participants’ scope decisions was measured as the total number of procedures to be tested 
at fiscal year-end, while the “extent” of their decisions was measured as the total number 
of budgeted audit hours. Thus, the scope of substantive procedures was measured with 
four dependent variables.29  
Table 10 presents the results of Hypothesis Set One testing. An independent-
samples t test was used to test Hypothesis 1a, as only AIS expertise is hypothesized to 
                                                 
 
27 As discussed in section 3.3.3, moderate inherent and control risk assessments from the prior year’s audit 
engagement (35% and 40%, respectively) were provided to participants. All prior year and current year 
audit workpapers included in the case study were prepared with the assistance of two senior managers and a 
partner from an international accounting firm. 
28 Audit programs and budgets from the prior year’s audit engagement were provided to participants. These 
materials contained a combined 12 audit procedures that were all performed by staff assistants. In addition, 
4 of the 12 procedures were tested at year-end/final (vs. interim) and the combined budget totaled 93 hours. 
There was no limit as to the number of procedures and budgeted hours the participants could provide for 
the current year audit. 
29 Hypothesis 1c predicts that auditors with higher AIS expertise will plan substantive audit procedures that 
are greater in scope. With respect to the four variables used to measure “scope,” more planned procedures, 
more procedures assigned to senior-level auditors, more procedures tested at fiscal year-end, and more 
budgeted hours indicate audit procedures that are greater in scope. 
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effect auditors’ inherent risk assessments.30 Because both AIS Expertise and CAS 
competence are expected to affect auditors’ control risk assessments and scope of 
substantive procedures, the F statistic for the main effect of auditor AIS expertise from 
the overall 2X2 ANOVA is presented for all other dependent variables in Table 10.31 
Significance levels presented in Table 10 are one-tailed due to the directional nature of 
the corresponding hypotheses (Keppel 1991). Mean inherent risk assessments for the low 
and high AIS expertise groups were 39.86 and 54.17, respectively. These means are in 
the hypothesized direction. Independent-samples t test results indicate a significant AIS 
expertise effect (t = -4.207, p < .001). Thus, Hypothesis 1a is supported by the sample 
data. Mean control risk assessments for the two groups were significant (i.e., the 
difference between group means was statistically significant) and in the expected 
direction, with the mean assessments for the low and high AIS groups being 46.70 and 
60.14, respectively (F = 12.266, p < .001). Thus, there is support for Hypothesis 1b. 
Table 10 also provides the descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for the 
dependent variables: (1) number of procedures planned (Procedures), (2) number of 
                                                 
 
30 Hypotheses 1a, 5a, 5b, and 5c predict that auditor AIS expertise will affect auditor inherent risk 
assessments, the quality of their inherent risk and control risk assessments, and the effectiveness of their 
substantive tests. Univariate tests of the hypothesized relationships are reported in sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.6. 
Because AIS expertise is expected to affect multiple dependent variables, MANOVA (including all of the 
aforementioned dependent variables) was conducted prior to performing all univariate tests in order to 
control the experimentwise Type I error rate (Gardner 2001). Non-tabulated MANOVA results indicate a 
significant AIS expertise effect (p = .001), thus providing support that significant univariate test results 
reported herein are not the result of an inflated experimentwise Type I error rate (Gardner 2001).  
31 Hypotheses 1b, 1c, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b predict the main and interactive effects of auditor AIS expertise 
and CAS competence on auditor control risk assessments and their scope decisions. Univariate tests of the 
hypothesized relationships are reported in sections 4.5.2, 4.5.4, and 4.5.5. Because these independent 
variables are expected to affect multiple dependent variables, MANOVA (including all of the 
aforementioned dependent variables) was conducted prior to performing all univariate tests in order to 
control the experimentwise Type I error rate (Gardner 2001). Non-tabulated MANOVA results indicate 
significant or marginally significant effects for AIS expertise, CAS competence, and their interaction      
(p’s = .008, .089, and .115), thus providing support that significant univariate test results reported herein 
are not the result of an inflated experimentwise Type I error rate (Gardner 2001).  
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procedures assigned to a more senior level auditor than staff assistant (Labor), (3) number 
of procedures to be tested at fiscal year-end (Timing), and (4) the number of budgeted 
audit hours (Extent). Ceteris paribus, an increase in any of these four measures indicates 
an increase in scope (i.e., support for Hypothesis 1c). Mean Procedures for the low and 
high AIS expertise groups were significant and in the expected direction (12.00 and 
12.97, respectively; F = 5.211, p = .013). Thus, on average, auditors with high expertise 
planned significantly more procedures than auditors with low AIS expertise. Mean Labor 
for the low and high AIS expertise groups were 2.32 and 3.31, respectively. These means 
were in the hypothesized direction and significant (F = 4.058, p = .024). Therefore, on 
average, auditors with higher AIS expertise also assigned more senior auditors to perform 
the procedures. Mean Timing for the low and high AIS expertise groups (4.89 and 5.67, 
respectively) were in the expected direction, though only significant at p = .125 (F = 
1.351). Mean Extent for the low and high AIS expertise groups were 100.77 and 107.33, 
respectively. Again, these means are in the hypothesized direction, though significant at 
only the p = .130 level (t = 1.296).  
Results support Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c. The above results indicate that 
auditors with higher AIS expertise provided higher inherent and control risk assessments 
than auditors with lower AIS expertise. High AIS expertise auditors also planned 
substantive tests that were greater in scope. Specifically, they used the nature (Procedures 
and Labor) of audit procedures to expand their scope. Though not significantly, high AIS 
expertise auditors also expanded the scope of testing with respect to the timing and extent  
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of planned procedures.32  
4.5.3  Relationship Between CAS Competence and Auditor Evidence Reliability 
Judgments (Hypothesis Two) 
 Hypothesis Two predicts the effect of CAS competence on auditor evidence 
reliability judgments. Hypothesis Two, in the alternative form, states: 
H2: Auditors will judge evidence from a CAS with high competence as more 
reliable than evidence from a CAS with low competence.  
 
After receiving the CAS competence manipulation and the CAS’s current year 
internal control workpaper, each participant provided a judgment regarding the perceived 
reliability of the CAS audit evidence (i.e., CAS testing of system-related controls).  The 
judgments were made on a scale that ranged from 1 (“not reliable”) to 10 (“very 
reliable”).  
Table 11 presents the results of Hypothesis Two testing. The significance level 
presented in Table 11 is one-tailed due to the directional nature of the corresponding 
hypothesis. Mean evidence reliability judgments for the low and high CAS competence 
groups were 3.69 and 7.15, respectively, and in the hypothesized direction. Independent-
samples t test results indicate a significant CAS competence effect (t = -7.880, p < .001). 
Thus, Hypothesis Two is supported by the sample data. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
32 In addition to the ANOVA and independent-samples t tests used to test Hypothesis Sets One, Four, and 
Five, simple and multiple (with CAS competence as a (0,1) dummy variable) linear regressions were 
performed using each participants’ mean AIS expertise score as an independent (i.e., continuous) variable. 
The regression results were generally consistent with the ANOVA and independent-samples t test results 
presented in sections 4.5.2, 4.5.5, and 4.5.6.   
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4.5.4  Relationship Between CAS Competence and Auditor Planning Judgments 
(Hypothesis Set Three) 
 Hypothesis Set Three predicts the effect of CAS competence on auditor control 
risk assessments and planned substantive audit procedures. Hypothesis Set Three, in the 
alternative form, states: 
H3a: Auditors using positive evidence from a CAS with high competence will 
assess control risk at a lower level than auditors using positive evidence from a 
CAS with low competence. 
  
H3b: Auditors using positive evidence from a CAS with high competence will 
plan substantive audit procedures that are lesser in scope than auditors using 
positive evidence from a CAS with low competence.  
 
Section 4.5.2 provides a description of the measurement of the dependent 
variables. Table 12 presents the results of Hypothesis Set Three testing. As both AIS 
expertise and CAS competence are expected to affect control risk and scope, the F 
statistic for the main effect of CAS competence from the overall 2X2 ANOVA is 
presented for all dependent variables in Table 12 (see footnote 31). Significance levels 
presented in Table 12 are one-tailed due to the directional nature of the corresponding 
hypotheses. Mean control risk assessments for the low and high CAS competence groups 
were 58.21 and 47.74, respectively. Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, these means were in 
the hypothesized direction and significant (F = 7.851, p = .004).  
Table 12 also provides the descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for the 
dependent variables: (1) number of procedures planned (Procedures), (2) number of 
procedures assigned to a more senior level auditor than staff assistant (Labor), (3) number 
of procedures to be tested at fiscal year-end (Timing), and (4) the number of budgeted 
audit hours (Extent). Ceteris paribus, an increase in any of these four measures indicates 
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an increase in scope (i.e., support for Hypothesis 3b). Mean Procedures for the low and 
high CAS competence groups were in the expected direction (12.64 and 12.29, 
respectively), but the difference was insignificant (F = .974, p = .164). Labor means for 
the low and high CAS competence groups were 3.15 and 2.41, respectively. These means 
were in the hypothesized direction and significant at the p = .051 level (F = 2.753). As 
expected, mean Timing for the low CAS competence group was higher than that of the 
high CAS competence group (5.56 and 4.94, respectively), though this difference is not 
significant (F = .922, p = .170). Lastly, Extent means for the low and high CAS 
competence groups were 107.33 and 100.19, respectively. These means are in the 
hypothesized direction and significant at p = .085 (F = 1.932).  
The above results indicate a significant CAS competence effect on auditors’ 
control risk assessments, with higher CAS competence levels causing auditors to 
decrease their control risk assessments.33 Thus, Hypothesis 3a is supported. Auditors also 
reacted to higher CAS competence by planning substantive audit procedures that were 
lesser in scope than auditors using evidence from a CAS with low competence. In 
particular, they used the nature (Labor) and extent of audit procedures to reduce their 
scope. Therefore, there is support for Hypothesis 3b. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
33 As discussed in section 3.3.3, CAS evidence provided to the auditors was positive and concluded that 
system controls appear “reliable.” Thus, the CAS evidence supports a reduction of control risk assessments 
and the scope of planned substantive procedures.  
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4.5.5  The Interactive Effect of Auditor AIS Expertise and CAS Competence on 
 Auditor Planning Judgments (Hypothesis Set Four) 
 Hypothesis Set Four predicts an interactive effect of auditor AIS expertise and 
CAS competence on auditor control risk assessments and planned substantive audit 
procedures. Hypothesis Set Four, in the alternative form, states: 
H4a: The difference between high AIS expertise auditors’ and low AIS expertise 
auditors’ control risk assessments will be greater when CAS competence is low 
than when it is high.  
 
H4b: The difference between high AIS expertise auditors’ and low AIS expertise 
auditors’ scope of planned substantive audit procedures will be greater when CAS 
competence is low than when it is high. 
 
 Figure 1 presents a graphical illustration of Hypothesis Set Four. In order to test 
the interaction hypotheses above, participants were coded into four groups (1-4) as 
depicted in Table 1. Group 1 consisted of participants with high AIS expertise and 
assigned to the low CAS competence condition.  Group 2 consisted of participants with 
high AIS expertise and assigned to the high CAS competence condition. The low auditor 
AIS expertise condition in which CAS competence was low (high) was labeled Group 3 
(4). In terms of group dependent variable means, the above hypotheses were tested with 
the following planned contrast within a 2X2 ANOVA: 
(Group 1 Mean – Group 3 Mean) > (Group 2 Mean – Group 4 Mean).  
 Section 4.5.2 provides a description of the measurement of the dependent 
variables. Table 13 presents the results of Hypothesis Set Four testing (see footnote 31). 
Significance levels presented in Table 13 are one-tailed when the value of the contrast is 
consistent with the directional nature of the corresponding hypotheses (i.e., positive). 
Panel A of Table 13 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. Panel 
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B of Table 13 depicts the planned contrast for the dependent variable control risk 
assessment. The value of this contrast is -2.30 and insignificant (two-tailed p = .780). 
Thus, Hypothesis 4a is not supported by the sample data. 
Table 13 Panel B also provides planned contrasts for the dependent variables: (1) 
number of procedures planned (Procedures), (2) number of procedures assigned to a more 
senior level auditor than staff assistant (Labor), (3) number of procedures to be tested at 
fiscal year-end (Timing), and (4) the number of budgeted audit hours (Extent). Ceteris 
paribus, a positive and significant contrast value for any of these four measures indicates 
an interaction effect on scope (i.e., support for Hypothesis 4b). In Panel B of Table 13, 
the value of the contrast for Procedures is 1.05, in the hypothesized direction (i.e., 
positive), and marginally significant (p = .108). Similarly, for Labor the value of the 
contrast is 1.37 and significant at p = .084. For the Timing of planned substantive tests, 
the value of the contrast is -.02 and insignificant (two-tailed p = .988).  The value of the 
contrast for Extent (23.58) is in the expected direction and significant at the p = .019 
level.34 
Hypothesis 4b is supported. The difference between high AIS expertise auditors’ 
and low AIS expertise auditors’ scope of planned substantive audit procedures was 
greater when CAS competence was low than when it was high. Auditors’ AIS expertise 
levels moderated their reaction to CAS competence with respect to the extent and, to 
some degree, the nature (Procedures and Labor) of planned audit procedures. 
                                                 
 
34 The overall 2X2 ANOVA indicated significant or moderately significant CAS competence and AIS 
expertise interaction effects for Procedures (p = .108), Labor (.084), and Extent (.019). For clarity of 
presentation and in order to test the form of the interaction, only the planned contrast tests within the 
overall 2X2 ANOVA are tabulated. 
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Specifically, under conditions of low CAS competence, auditors with higher AIS 
expertise, on average, planned a higher number of substantive tests, assigned more 
procedures to a senior level auditor, and provided higher budgets than auditors with lower 
AIS expertise. Under conditions of high CAS competence, scope decision differences 
between high and low AIS expertise auditors were smaller.  
4.5.6  Relationship Between Auditor AIS Expertise and the Quality and 
Effectiveness of Auditor Planning Judgments (Hypothesis Set Five) 
Hypothesis Set Five predicts the effect of auditor AIS expertise on the quality of 
their inherent and control risk assessments and the effectiveness of their planned 
substantive audit procedures. Hypothesis Set Five, in the alternative form, states: 
H5a: The quality of inherent risk assessments will be greater for auditors with 
high AIS expertise than auditors with low AIS expertise.  
 
H5b: The quality of control risk assessments will be greater for auditors with high 
AIS expertise than auditors with low AIS expertise. 
 
H5c: Auditors with high AIS expertise will plan more effective substantive audit 
procedures than auditors with low AIS expertise.  
 
Section 4.5.2 provides a description of the measurement of auditors’ 
(participants’) inherent risk assessments, control risk assessments, and planned 
substantive audit procedures. Two groups of experts, each with three experienced 
auditors, completed the entire case under one of the two CAS competence conditions 
(i.e., low or high). The mean audit experience of the experts was 10.03 years.35 Like the 
                                                 
 
35 Expert auditors were randomly assigned to cases with either low or high CAS competence conditions. 
Expert auditors in the low CAS competence condition consisted of one audit manager and two senior 
managers from one international accounting firm with a mean of 8.64 years audit experience. Expert 
auditors in the high CAS competence condition consisted of two senior managers and one partner from the 
same international accounting firm with a mean of 11.42 years audit experience.  
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study’s participants, the experts assessed the inherent and control risk levels associated 
with the sales and accounts receivable cycle and planned substantive tests for the cycle. 
The experts’ mean risk assessments served as the criteria for measuring the 
quality of participants’ risk assessments. Audit managers and a partner served as criterion 
groups since they evaluate the validity of approaches used by audit staff and are involved 
in final audit judgments (Tan 1995). Similar to Low (2004), one group of experts 
provided judgment quality criteria and evaluated the effectiveness of participants’ scope 
decisions in one experimental condition (low CAS competence) and another group of 
experts served the same function in the other experimental condition (high CAS 
competence). The mean inherent risk assessment for all six experts was used as a quality 
criterion because experts assessed inherent risk prior to the CAS competence 
manipulation. One group of experts provided a judgment quality criterion for control risk 
in the low CAS competence condition and another group of experts served the same 
function in the high CAS competence condition because it is hypothesized that CAS 
competence affects control risk assessments (i.e., H3a). Thus, the CAS competence 
manipulation is confounded with expert group for the dependent variable “quality of 
control risk assessments” in Hypothesis Set 5. 
The mean expert inherent risk assessment was 56.67. Mean expert control risk 
assessments in the low and high CAS competence conditions were both 63.33. The 
qualities of participants’ inherent and control risk assessments were measured as the 
absolute value of the difference between their risk assessments and the mean assessments 
of the experts. Consistent with Tan (1995), lower absolute deviations are indicative of 
greater judgment quality (i.e., closer to the expert criterion). After completing the case, 
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like Low (2004), the experts individually evaluated the effectiveness of the planned 
substantive procedures (i.e., sales and accounts receivable audit programs) for each 
participant assigned to their condition. Therefore, the CAS competence manipulation is 
confounded with expert group for the dependent variable “effectiveness of substantive 
audit procedures” in Hypothesis Set 5. Experts provided their effectiveness evaluations 
by responding to the statement: “the audit effectiveness of this senior’s two audit 
programs above was:” on a 10-point Likert scale with endpoints of 1 and 10 labeled 
“very low” and “very high,” respectively. The mean score for the three experts assigned 
to each condition was used as an effectiveness measure for the participants in that 
condition. 
Table 14 presents the descriptive statistics and results of Hypothesis Set Five 
testing (see footnote 30). Consistent with the statistical analyses of Low (2004), whose 
quasi-experimental design included one independent variable of interest and one 
independent variable confounded with expert group, F statistics for the main effect of 
auditor AIS expertise from the overall 2X2 ANOVA are presented for the dependent 
variables “inherent risk assessment quality” and “control risk assessment quality.” Also, 
and similar to Low (2004), the F statistic for the main effect of auditor AIS expertise 
from a 2X2 ANCOVA containing participants’ inherent and control risk assessments as 
covariates is presented for the dependent variable “effectiveness of planned substantive 
procedures.”36 Significance levels presented in Table 14 are one-tailed due to the 
                                                 
 
36 Similar to Low (2004), when evaluating the effectiveness of participants’ substantive testing, experts 
were provided participants’ inherent and control risk assessments. Therefore, participants’ risk assessments 
could have affected the experts’ evaluations. Informing the experts of the participants’ risk assessments is 
consistent with practice as audit managers and/or partners are typically aware of their subordinates’ risk 
assessments from their review of risk assessment workpapers (Low 2004). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
107
 
 
 
 
 
directional nature of the corresponding hypotheses. Mean absolute inherent risk 
assessment deviations for the low and high AIS expertise groups were 18.96 and 13.80, 
respectively. These means were in the hypothesized direction (i.e., lower absolute 
deviations for the high AIS expertise group) and significant (F = 6.266, p = .008). Thus, 
there is support for Hypothesis 5a. Mean absolute control risk assessment deviations for 
the two groups were significant and in the expected direction, with the mean deviations 
for the low and high AIS groups being 19.69 and 15.60, respectively (F = 2.840, p = 
.048). Therefore, there is support for Hypothesis 5b. Mean expert effectiveness ratings for 
the planned substantive tests of the low and high AIS expertise groups were 5.15 and 
5.71, respectively. These means were in the hypothesized direction and ANCOVA results 
point to a significant AIS expertise effect (F = 1.809, p = .092), supporting H5c. 
As discussed above, the CAS competence manipulation is confounded with expert 
group for the dependent variables “quality of control risk assessments” and “effectiveness 
of substantive audit procedures” in Hypothesis Set 5. In other words, any significant CAS 
competence effect upon these dependent variables in Hypothesis Set Five could be due to 
either the CAS competence manipulation or the use of two different expert groups 
assigned to high and low CAS competence conditions. Thus, no hypotheses predicting 
the effect of CAS competence on these variables are offered in this study. To address the 
impact of confounding CAS competence with expert group, Low (2004) suggests 
performing independent-samples t tests within each CAS competence condition/expert 
group to determine whether the results are consistent with those presented for Hypothesis 
Set 5 above. Within the low CAS competence condition, non-tabulated differences 
between the low and high AIS expertise groups for control risk quality were in the 
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expected direction, but not significant (p = .163). Differences for mean expert 
effectiveness ratings were in the expected direction and significant (p < .001). Within the 
high CAS competence condition, the difference between the low and high AIS expertise 
groups for control risk quality was in the expected direction and was significant               
(p = .090) and differences for mean expert effectiveness ratings were insignificant (p = 
.235). Thus, although not all differences were significant, they were directionally 
consistent with Hypothesis Set Five. 
Using the risk assessments of audit experts as standards for judgment quality, the 
above results indicate that, in general, auditors with higher AIS expertise provided higher 
quality inherent and control risk assessments than auditors with lower AIS expertise. 
High AIS expertise auditors also planned substantive tests that were deemed more 
effective, on average, by expert auditors.  
 
4.6 Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
The results of this study indicate that both auditor AIS expertise and CAS 
competence affect auditor planning judgments in a complex AIS environment. Auditors 
with higher AIS expertise assessed inherent risk and control risk at higher levels and also 
planned substantive tests that were greater in scope than auditors with lower AIS 
expertise. In particular, auditors with higher AIS expertise used the nature of substantive 
tests to expand their scope beyond that planned by low AIS expertise auditors (i.e., 
greater number of procedures and higher grade of labor). Also, auditors with higher AIS 
expertise provided higher quality inherent and control risk assessments and planned more 
effective substantive tests than auditors with lower AIS expertise. 
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The competence of CAS used on the audit engagement also affected auditors’ 
planning processes. Specifically, auditors judged positive internal control testing 
evidence provided by a CAS with higher competence as more reliable than similar 
evidence provided by a CAS with lower competence. In turn, auditors assigned to the 
high CAS competence condition provided lower control risk assessments than auditors 
receiving the low CAS competence treatment. Also, auditors in the high CAS 
competence group provided substantive tests that were lesser in scope than auditors in the 
low CAS competence group. Auditors receiving evidence from a highly competent CAS 
used the nature (i.e., assigning less senior staff to procedures) and extent (i.e., smaller 
budgets) of planned tests to differentiate themselves from auditors in the low CAS 
competence condition.  
 Lastly, while there was no interactive effect between auditor AIS expertise and 
CAS competence on control risk assessments, results indicated such an interaction was 
present for the scope of planned substantive tests. Under conditions of low CAS 
competence, auditors with higher AIS expertise expanded the scope of substantive tests 
(i.e., larger budgets and more procedures assigned to more senior-level engagement team 
members) beyond the scope set by auditors with lower AIS expertise. No such auditor 
AIS expertise effect occurred when auditors received evidence from a highly competent 
CAS. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study examined the effects of computer assurance specialist (CAS) 
competence and auditor accounting information system (AIS) expertise on auditor 
planning judgments. Senior-level auditors (participants) completed a quasi-experimental 
case which depicted a complex AIS audit environment and required them to assess 
inherent and control risks for a transaction cycle and plan related substantive tests. CAS 
competence was manipulated as high and low between participants and auditor AIS 
expertise was measured. In addition, the quality and effectiveness of the participants 
planning judgments were evaluated with the assistance of audit experts. The following 
sections offer conclusions, limitations, and implications for the study. 
 
5.2 Conclusions 
In complex AIS environments, both auditor AIS expertise and their evaluations of 
CAS evidence play a critical role in determining audit quality (POB 2000). The audit 
literature has yet to investigate the role of auditor AIS expertise in their judgment 
processes, and complex AIS environments may require auditors to draw on this expertise 
when using CAS evidence. This study extends the literature by demonstrating that auditor 
AIS expertise and CAS competence significantly affect auditor planning judgments in 
advanced AIS settings. More importantly, auditors’ AIS expertise levels appear to 
determine their ability to compensate for CAS competence deficiencies.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
111
 
 
 
 
 
The results of this study indicate that, given a complex AIS environment, auditors 
with higher AIS expertise assessed inherent and control risk as higher than auditors with 
lower AIS expertise. Higher AIS expertise auditors also planned substantive tests that 
were greater in scope. Specifically, they planned significantly more procedures and 
assigned more senior level auditors to perform those procedures than their counterparts. 
Results also indicated that the higher risk levels and greater scope provided by auditors 
with higher AIS expertise were judged by audit experts to be of higher quality and more 
effective. Clearly, these results point to auditor AIS expertise playing a significant role in 
determining audit quality in complex AIS environments.  
Auditors were also sensitive to the competence of CAS as an evidence source. 
When auditors received evidence supporting a control risk reduction from a highly 
competent CAS, they relied more on that evidence and, in turn, provided lower control 
risk assessments than auditors assigned to the low CAS competence condition. Auditors 
using a highly competent CAS also reduced the scope of their planned substantive tests 
below that set by auditors in the low CAS competence condition. Consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Bamber 1983), auditors appear to consider source competence when 
evaluating CAS evidence and variation in source competence affected their planning 
judgments. 
Lastly, while there was no interactive effect between auditor AIS expertise and 
CAS competence on control risk assessments, results indicated such an interaction was 
present for the scope of planned substantive tests. Specifically, when CAS competence 
was low, auditors with higher AIS expertise planned a greater number of substantive 
tests, assigned more procedures to a senior-level auditor, and provided higher budgets 
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than auditors with lower AIS expertise. Under conditions of high CAS competence, scope 
decision differences between high and low AIS expertise auditors were smaller. Thus, 
while auditor AIS expertise plays an important role in complex AIS environments, it 
appears to be most critical when there are CAS competence deficiencies. This may 
represent a significant obstacle to firms, given practitioner concerns regarding CAS 
competence variability, as well as the perceived variability in their own AIS expertise. 
  
5.3 Limitations 
The conclusions drawn from this study are subject to several limitations. First, all 
participants in this study were provided with positive evidence from the CAS (i.e., client 
system controls appear reliable). The decision was made to use positive instead of 
negative evidence because the use of the former could point to possible audit 
ineffectiveness while using the later would focus the study on possible inefficiency 
issues. Failure to consider and react to source competence or over-rely on positive CAS 
evidence may lead to insufficient risk levels and under-auditing. On the other hand, 
failure to consider source competence in light of negative CAS evidence may cause 
auditors to over-rely on such evidence, increase risks beyond an appropriate level, and 
over-audit. In today’s environment of audit failures, factors or scenarios which may lead 
to under-auditing are of particular importance (e.g., Weil 2004). In addition, informal 
discussions with audit professionals indicated that the majority of CAS evidence in 
practice is positive in nature and the probability of a CAS with low competence 
identifying system-related control weaknesses and providing the auditor with negative 
evidence is relatively low. 
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Second, because AIS expertise is a trait associated with the auditor, it was 
measured and not manipulated between the study’s participants. Thus, conclusions drawn 
with respect to significant relationships between auditor AIS expertise and the study’s 
dependent variables are limited to evidence of correlation and not causality. It should be 
noted, however, several other explanatory variables (e.g., general audit experience, 
experience with ERP implementations) were measured, analyzed, and controlled, and 
there is no evidence that they were responsible for the results obtained in this study. None 
of these other explanatory variables were found to be significant between AIS expertise 
groups (see Table 3). Also, non-tabulated ANCOVA results using AIS expertise as an 
independent variable and the explanatory variables as covariates were consistent with 
Hypothesis Set One, Four, and Five testing results presented in section 4.5. 
Third, in order to investigate research questions for which little to no archival data 
is available to researchers (e.g., competence levels of CAS assigned to actual audit 
engagements), this study employed a quasi-experimental design to test its hypotheses. 
While the chief advantages of such a design are the ability to collect unavailable data and 
enhanced internal validity, the use of a quasi-experiment may reduce the study’s external 
validity. Although the case materials were developed with the assistance of practicing 
auditors to ensure their realism, in an actual audit engagement auditors have access to a 
far richer set of information that is processed over a much longer period of time. In 
addition, participants were asked to provide judgments related to only one part of the 
audit process and were unable to interact with the CAS.  
Lastly, the sample of participants was not a random sample from the population of 
all senior-level auditors. Because the nonrandom nature of this study’s sample may 
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restrict the ability to generalize its results, great care was taken to involve as many large 
audit firms as possible in the study and to obtain participants from multiple regions of the 
United States. 
  
5.4 Implications 
The findings of this study have implications for practice and future research. 
Since the likelihood of under-auditing may increase in cases where both the CAS and 
auditor are of lesser ability, firms should consider the combined capabilities of these 
individuals when assigning them to audit engagements with advanced AIS. Given that 
auditor AIS expertise may play a significant role in determining audit quality in complex 
AIS environments, firms might also want to stress AIS training and experience during the 
initial years of auditors’ careers. In this way, as staff auditors transition to the role of 
senior, they may be better equipped with the AIS expertise required in today’s audit 
environment. The results also validate the importance of AIS-related courses in 
accounting curricula. Lastly, policy-makers should consider whether additional guidance, 
beyond that provided by SAS No. 22 (1978), is needed to assist auditors when using CAS 
on their engagements (e.g., see above implication concerning the combined assessment of 
CAS/auditor capabilities).  
Future research could explore ways in which to improve the CAS/auditor 
relationship (e.g., through combined trainings and on-going dialogues). In addition, the 
impact of advanced AIS on audit quality should be further examined. For example, future 
research could investigate the relationship between the complexity level of corporations’ 
AIS and an observable measure of audit quality (e.g., restatements, earnings 
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management). Also, auditor AIS expertise appears to be a distinct domain of expertise 
and not simply a by-product of general audit experience. Therefore, this study’s auditor 
AIS expertise measure could be used to evaluate the effects of auditor AIS expertise on 
other audit activities such as the performance of substantive tests. Lastly, this study 
examined auditors’ reactions to the implementation of an ERP module and the numerous 
increased risks that often accompany such implementations. Future research could 
evaluate if, and how, auditors react to specific ERP-related risks (e.g., lack of employee 
training, password/system access issues). Such research will advance our understanding 
of the role CAS, advanced AIS, and auditor AIS expertise play in determining the quality 
of contemporary audit services. 
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HIGH 
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Scope 
 
 
 
 
LOW 
 
 
 
 
  LOW          CAS Competence        HIGH 
 
 
 
Note:                          indicates high auditor AIS expertise. 
                                   indicates low auditor AIS expertise.  
  
CR: Control risk assessment level 
Scope: Scope of substantive tests (i.e., nature, timing, and extent). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Graph Depicting Computer Assurance Specialist (CAS) and Auditor 
Accounting Information System (AIS) Expertise Interaction 
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Figure 2 – Diagram of the Quasi-Experimental Task  
 
BACKGROUND DATA AND TASK OBJECTIVE 
AUDIT GUIDANCE AND FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS 
PRIOR YEAR WORKPAPERS 
CURRENT YEAR INFORMATION AND 
CURRENT YEAR WORKPAPERS 
POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
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 Low CAS Competence High CAS Competence 
High Auditor AIS Expertise Group 1 Group 2 
Low Auditor AIS Expertise Group 3 Group 4 
 
 
Figure 3 – Experimental Groups 
 
Hypothesis 
Number Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
H1a Auditor AIS Expertise Inherent Risk Level 
H1b Auditor AIS Expertise Control Risk Level 
H1c Auditor AIS Expertise Scope of Substantive Testing 
   
H2 CAS Competence Reliability Judgment 
   
H3a CAS Competence Control Risk Level 
H3b CAS Competence Scope of Substantive Testing 
   
H4a Auditor AIS Expertise * CAS Competence Control Risk Level 
H4b Auditor AIS Expertise * CAS Competence Scope of Substantive Testing 
   
H5a Auditor AIS Expertise Quality of Inherent Risk Assessment  
H5b Auditor AIS Expertise Quality of Control Risk Assessment  
H5c Auditor AIS Expertise Effectiveness of Scope of Substantive Testing 
 
 
Figure 4 – Summary of Testing 
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APPENDIX A: COMPUTER ASSURANCE SPECIALIST (CAS) 
COMPETENCE/AUDITOR RELATIONSHIP SURVEY 
 
 
 
 
Year of experience (in years): 
 
Level in firm (senior or manager): 
 
Do you have experience dealing with CAS personnel (the CAS staff that perform system 
control testing procedures) on your engagements? (yes or no): 
 
Has the competence / ability of CAS personnel assigned to your engagements, at times, 
been an issue on your audit engagements? (yes or no): 
 
Do you, for some CAS personnel, feel they could be more experienced / more competent 
at their job? (yes or no): 
 
Indicators of CAS competence / ability: Please read the statements below and answer the 
question at the end regarding which items most influence your perceptions of CAS 
competence / ability on your engagements. 
 
1. The technical ability of the CAS. 
2. Your manager’s opinion of the CAS. 
3. How much training the CAS has received. 
4. The number of years of experience of the CAS. 
5. How well the CAS knows your client / amount of interaction of the CAS with the 
engagement team. 
6. How quickly or late you receive the CAS internal control testing workpapers. 
 
Question: Of the items identified above, pick the three items that affect your perceptions 
of CAS competence / ability on your engagements. Simply input the numbers below. If 
less than three affect you perceptions of the CAS or none at all, simply list the ones that 
are relevant below or input “none.” 
 
Input numbers from above that are relevant here: 
 
Do any other factors affect your perception of CAS competence more than the items you 
listed above?  
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APPENDIX B: HYPOTHESES 
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* As described in H4a,b, the positive relationship between auditor AIS expertise and their 
planning judgments is expected to be stronger in the low CAS competence condition and 
weaker in the high CAS competence condition (see graph below). 
 
H4a,b: CAS competence and auditor AIS expertise are expected to interact to affect 
auditor planning judgments as follows: 
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APPENDIX C: QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
 
 
 
 
[The following letter was provided to all participants in hardcopy form along with the 
case study.] 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
Thank you for participating in this research project by completing this case study. I am a 
former Deloitte and Touche auditor who is currently completing the requirements for a 
Ph.D. in Accounting at Drexel University. By completing this case study, you will be 
assisting me in satisfying these requirements and helping me finish my degree. Please be 
assured that all of your responses are for academic purposes, will remain completely 
confidential, and will not be shared with any member of your firm or any other party. 
For each auditor who completes this case study I will be making a monetary donation to 
the United Way. This research project has been approved by your firm and they also 
request your participation and thank you for your time spent on the project. 
 
The case study materials should take you approximately 20 to 30 minutes to complete. 
Since you will be asked to record the time spent on the case study, please attempt to work 
all the way through it in one sitting. Once you have completed the case study, please 
place all materials in the pre-addressed and stamped envelope provided and mail it back 
to me. If you have any questions about the case study, do not hesitate to call me at 
215-895-2883 or e-mail me at jfb24@drexel.edu.  
 
Again, thank you for offering your time to complete this research project and assisting 
me in obtaining my Ph.D. degree.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Joe Brazel  
Ph.D. Candidate 
Drexel University 
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MADISON INC. 
 
CASE STUDY 
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BACKGROUND  
 
Assume that you are the senior (in-charge) auditor assigned to the 12/31/03 fiscal year-
end audit of Madison Inc. The audit team consists of you (the senior auditor), four 
assistants, a manager, and a partner. Madison Inc. is a publicly held, mid-sized 
manufacturer of sporting goods equipment headquartered in Philadelphia, PA.  It makes a 
variety of products for baseball, football, hockey, basketball, hunting, and fishing.  Its 
products are sold across the U.S. to retailers of sporting goods equipment and also 
directly to customers via its internet website. Your firm has audited Madison Inc. for the 
last five years and past audits have always resulted in unqualified audit opinions. As in 
the prior year, the partner in-charge of the Madison Inc. audit has set audit risk at a low 
level of 5%. The financial statements and materiality calculations for Madison Inc. are 
contained in the appendix of this case study. Feel free to refer to these items at any time. 
 
It is now October of 2003 and you are currently in the planning/internal control phase of 
the 12/31/03 fiscal year-end audit.  
 
 
 
TASK OBJECTIVE 
 
Based on the information provided in this case, you will be asked to provide preliminary 
assessments of the current year (12/31/03) risks associated with the Sales and Accounts 
Receivable cycle of Madison Inc. Also, you will be asked to prepare audit programs and 
budgets for the current year’s substantive tests of that cycle. It is important that you 
respond to questions in this case study as you normally would during your day-to-
activities. Prior year workpapers are provided in this case study. You may consult 
these workpapers at any time. The format of some information presented in the case was 
chosen to accommodate any firm’s audit approach and, thus, may differ from the format 
used by your firm. However, the format used in the case is designed to be straight-
forward and should be easy to follow. Be especially attentive to items in YELLOW, as 
these items require you to provide a response.  
 
PLEASE INPUT THE EXACT CURRENT TIME:_______:_______ (e.g., 6:37 pm). 
 
 
 
After you have input the current time, please turn the page and begin the case study.
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AUDIT GUIDANCE: SAS No. 47 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please review the following guidance for assessing risks and 
planning substantive procedures adapted from SAS No. 47 (AICPA 1983). 
 
SAS No. 47 provides the conceptual underpinning for the audit risk model. The auditor 
applies the audit risk model during the planning/internal control phase of the audit. Audit 
risk (AR) is the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his or 
her opinion on financial statements that are materially misstated. Audit risk is the product 
of the following interrelated factors: 
 
Inherent Risk (IR) = the risk that a financial statement assertion is susceptible to a 
material misstatement, assuming there are no related controls 
 
Control Risk (CR) = the risk that the entity’s internal control structure or 
procedures will not prevent or detect, in a timely manner, a material misstatement 
which could occur in a financial statement assertion 
 
Detection Risk (DR) = the risk that the auditor will not detect a material 
misstatement that exists in a financial statement assertion 
 
Thus, the mathematical depiction of the model is AR = IR x CR x DR, with each risk 
level assessed by the auditor as a percentage of 1.0 (e.g., IR = 40% or .40). In theory, the 
model is intended to be applied as follows: AR is first set by the partner in-charge of the 
audit engagement at an acceptably low level (e.g., 5%). Next, IR and CR are assessed via 
the auditor’s knowledge of client operations, testing of internal controls, prior history 
with the client, etc. Lastly, given the assessed levels of IR and CR, the scope of planned 
substantive procedures (i.e., the nature, timing, and extent of substantive testing 
procedures), or DR, is adjusted by the auditor to obtain the desired level of AR  
(DR = AR / (IR x CR)).   
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PRIOR YEAR WORKPAPERS: Inherent Risk Assessment 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please review the following prior year workpaper. 
 
Madison Inc.: FYE 12/31/02 
              Preparer:   HSD 10/10/02 
              Reviewer: LDM 10/17/02 
                         JSP   10/23/02 
  
12/31/02 Inherent Risk Assessment Workpaper: Sales and Accounts Receivable 
Cycle 
 
Audit Risk = 5% 
Monetary Precision/Tolerable Error = $261,000 
 
Inherent Risk Assessment: Sales and Accounts Receivable Cycle (percentages) 
 
  0          10         20         30         40         50         60         70       80         90        100 
Low                              Moderate                                    High 
Risk          Risk                       Risk 
 
12/31/02 Inherent Risk Assessment (in percentage form): 35% 
 
Inherent Risk Factors: Sales and Accounts Receivable Cycle 
 
In the prior year (12/31/01), one material audit adjustment was identified and recorded by 
the client for the cycle. No material misstatements were identified for the cycle for the 
fiscal year-ended 12/31/00. 
 
The majority of transactions in this cycle are routine transactions, but there is a 
considerable amount of management judgment required for the allowance for doubtful 
accounts valuation. From a review of the 9/30/02 accounts receivable aging schedule, it 
appears that 75% of the accounts receivable balance is current (<30 days old). No prior 
year audit adjustment was required for the allowance for doubtful accounts. 
 
Experience with the client indicates that top management of Madison Inc. is fairly 
conservative in terms of reporting financial results. No factors appear to exist that might 
motivate them to circumvent or override existing control procedures. 
 
Madison Inc. is a manufacturer and distributor of sporting goods to mainly large sporting 
goods retailers. Prior years audits have shown that these customers are generally good 
credit risks because they have a low risk of default. Approximately 10% of sales are on a 
consignment basis. 
 
There do not appear to be any material revenue transactions with related parties in the 
current year.  
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PRIOR YEAR WORKPAPERS: Control Risk Assessment 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please review the following prior year workpaper. 
 
Madison Inc.: FYE 12/31/02 
                                                                                           Preparer:  HSD 10/15/02 
              Reviewer: LDM 10/22/02 
                         JSP   10/25/02 
   
12/31/02 Control Risk Assessment Workpaper: Sales and Accounts Receivable 
Cycle 
 
Audit Risk = 5% 
Inherent Risk = 35% 
Monetary Precision/Tolerable Error = $261,000 
 
Control Risk Assessment: Sales and Accounts Receivable Cycle (percentages) 
 
  0          10         20         30         40         50         60         70       80         90        100 
Low                              Moderate                                    High 
Risk          Risk                       Risk 
 
12/31/02 Control Risk Assessment (in percentage form): 40% 
 
Control Risk Factors: Sales and Accounts Receivable Cycle 
 
The results of tests: manual and programmed controls were adequate except for the 
following results: 
1. Statements are not prepared and mailed to customers on a monthly basis. 
2. The credit-granting control procedures were not operating at an acceptable level. 
Additional audit work indicated that the average number of days’ sales outstanding has 
only risen from 20 to 21 days in the current year. Write-offs of accounts as uncollectable 
have not increased. 
 
Current year testing of internal controls indicates that the client largely relies on adequate 
separation of duties and proper authorization of transactions to meet its control 
objectives. The internal control structure consists of both manual and programmed 
controls. 
 
Prior year’s (12/31/01) tests of controls indicated adequate controls over the 
sales/accounts receivable cycle. 
 
Sales representatives have the authority to grant their customers price discounts without 
approval. The amount of revenue lost is not determinable at this time, but it is unlikely to 
be material. A letter has been provided to management proposing that discount terms be 
in writing and approved by a company official. 
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Madison Inc. 
 
Current Year Workpapers 
 
 
 
 
 
The following pages contain the current year workpapers for Madision 
Inc. You may consult the Prior Year Workpapers presented on pages 3 
and 4 at any time. 
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CURRENT YEAR WORKPAPER: The Effects of ERP Implementation 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please review the following CURRENT YEAR workpaper. 
 
Madison Inc.: FYE 12/31/03 
                                                                                    Preparer:   LDM 9/4/03 
        Reviewer: JSP    9/10/03 
 
12/31/03 Planning Workpaper Documenting the Effects of Madison Inc.’s Current 
Year ERP System Module Implementation on the Sales and Accounts Receivable 
Cycle 
  
During the fiscal year-ended 12/31/03, Madison Inc. implemented the Sales and 
Distribution (SD) module of Automated Processing Systems (APS) Version 3: an 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) system. The client started the SD implementation on 
1/12/03 and completed the implementation 6/18/03. In the prior year, the client 
implemented the Financial Accounting and Materials Management modules of APS 
Version 3. Over the next two fiscal years, the client intends to implement several other 
modules of the system. 
 
From discussions with client personnel involved with the implementation of the SD 
module, it appears that the Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle will be the transaction 
cycle most affected by the current year SD module implementation. As documented in 
prior year workpapers, prior to the SD implementation, the system that accounted for 
Sales and Accounts Receivable transactions was a non-complex, spreadsheet-based, off-
the-shelf computer package. That system was not integrated with other systems, the 
majority of internal controls were manually performed, and the majority of audit 
evidence used to test Sales and Accounts Receivable was produced by client personnel 
with the assistance of the system.  
 
Workpaper continued on next page. 
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CURRENT YEAR WORKPAPER: The Effects of ERP Implementation (cont.) 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please continue reviewing the following CURRENT YEAR 
workpaper. 
 
Madison Inc.: FYE 12/31/03 
The implementation of the Sales and Distribution (SD) module has made the Sales and 
Accounts Receivable cycle computer dominant and complex for the current year-ended 
12/31/03. From our observations of the SD module in use and discussions with the SD 
module implementation team, the following specific items were noted: 
 
1. Madison Inc. has followed the same procedures as in the prior year’s module 
implementations when (a) transferring data from the old system to the SD module and (b) 
integrating the SD module with the other modules implemented in the prior year. 
 
2. Madison, Inc. will be integrating an internal control application with the SD module in 
the current year. This internal control application is a non-APS version 3 product (i.e., the 
application is produced by another software company). 
 
3. The majority of data input for the Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle has been 
moved to transaction sources (e.g., shipping department). 
 
4. On 6/18/03, the date of the completion of the SD module implementation, Madison 
Inc. stopped accounting for Sales and Accounts Receivable transactions with the prior 
system and used only the SD module. 
 
5. The SD module implementation team consisted of external consultants and Madison 
Inc. IT personnel. 
 
Conclusion: Engagement management concludes that, for the 12/31/03 audit of Madison 
Inc., the Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle is computer dominant and complex. 
Therefore, a computer assurance specialist (CAS) from our firm will be assigned to the 
engagement team to test the reliability of the cycle’s system-related internal controls. As 
in the prior year, an audit staff assistant will test the remaining few manual controls of the 
cycle.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
144
 
 
CURRENT YEAR WORKPAPER: Inherent Risk Assessment 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please review the following CURRENT YEAR workpaper. FIRST 
input your risk assessment and THEN provide documentation for your assessment.  
 
Madison Inc.: FYE 12/31/03 
12/31/03 Preliminary Inherent Risk Assessment Workpaper: Sales and Accounts 
Receivable Cycle 
 
Current Year Audit Risk = 5% 
Current Year Monetary Precision/Tolerable Error = $264,000 
Prior Year Inherent Risk = 35% 
 
Preliminary Inherent Risk Assessment: Sales and Accounts Receivable Cycle 
(percentages) 
 
  0          10         20         30         40         50         60         70       80         90        100 
Low                              Moderate                                    High 
Risk          Risk                       Risk 
 
12/31/03 Preliminary Inherent Risk Assessment (Please input any whole number 
between 0 and 100) t ____% 
 
Inherent Risk Factors: Sales and Accounts Receivable Cycle 
Based on the information provided to you previously, please DOCUMENT inherent 
risk factors that support your PRELIMINARY inherent risk ASSESSMENT 
BELOW. Also, please list any additional factors you would consider before making 
a final inherent risk assessment or changing your preliminary assessment. 
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CAS INFORMATION 
 
[The following is the manipulation provided to the Low CAS competence group.] 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please review the following information about the computer 
assurance specialist assigned to test SYSTEM-RELATED internal controls. 
 
As noted in the planning workpaper documenting the current year Sales and Distribution 
module implementation, the Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle has been deemed 
computer dominant and complex for the current year (12/31/03). Thus, the majority of 
controls related to the Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle are system-related in the 
current year. A competent and qualified staff assistant tested the relatively few remaining 
manual controls of the cycle in the current year. The results of those tests indicate that 
manual controls for the Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle appear reliable. 
 
Chris Smith, a computer assurance specialist (CAS) from your firm, has been assigned 
to the 12/31/03 Madison Inc. audit engagement to test system-related controls for the 
Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle.  
 
Chris has eight months of experience testing system-related controls for your firm. He 
has yet to receive training in relation to the Automated Processing Systems (APS) 
Version 3 implemented by Madison Inc. Conversations with fellow audit seniors who 
have used Chris indicate that he has a tendency to perform weak (i.e., less than effective) 
tests of controls. In fact, one of your fellow audit seniors has informed you that Chris did 
not uncover a material weakness in her client’s system-related controls. During the 
course of that audit, it became apparent to that senior’s audit team that the system did not 
allow for a proper segregation of duties in relation to the payroll cycle. Chris’ system 
control testing workpaper for that audit did not identify that control weakness and 
therefore the scope of planned substantive testing failed to reflect this weakness. 
 
You have just received Chris’s workpaper documenting his system-related control 
testing. It is provided on the following page. 
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CAS INFORMATION 
 
[The following is the manipulation provided to the High CAS competence group.] 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please review the following information about the computer 
assurance specialist assigned to test SYSTEM-RELATED internal controls. 
 
As noted in the planning workpaper documenting the current year Sales and Distribution 
module implementation, the Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle has been deemed 
computer dominant and complex for the current year (12/31/03). Thus, the majority of 
controls related to the Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle are system-related in the 
current year. A competent and qualified staff assistant tested the relatively few remaining 
manual controls of the cycle in the current year. The results of those tests indicate that 
manual controls for the Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle appear reliable. 
 
Chris Smith, a computer assurance specialist (CAS) from your firm, has been assigned 
to the 12/31/03 Madison Inc. audit engagement to test system-related controls for the 
Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle.  
 
Chris has approximately four years of experience testing system-related controls for your 
firm. He has also received an extensive amount of training in relation to the Automated 
Processing Systems (APS) Version 3 implemented by Madison Inc. Conversations with 
fellow audit seniors who have used Chris indicate that he has the ability to perform strong 
(i.e., very effective) tests of controls. In fact, one of your fellow audit seniors has 
informed you that Chris uncovered a material weakness in her client’s system-related 
controls. During the course of that audit, Chris appropriately concluded that the system 
for that client did not allow for a proper segregation of duties in relation to the payroll 
cycle. Chris’ system control testing workpaper properly identified that control weakness 
and therefore the scope of planned substantive testing was increased by the audit senior. 
 
You have just received Chris’s workpaper documenting his system-related control 
testing. It is provided on the following page. 
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CURRENT YEAR WORKPAPER: System Control Testing 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please review the following CURRENT YEAR workpaper. 
 
Madison Inc.: FYE 12/31/03 
12/31/03 System Control Testing: Sales and Accounts Receivable Cycle 
                                                                                
System-Related Controls – tested by Chris Smith, computer assurance specialist      
 
Control Tested        Testing Result 
 
1. Proper transferal of data from legacy operating system to Sales              (a) 
    and Distribution (SD) module and integration of the SD module with 
    the rest of the ERP system modules. 
 
2. External control application successfully integrated with SD Module.                (a) 
 
3. Access controls – password used to ensure only authorized              (b) 
    user access. 
  
4. System requires an approved sales order to produce a shipping document and   (c) 
    compares totals of quantities shipped to quantities billed.         
 
5. System automatically posts sales transactions to the accounts receivable            (c) 
    subsidiary ledger and general ledger.  
 
6. System compares customer order with customer’s authorized credit limit           (c) 
    and current account balance.  
 
 
 
(a) Implementation process appears to be properly controlled. 
 
(b) Tests revealed that access to the system was achieved without the use of a password; 
further testing indicated that the problem was isolated and was properly addressed by 
the client.  
 
(c) Control appears to be in place. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: The system-related controls for the Sales and Accounts Receivable cycle  
                      appear reliable, taking into account the exception noted above. 
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CAS MEASURES 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please respond to the following statements about the computer 
assurance specialist (CAS) Chris Smith by CIRCLING the appropriate number. 
 
In your opinion, the strength (i.e., effectiveness) of the system-related control testing 
performed by the computer assurance specialist (CAS) Chris Smith was probably: 
  
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Weak                                   Strong 
 
 
In your opinion, the system-related control testing workpaper obtained from the computer 
assurance specialist (CAS) Chris Smith is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Not                                            Very 
Reliable                      Reliable
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CURRENT YEAR WORKPAPER: Control Risk Assessment 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please review the following CURRENT YEAR workpaper. FIRST 
input your risk assessment and THEN provide documentation for your assessment.  
 
Madison Inc.: FYE 12/31/03 
12/31/03 Preliminary Control Risk Assessment Workpaper: Sales and Accounts 
Receivable Cycle 
 
Current Year Audit Risk = 5% 
Current Year Monetary Precision/Tolerable Error = $264,000 
Prior Year Inherent Risk = 35% 
 
Preliminary Control Risk Assessment: Sales and Accounts Receivable Cycle 
(percentages) 
 
  0          10         20         30         40         50         60         70       80         90        100 
Low                              Moderate                                    High 
Risk          Risk                       Risk 
 
12/31/03 Preliminary Control Risk Assessment (Please input any whole number 
between 0 and 100) t ____% 
 
Control Risk Factors: Sales and Accounts Receivable Cycle 
Based on the information provided to you previously, please DOCUMENT control 
risk factors that support your PRELIMINARY control risk ASSESSMENT 
BELOW. Also, please list any additional factors you would consider before making 
a final controlt risk assessment or changing your preliminary assessment. 
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SAS No. 47 EXAMPLES 
 
INSTRUCTION: Please review these examples illustrating the application of the audit 
risk model. 
 
EXAMPLES: 
 
1. If control risk associated with the sales/accounts receivable cycle is assessed at a 
higher level in the current year in comparison to the prior year, all other things held 
constant, the auditor may consider increasing the number of accounts receivable 
confirmations tested in the current year over that of the prior year. As IR and CR 
increase, the auditor is expected to compensate with substantive procedures that are 
greater in scope to reduce DR.  
 
2. If AR, IR, and CR are assessed at 5%, 35%, and 60%, respectively, then the scope of 
planned substantive procedures should be designed to allow for a DR of 24% (.24 = .05 / 
(.35 x .60)).
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CURRENT YEAR WORKPAPER: Sales Audit Program and Budget        
INSTRUCTION: Given the current year ERP system implementation, your IR and CR assessments, and the CAS information 
provided, please complete the workpaper that follows. You have been provided with prior year audit procedures and budgets. 
For each procedure, respond as to whether you would like to REPEAT (repeat procedure, performer, timing, and budget 
for the current year), DELETE, or CHANGE (change the performer, timing, or budgeted hours) the procedure. Indicate your  
response by circling one of the three options for each procedure. If you decide to REPEAT or DELETE a procedure, please 
continue to the next procedure. If you decide to CHANGE a procedure (e.g., increase the budgeted hours), please input changes  
in the yellow boxes provided. You will also have the opportunity to input any customized procedures that you would like performed. 
         
Madison Inc.: FYE 12/31/03         
12/31/03 Audit Program and Budget: Sales 
Account         
         
12/31/03 Audit Risk = 5%         
12/31/03 Inherent Risk = ________________ 
(input from p. 8)          
12/31/03 Control Risk =   ________________ 
(input from p.12)         
12/31/03 Monetary Precision / Tolerable Error = 
$264,000         
 
Staff Assistant, 
Senior or 
Manager  
Interim: 9/30/03 or 
Final: 12/31/03     
 Performed By  Timing   
 
 
 
 
Budgeted Hours  
CIRCLE one for each 
procedure 
EXAMPLE:         
A. Sample audit procedure                                           PY: Staff Assistant  Final  10  
Repeat    Delete   
Change* 
        
                                                                                      CY:          
* If change, input 
changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
        1. Compare sales to an expectation of sales (by 
product line). Roll-forward interim account balance 
to fiscal year-end.   PY: Staff Assistant   Interim  16  
Repeat    Delete   
Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input 
changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
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Staff Assistant, 
Senior or 
Manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interim: 9/30/03 or 
Final: 12/31/03 
 
Audit Procedure  Performed By  Timing   Budgeted Hours  
CIRCLE one for each 
procedure 
        
        
2. Compare sales returns and allowances as a 
percentage of gross sales with previous years (by 
product line). Roll-forward interim account balance 
to fiscal year-end.                                   PY: Staff Assistant   Interim  5  
Repeat    Delete   
Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input 
changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
         
        
        3. Compare bad debts expense as a percentage of 
gross sales  with previous years. Roll-forward 
interim account balance to fiscal year-end.                  PY: Staff Assistant   Interim  5  
Repeat    Delete   
Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input 
changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
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Staff Assistant, 
Senior or 
Manager  
Interim: 9/30/03 
or Final: 
12/31/03    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audit Procedure  Performed By  Timing   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budgeted Hours  
CIRCLE one for each 
procedure 
        4. Review sales journal and master file for unusual 
transactions and amounts.                                                PY: Staff Assistant   Final  4  Repeat    Delete   Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
         
        5. Select a sample of shipping documents and trace 
transactions to the sales journal.                                       PY: Staff Assistant   Interim  6  Repeat    Delete   Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
         
        
        
6. Perform sales cut-off testing by sampling sales 
transactions from the sales journals before and after 
fiscal year-end andtracing to sales invoice and bill of 
lading.                                   PY: Staff Assistant   Final  5  Repeat    Delete   Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
         
        
        
        
7. Select a sample of transactions from the sales 
journal, tracetransaction to invoice, recompute 
extensions on sales invoices, and trace details on sales 
invoices to shipping documents and customer order.      PY: Staff Assistant  Interim  6  Repeat    Delete   Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
         
        8. Select a sample of transactions from the sales 
journal and trace transactions to the accounts 
receivable subsidiary ledger.    PY: Staff Assistant  Interim  6  Repeat    Delete   Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
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Any additional procedures for the current year? 
If YES, please input procedures below along with 
the performer, timing, and budgeted hours for 
each additional procedure. If NO, please go to the 
Accounts Receivable Audit Program.          
 
Staff Assistant, 
Senior or 
Manager  
Interim: 9/30/03 
or Final: 
12/31/03    
 
 
 
Additional Audit Procedures (if any)  Performed By  Timing   
 
 
 
Budgeted Hours   
9.         
         
             
         
10.       
       
           
11.       
       
           
12.        
       
           
13.       
       
           
14.       
       
           
15.       
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CURRENT YEAR WORKPAPER: Accounts Receivable Audit Program and Budget  
 
INSTRUCTION: Given the current year ERP system implementation, your IR and CR assessments, and the CAS information 
provided, please complete the workpaper that follows. You have been provided with prior year audit procedures and budgets. 
For each procedure, respond as to whether you would like to REPEAT (repeat procedure, performer, timing, and budget 
for the current year), DELETE, or CHANGE (change the performer, timing, or budgeted hours) the procedure. Indicate your  
response by circling one of the three options for each procedure. If you decide to REPEAT or DELETE a procedure, please 
continue to the next procedure. If you decide to CHANGE a procedure (e.g., increase the budgeted hours), please input   
changes in the yellow boxes provided. You will also have the opportunity to input any customized procedures that you would like performed. 
         
12/31/03 Audit Program and Budget: Accounts 
Receivable         
12/31/03 Audit Risk = 5%         
12/31/03 Inherent Risk = ________________ 
(input from p. 8)         
12/31/03 Control Risk =   ________________ 
(input from p.12)         
12/31/03 Monetary Precision / Tolerable Error = 
$264,000         
 
Staff Assistant, 
Senior or 
Manager  
Interim: 
9/30/03 or 
Final: 12/31/03     
 Performed By  Timing   
 
 
 
 
Budgeted 
Hours  
CIRCLE one for each 
procedure 
EXAMPLE:         
A. Sample audit procedure                                              PY: Senior  Interim  10  Repeat    Delete   Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
        
         
        
        
1. Select a sample of accounts from the accounts 
receivable subsidiary ledger, trace accounts to the 
accounts receivable trial balance, and obtain positive 
confirmation. Perform alternative procedures for 
nonresponses. Roll-forward interim account balance 
to fiscal year-end.                                             PY: Staff Assistant   Interim  18  Repeat    Delete   Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
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Staff Assistant, 
Senior or 
Manager  
Interim: 
9/30/03 or 
Final: 12/31/03     
Audit Procedure  Performed By  Timing   
Budgeted 
Hours  
CIRCLE one for each 
procedure 
        
        
          
2. Obtain an aged list of receivables: select a sample 
of accounts and trace to the accounts receivable trial 
balance, foot trial balance, and trace to the general 
ledger. Investigate the collectability of account 
balances on aged list of receivables.      PY: Staff Assistant   Interim  10  Repeat    Delete   Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input changes 
<------in boxes to the left 
         
         
        
        
3. Obtain an analysis for the allowance for doubtful 
accounts and bad debt expense: test accuracy, 
examine authorization for write-offs, and trace to 
general ledger.                                        PY: Staff Assistant   Interim  6  Repeat    Delete Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input changes  
<------in boxes to the left 
         
        
          
4. Review lists of balances for amounts due from 
related parties or employees, credit balances, unusual 
items, and notes receivable due after one year.               PY: Staff Assistant   Final  6  Repeat    Delete   Change* 
        
  CY:          
* If change, input changes  
<------in boxes to the left 
         
        
        
        
Any additional procedures for the current year? 
If YES, please input procedures below along with 
the performer,timing, and budgeted hours for 
each additional procedure.If NO, please skip the 
next page and turn to the following page. 
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Staff Assistant,  
Senior or 
Manager  
Interim: 
9/30/03 or 
Final: 
12/31/03    
Additional Audit Procedures (if any)  Performed By  Timing   
Budgeted 
Hours   
5.         
         
             
6.         
         
             
7.         
         
             
8.         
         
             
9.         
         
             
10.         
         
             
11.         
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STOP  
 
 
 
 
1) Please take a moment now to check and make sure that you 
have provided responses in all the YELLOW areas in the 
current year workpapers on pages 8, 12, 14, 15, 17, and 18.  
 
2) Please also make sure that you have responded properly to 
the two scales on page 11.  
 
3) After checking your responses, please input the current 
time below and complete the questionnaire that follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE INPUT THE EXACT CURRENT TIME:_______:_______ (e.g., 7:08 pm).
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Thank you for preparing your current workpapers for Madison, Inc. Please complete the 
following questionnaire to finish the research project. Again, be assured that all of your 
responses will be used for academic purposes only, will remain completely confidential, 
and will not be shared with any member of your or any other firm. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate your response to the following statements by 
CIRCLING a number.  
 
1. The competence (ability) level of the computer assurance specialist (CAS) Chris 
Smith assigned to the Madison Inc. audit engagement was: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                            Very 
Low                                   High 
 
2. The strength of controls listed on the current year system control testing workpaper for 
Madison Inc. were: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Weak                                   Strong 
 
3. The conclusion from the current year system control testing workpaper for Madison 
Inc. indicated controls were: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Unreliable                      Reliable 
 
4. My confidence level in the inherent risk assessment and documentation that I provided 
in the case is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
 
5. My confidence level in the control risk assessment and documentation that I provided 
in the case is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
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6. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I have received more combined 
informal and formal training in relation to complex and pervasive accounting information 
systems (e.g., ERP systems) during my career. 
 
   1        2             3      4            5     6               7           8                   
Strongly      Mostly       Moderately     Mildly          Mildly      Moderately      Mostly    Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree       Disagree      Disagree        Agree          Agree            Agree       Agree 
7. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I have more experience auditing 
complex and pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems). 
  
   1        2             3      4            5     6               7           8                   
Strongly      Mostly       Moderately     Mildly          Mildly      Moderately      Mostly    Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree       Disagree      Disagree        Agree          Agree            Agree       Agree 
8. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I feel more comfortable auditing 
complex and pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems).  
 
   1        2             3      4            5     6               7           8                   
Strongly      Mostly       Moderately     Mildly          Mildly      Moderately      Mostly    Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree       Disagree      Disagree        Agree          Agree            Agree       Agree 
9. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I receive more enjoyment from auditing 
complex and pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems). 
 
   1        2             3      4            5     6               7           8                   
Strongly      Mostly       Moderately     Mildly          Mildly      Moderately      Mostly    Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree       Disagree      Disagree        Agree          Agree            Agree       Agree 
10. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, a larger portion of my time is 
assigned to auditing complex and pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP 
systems). 
 
   1        2             3      4            5     6               7           8                   
Strongly      Mostly       Moderately     Mildly          Mildly      Moderately      Mostly    Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree       Disagree      Disagree        Agree          Agree            Agree       Agree 
11. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I began auditing complex and 
pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems) at an earlier point in my 
career.  
 
   1        2             3      4            5     6               7           8                   
Strongly      Mostly       Moderately     Mildly          Mildly      Moderately      Mostly    Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree       Disagree      Disagree        Agree          Agree            Agree       Agree 
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12. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, auditing complex and pervasive 
accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems) is more important in my day-to-day 
audit activities. 
 
   1        2             3      4            5     6               7           8                   
Strongly      Mostly       Moderately     Mildly          Mildly      Moderately      Mostly    Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree       Disagree      Disagree        Agree          Agree            Agree       Agree 
13. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, auditing complex and pervasive 
accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems) will play a more important role in 
my career in the future. 
 
   1        2             3      4            5     6               7           8                   
Strongly      Mostly       Moderately     Mildly          Mildly      Moderately      Mostly    Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree       Disagree      Disagree        Agree          Agree            Agree       Agree 
14. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I have a higher level of complex and 
pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems) expertise. 
 
   1        2             3      4            5     6               7           8                   
Strongly      Mostly       Moderately     Mildly          Mildly      Moderately      Mostly    Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree       Disagree      Disagree        Agree          Agree            Agree       Agree 
15. The amount of experience I have interacting with computer assurance specialists is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High  
 
16. The amount of experience I have assessing risks is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
 
17. The amount of experience I have planning substantive testing procedures is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
 
18. The amount of experience I have with clients that have implemented enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) systems is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
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19. The financial statements of Madison Inc. significantly affected my risk assessments, 
audit programs, and budgets. 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Disagree                 Agree 
 
20. Had the financial statements of Madison Inc. not been provided, my risk assessments, 
audit programs, and budgets would have been very similar. 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Disagree                 Agree 
 
21. In the year of their implementation, ERP systems typically: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Decrease                                                  Increase   
Inherent                    Inherent         
Risks                             Risks 
 
22. In the year of their implementation, ERP systems typically: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Decrease                                                  Increase   
Control                    Control        
Risks                             Risks 
 
23. Computer assurance specialists (CAS) similar to the CAS described in this case study 
exist at my firm. 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Disagree                 Agree         
 
24. The likelihood that a computer assurance specialist (CAS) similar to the CAS 
described in this case study could be assigned to an audit engagement is: 
  
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
 
25. The likelihood that I could be assigned to an audit engagement like Madison Inc. in 
the future is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
 
26. My motivation level to complete this case study could be described as: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
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27. The likelihood that I would seek the services of a computer assurance specialist when 
auditing a client with complex and dominant systems (e.g., ERP systems) is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
 
28. From my experiences using computer assurance specialists, the value they provide to 
my audit engagements can be described as: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
 
29. In practice, I have experienced variation (i.e., differences) in computer assurance 
specialist competence (i.e., ability levels).  
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Disagree                       Agree 
 
30. In practice, the amount of variation (i.e., differences) in computer assurance specialist 
competence (i.e., ability levels) I have experienced is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Small                                  Large 
 
31. When evaluating the competence level of the computer assurance specialist (CAS) 
Chris Smith described in this case study, the years of experience the CAS had in testing 
systems was: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Not                   Very 
Important                              Important                        
 
32. When evaluating the competence level of the computer assurance specialist (CAS) 
Chris Smith described in this case study, the amount of training the CAS had in relation 
to the system was: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Not                  Very 
Important                             Important 
 
33. When evaluating the competence level of the computer assurance specialist (CAS) 
Chris Smith described in this case study, the information provided to me by fellow 
auditors about the quality of the CAS’s work on their audits was: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Not                  Very 
Important                             Important 
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34. My experience with clients that have intentionally or unintentionally materially 
misstated their financial statements is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                  Very 
Low                                        High 
 
35. On average, I would classify the computerized accounting information system 
expertise of the managers and partners I work for as typically: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                  Very 
Low                                        High 
 
36. The amount of experience I have with auditing manufacturing clients is: 
 
   1    2      3      4        5         6           7           8           9           10 
Very                                           Very 
Low                                   High 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate your response to the following statement by 
INPUTTING the appropriate numbers. 
 
 
37. The amount of audit experience I have is: ______years and ______ months. 
  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate your response to the following statements by 
CIRCLING Yes or No.  
 
 
38. I had a system-related major or minor in college (e.g., MIS major):  Yes No 
 
 
39. I generally perform separate assessments of inherent and control  
risk:          Yes No 
 
 
40. I generally assess inherent and control risk at the transaction cycle  
level:          Yes No 
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Thank you very much for completing the case study. 
 
 
 
 
 
Please place all materials in the pre-addressed and stamped 
envelope provided and mail it back to me. If you have any 
questions about the case study, do not hesitate to call me 
at 215-895-2883 or e-mail me at jfb24@drexel.edu. 
 
Thank you for offering your time to complete this research 
project and assisting me in obtaining my Ph.D. degree. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
 
MADISON INC. 
BALANCE SHEETS, INCOME STATEMENTS, AND 
MATERIALITY CALCULATIONS 
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APPENDIX: BALANCE SHEETS 
 
INSTRUCTION: Feel free to review the following background information. 
 
Madison Inc. 
Balance Sheets 
(in thousands)     9/30/2003 12/31/2002 12/31/2001 
Assets     (Unaudited) (Audited) (Audited) 
Current assets:                                    
 Cash and cash equivalents  $2,599 $2,499 $2,380 
 
Accounts receivable, net of allowances for doubtful 
accounts of 305; 294; and 280, respectively           2,219          2,114          1,994
 Inventory    81,097 76,507 73,564 
 Prepaid advertising   3,592 3,453 3,289 
 Other prepaid expenses  1,782 1,697 1,601 
 Deferred income tax benefits  4,055 3,825 3,678 
Total current assets    $95,343 $90,095 $86,506 
Property, plant, and equipment, at cost:   
 Land and buildings   33,267 31,987 30,464 
 Fixtures and equipment  36,122 34,402 32,455 
 Leasehold improvements  906 855 822 
Total property, plant, and equipment  $70,295 $67,244 $63,741 
 Less - accumulated depreciation 23,627 22,718 21,636 
Property, plant, and equipment, net  $46,669 $44,527 $42,105 
Intangibles, net    1,204 1,147 1,082 
Total assets    $143,216 $135,768 $129,693 
      
Liabilities and shareholders' equity   
Current liabilities     
 Accounts payable   $27,441 $25,769 $24,370 
 Accrued liabilities   14,872 13,556 12,888 
 Short-term notes payable  4,076 3,554 3,289 
 Income taxes payable  5,205 4,596 4,241 
Total current liabilities   $51,594 $47,476 $44,788 
Deferred income taxes   2,667 2,516 2,337 
Long-term liabilities    190 182 173 
Shareholders' equity:     
 Common Stock, 17,773,000 shares issued 177 177 177 
 Additional paid-in capital  15,146 15,146 15,146 
 Retained earnings   109,818 104,588 99,527 
 Treasury stock (at cost)   (36,376) (34,317) (32,455)
Total shareholders' equity   88,764 85,594 82,395 
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity  $143,216 $135,768 $129,693 
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APPENDIX: INCOME STATEMENTS AND MATERIALITY CALCULATIONS 
 
INSTRUCTION: Feel free to review the following background information. 
 
              Madison Inc. 
              Income Statements 
(in thousands)       
Note: 9/30/03 Income Statement for 9 months ended 9/30/03; 12/31/02 and 12/31/01 
Income Statements for 12 months ended 12/31/02 and 12/31/01, respectively. 
         
    9/30/2003 12/31/2002 12/31/2001 
    (Unaudited) (Audited) (Audited) 
Net Sales    $357,812 $454,364 $432,728 
Cost of sales   210,044 264,206 249,251 
Gross profit   147,768 190,158 183,477 
Selling, general, and administration expenses               131,987       169,214     162,706 
Income from operations  15,781 20,944 20,771 
Other income (expense):     
 Interest expense  (632) (818) (779) 
 Interest income  113 142 134 
 Other   465 586 563 
 Total other income (expense), net (53) (90) (82) 
Income before income taxes   15,728 20,854 20,689 
Income tax provision    6,291 8,341 8,276 
Net income    $9,437 $12,512 $12,413 
 
 
        Madison Inc.  
Materiality Calculations 
 
                                   Materiality Calculations CURRENT YEAR   
                                   (in thousands)  12/31/03 Audit 12/31/02 Audit 12/31/01 Audit 
                               Income Before Income Taxes     20,971(a) 20,854       20,689 
                                   Multiply by 5%  X 0.05 X 0.05       X 0.05 
                              Result: Planning Materiality 1,055 1,043        1,034 
                                  
                                Multiply by 25%  X 0.25 X 0.25       X 0.25 
 
264 261         259 
                               
                              Result: Monetary Precision or 
Tolerable Error 
      
                              Note: Planning Materiality is the preliminary estimate of materiality made during initial planning. 
                              Monetary Precision/Tolerable Error is the application of Planning Materiality at the individual account balance 
                              level. 
                              (a) Estimate of 12/31/03 amount represents the 9/30/03 Income Before Income Taxes amount annualized 
                              (15,728/.75 = 20,971). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
169
 
 
APPENDIX D: AUDITOR ACCOUNTING INFORMATION SYSTEM (AIS) 
EXPERTISE MEASURE 
 
 
 
 
The following questions will be used to measure self-assessments of participants’ AIS 
expertise levels: 
1. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I have received more combined 
informal and formal training in relation to complex and pervasive accounting information 
systems (e.g., ERP systems) during my career. 
 
2. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I have more experience auditing 
complex and pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems). 
 
3. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I feel more comfortable auditing 
complex and pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems).  
 
4. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I receive more enjoyment from auditing 
complex and pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems). 
 
5. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, a larger portion of my time is assigned 
to auditing complex and pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems). 
 
6. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I began auditing complex and 
pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems) at an earlier point in my 
career.  
 
7. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, auditing complex and pervasive 
accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems) is more important in my day-to-day 
audit activities. 
 
8. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, auditing complex and pervasive 
accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems) will play a more important role in 
my career in the future. 
 
9. Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm, I have a higher level of complex and 
pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP systems) expertise. 
 
Participants will respond to each of the above questions via the following eight-
point Likert scale: 
 
      1  2        3              4              5                  6                     7                   8 
Strongly        Mostly        Somewhat     Mildly     Mildly      Somewhat          Mostly         Strongly 
  Disagree      Disagree        Disagree    Disagree    Agree          Agree              Agree            Agree 
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                  APPENDIX E: FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR PRE-TEST OF AUDITOR AIS 
EXPERTISE MEASURE 
 
 
 
 
                        Panel 1: 
 
                       Spearman Correlation Matrix: 
  
Itemb 
AIS 
TRAIN 
AIS
EXP
AIS 
COMFO
AIS 
ENJOY
AIS 
TIME
AIS 
BEGAN
AIS 
IMPOR
AIS 
ROLE 
AIS 
EXPER 
AUDIT 
EXP 
YEAR
INFI
Correlation AISTRAIN 1.00 0.76 0.72 0.57 0.52 0.55 0.44 0.44 0.63 -0.07 -0.11
 AISEXP 0.76 1.00 0.81 0.57 0.64 0.63 0.55 0.45 0.73 0.08 0.08 
 AISCOMFO 0.72 0.81 1.00 0.70 0.77 0.63 0.66 0.59 0.78 -0.08 -0.05
 AISENJOY 0.57 0.57 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.60 0.59 0.53 0.66 -0.19 -0.07
 AISTIME 0.52 0.64 0.77 0.70 1.00 0.71 0.66 0.57 0.78 -0.16 -0.15
 AISBEGAN 0.55 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.71 1.00 0.64 0.64 0.84 -0.12 -0.03
 AISIMPOR 0.44 0.55 0.66 0.59 0.66 0.64 1.00 0.70 0.78 -0.23 -0.12
 AISROLE 0.44 0.45 0.59 0.53 0.57 0.64 0.70 1.00 0.65 -0.38 -0.24
 AISEXPER 0.63 0.73 0.78 0.66 0.78 0.84 0.78 0.65 1.00 -0.13 -0.04
 AUDITEXP -0.07 0.08 -0.08 -0.19 -0.16 -0.12 -0.23 -0.38 -0.13 1.00 0.88 
 YEARINFI -0.11 0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -0.15 -0.03 -0.12 -0.24 -0.04 0.88 1.00 
Sig. (2-tailed)a AISTRAIN  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.48 
 AISEXP 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.60 
 AISCOMFO 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.74 
 AISENJOY 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.67 
 AISTIME 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.33 
 AISBEGAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.83 
 AISIMPOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.12 0.42 
 AISROLE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.01 0.11 
 AISEXPER 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.41 0.81 
 AUDITEXP 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.20 0.28 0.43 0.12 0.01 0.41  0.00 
 YEARINFI 0.48 0.60 0.74 0.67 0.33 0.83 0.42 0.11 0.81 0.00  
                         
                         
 
a p-values associated with two-tailed t tests for Spearman correlations. 
b AISTRAIN = Relative to other in-charge auditors, I have received more combined    
informal and formal accounting information systems training during my career. 
AISEXP = Relative to other in-charge auditors, I have more experience auditing 
accounting information systems. 
AISCOMFO = Relative to other in-charge auditors, I feel more comfortable auditing 
accounting information systems. 
AISENJOY = Relative to other in-charge auditors, I feel more enjoyment when auditing 
accounting information systems. 
AISTIME = Relative to other in-charge auditors, I spend more time auditing accounting 
information systems. 
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b AISBEGAN = Relative to other in-charge auditors, I began auditing accounting 
information systems at an earlier point in my career.  
AISIMPOR = Relative to other in-charge auditors, auditing accounting information 
systems is more important in my day-to-day audit activities. 
AISROLE = Relative to other in-charge auditors, auditing accounting information 
systems will play a more important role in my career in the future. 
AISEXPER = Relative to other in-charge auditors, I have a higher level of accounting 
information system expertise. 
AUDITEXP = Number of audit experience in months. 
YEARINFI = Level / year in firm. 
 
                        Panel 2: 
                            Communalities: 
Itema  Initial Extraction
AISTRAIN 1.000 .576
AISEXP 1.000 .756
AISCOMFO 1.000 .811
AISENJOY 1.000 .631
AISTIME 1.000 .736
AISBEGAN 1.000 .706
AISIMPOR 1.000 .666
AISROLE 1.000 .644
AISEXPER 1.000 .854
AUDITEXP 1.000 .943
YEARINFI 1.000 .884
                              
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
               a As defined in Panel 1. 
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Panel 3: 
                             
Total Variance Explained: 
  
 
 
 
Initial 
Eigen- 
values 
    
 
 
Extraction 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings 
   
 
 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings 
  
 
 
 
 
Comp. 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
 
 
% of 
Variance 
 
 
Cumu-
lative  
% 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
 
% of  
Vari-
ance 
 
 
Cumu-
lative  
% 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
 
 
% of 
Variance 
 
 
Cumu-
lative 
 % 
1 6.231 56.648 56.648 6.231 56.648 56.648 6.137 55.789 55.789 
2 1.975 17.957 74.605 1.975 17.957 74.605 2.070 18.816 74.605 
3 .784 7.123 81.728       
4 .484 4.398 86.126       
5 .398 3.622 89.748       
6 .362 3.290 93.038       
7 .267 2.428 95.467       
8 .189 1.717 97.184       
9 .141 1.284 98.467       
10 .100 .909 99.377       
11 .000 .623 100.000       
                                 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
                       Panel 4: 
                            Component Matrix: 
   Component          Component 
                Itema  1 2
AISTRAIN .749 .123
AISEXP .812 .311
AISCOMFO .890 .136
AISENJOY .794 1.382E-02
AISTIME .858 2.889E-04
AISBEGAN .837 7.106E-02
AISIMPOR .812 -8.369E-02
AISROLE .757 -.266
AISEXPER .919 9.327E-02
AUDITEXP -.226 .944
YEARINFI -.150 .928
                             
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
                             2 components extracted. 
                             a As defined in Panel 1. 
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Table 1: Participants by Group 
 
  Low CAS Competence High CAS Competence 
High Auditor AIS Expertise n = 18 (Group 1) n = 18 (Group 2) 
Low Auditor AIS Expertise n = 21 (Group 3) n = 16 (Group 4) 
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Table 2: Sample Demographic Data 
 
Demographic Variablea 
Sample 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
      
Audit experience  44.21 17.38 
      
Experience with CAS  5.19 2.15 
      
Experience assessing risks 6.84 1.70 
      
Experience planning substantive procedures 7.23 1.71 
      
Experience with ERP systems 4.86 2.30 
      
Liklihood of assignment to a similar   
engagement  6.29 2.59 
      
Manufacturing industry experience  6.10 2.86 
      
 
 
a Audit experience is measured in months. For all other variables, participants 
responded on ten-point response scales (1 = “very low;” 10 = “very high”). 
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Table 3: Demographic Data by Group 
 
 
 
 
Demographic 
Variablea   
High 
AIS/Low 
CAS  
 (Group 1) 
High 
AIS/High  
CAS    
(Group 2)  
Low 
AIS/Low 
CAS     
(Group 3) 
Low 
AIS/High 
CAS 
(Group 4)  
F 
Value 
p-
value 
           
Audit experience Mean 43.22 45.78 43.86 44.00 0.07 0.98 
 (SD) 14.43 23.92 17.75 11.86     
           
Experience with  
CAS Mean 4.56 5.19 4.76 5.94 1.81 0.15 
 (SD) 2.06 2.15 2.00 1.88     
           
Experience  
assessing risks Mean 7.17 7.06 6.52 6.63 0.64 0.60 
 (SD) 1.62 1.63 1.99 1.50     
           
Experience planning 
substantive 
procedures Mean 7.44 7.78 6.71 7.06 1.42 0.25 
 (SD) 1.89 1.35 1.88 1.57     
           
Experience with  
ERP systems Mean 5.00 5.22 4.19 5.19 0.87 0.46 
 (SD) 2.22 2.53 2.32 2.11     
           
Likelihood of 
assignment to a 
similar engagement Mean 5.28 6.78 6.48 6.63 1.27 0.29 
 (SD) 2.72 2.71 2.36 2.53     
           
Manufacturing 
industry experience Mean 5.78 6.00 6.10 6.56 0.22 0.89 
  (SD) 3.08 2.97 2.95 2.56     
          
 
 
a Audit experience is measured in months. For all other variables, participants responded  
on ten-point response scales (1 = “very low;” 10 = “very high”). 
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Table 4: Manipulation Check  
 
Variablea   
Low CAS 
Competence Group 
High CAS 
Competence Group 
t 
statistic 
p-
value 
Mean 3.77 7.91 -11.774 < .001 Perceived CAS  
Competence Level (SD) 1.66 1.28     
          
 
 
a (1 = “very low;” 10 = “very high”).        
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
177
 
 
Table 5: Spearman Correlation Matrix for AIS Expertise Measures and Audit 
Experience  
 
Spearman Correlation Matrix                 
 
 
Item
a
 
AIS 
TR
AIN 
AIS 
EXP 
AIS 
COMF 
AIS 
ENJO
Y 
AIS 
TIME 
AIS 
BEGA
N 
AIS 
IMPO
RT 
AIS 
ROLE 
AIS 
EXPE
RT 
AU 
EX 
AIS 
TRAIN 
 
1 
 
0.874 
 
0.770 
 
0.699 
 
0.799 
 
0.753 
 
0.751 
 
0.643 
 
0.850 
 
0.019 
            
AIS 
EXP  1 0.861 0.716 0.751 0.708 0.7441 0.7531 0.891 0.020 
            
AIS 
COMF 
   
1 
 
0.783 
 
0.722 
 
0.653 
 
0.716 
 
0.706 
 
0.830 
 
0.031 
            
AIS 
ENJOY    1 0.779 0.755 0.7130 0.748 0.697 0.012 
            
AIS 
TIME 
     
1 
 
0.822 
 
0.850 
 
0.631 
 
0.845 
 
0.004 
            
AIS 
BEGAN      1 0.758 0.691 0.802 0.019 
            
AIS 
IMPORT 
       
 
1 
 
 
0.757 
 
 
0.843 
 
 
0.017 
            
AIS 
ROLE        1 0.725 0.073 
            
AIS 
EXPERT 
         
1 
 
-0.011 
            
AU 
EX          1 
 
 
           
Bold = significant correlations at the p < .001 level (two-tailed test). 
a The nine items related to auditing complex and pervasive accounting information systems (e.g., ERP 
systems) and asked participants to respond on eight-point scales (1 = “strongly disagree”; 8 = “strongly 
agree”). All nine items began with the same prompt (“Relative to other in-charge auditors at my firm,”), 
before diverging. The prompts related to each of the individual items: “I have received more combined 
informal and formal training during my career” (AISTRAIN) “I have more experience” (AISEXP) “I feel 
more comfortable” (AISCOMF) “I receive more enjoyment” (AISENJOY) “a larger portion of my time is 
assigned” (AISTIME) “I began at an earlier point in my career” (AISBEGAN) “is more important in my 
day-to-day audit activities” (AISIMPORT) “will play a more important role in my career in the future” 
(AISROLE) “I have a higher level of expertise” (AISEXPERT). Participants were also asked to provide 
their audit experience in months (AUEX). 
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Table 6: Communalities for AIS Expertise Measures and Audit Experience  
 
Communalities                 
Itema Initial Extraction               
AISTRAIN 1 0.8040227         
AISEXP 1 0.8385413         
AISCOMF 1 0.7800911         
AISENJOY 1 0.7405476         
AISTIME 1 0.8150119         
AISBEGAN 1 0.7552177         
AISIMPORT 1 0.7991858         
AISROLE 1 0.7026042         
AISEXPERT 1 0.8821781         
AUDEXP 1 0.9931621         
 
 
            
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a The nine items related to auditing complex and pervasive accounting information systems 
 (e.g., ERP systems) and asked participants to respond on eight-point scales (1 = “strongly  
disagree”; 8 = “strongly agree”). All nine items began with the same prompt (“Relative to  
other in-charge auditors at my firm,”), before diverging. The prompts related to each of  
the individual items: “I have received more combined informal and formal training during  
my career” (AISTRAIN) “I have more experience” (AISEXP) “I feel more comfortable”  
(AISCOMF) “I receive more enjoyment” (AISENJOY) “a larger portion of my time is  
assigned” (AISTIME) “I began at an earlier point in my career” (AISBEGAN) “is more 
 important in my day-to-day audit activities” (AISIMPORT) “will play a more important 
 role in my career in the future” (AISROLE) “I have a higher level of expertise” (AISEXPERT). 
 Participants were also asked to provide their audit experience in months (AUDEXP). 
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Table 7: Factor Components for AIS Expertise Measures and Audit Experience  
 
Factor Components: Total Variance Explained       
  Initial Eigenvalues  Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 7.098 70.98164446 70.98164446 7.098 70.98164446 70.98164446 
2 1.012 10.12398203 81.10562649 1.012 10.12398203 81.10562649 
3 0.473 4.728820142 85.83444663     
4 0.457 4.573227683 90.40767432     
5 0.322 3.223934984 93.6316093     
6 0.247 2.472086572 96.10369587     
7 0.167 1.673470619 97.77716649     
8 0.1 0.996378626 98.77354512     
9 0.066 0.656767449 99.43031257     
10 0.057 0.569687434 100.00       
         
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.       
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Table 8: Component Matrix for AIS Expertise Measures and Audit Experience  
 
Component Matrixa                 
  Component Component         
Itemb 1 2               
AISTRAIN 0.89587379 0.03785278         
AISEXP 0.91529445 0.02788212         
AISCOMF 0.88221541 0.04227413         
AISENJOY 0.86050838 0.00854074         
AISTIME 0.90268603 0.01303113         
AISBEGAN 0.86883325 0.0186136         
AISIMPORT 0.89330969 0.03440384         
AISROLE 0.83017153 0.11584237         
AISEXPERT 0.93921758 0.00696224         
AUDEXP 0.00143523 0.99657417               
            
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.        
a Two components extracted.      
b The nine items related to auditing complex and pervasive accounting information systems  
(e.g., ERP systems) and asked participants to respond on eight-point scales (1 = “strongly  
disagree”; 8 = “strongly agree”). All nine items began with the same prompt (“Relative to  
other in-charge auditors at my firm,”), before diverging. The prompts related to each of the 
individual items: “I have received more combined informal and formal training during my 
career” (AISTRAIN) “I have more experience” (AISEXP) “I feel more comfortable”  
(AISCOMF) “I receive more enjoyment” (AISENJOY) “a larger portion of my time is  
assigned” (AISTIME) “I began at an earlier point in my career” (AISBEGAN) “is more 
 important in my day-to-day audit activities” (AISIMPORT) “will play a more important role 
 in my career in the future” (AISROLE) “I have a higher level of expertise” (AISEXPERT). 
 Participants were also asked to provide their audit experience in months (AUDEXP). 
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Table 9: Frequency Distribution and Descriptive Statistics for Mean AIS Expertise 
Measure 
 
Mean AIS 
Scorea Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1.000 1 1.37% 1.37% 
1.222 2 2.74% 4.11% 
1.333 3 4.11% 8.22% 
1.444 1 1.37% 9.59% 
1.556 2 2.74% 12.33% 
1.667 4 5.48% 17.81% 
1.778 5 6.85% 24.66% 
1.889 1 1.37% 26.03% 
2.000 2 2.74% 28.77% 
2.111 3 4.11% 32.88% 
2.222 2 2.74% 35.62% 
2.333 2 2.74% 38.36% 
2.556 2 2.74% 41.10% 
2.778 3 4.11% 45.21% 
2.889 1 1.37% 46.58% 
3.000 1 1.37% 47.95% 
3.111 1 1.37% 49.32% 
3.222 2 2.74% 52.05% 
3.333 2 2.74% 54.79% 
3.444 2 2.74% 57.53% 
3.667 1 1.37% 58.90% 
3.778 1 1.37% 60.27% 
3.889 1 1.37% 61.64% 
4.000 1 1.37% 63.01% 
4.111 3 4.11% 67.12% 
4.222 1 1.37% 68.49% 
4.333 1 1.37% 69.86% 
4.444 1 1.37% 71.23% 
4.556 1 1.37% 72.60% 
4.667 1 1.37% 73.97% 
4.889 1 1.37% 75.34% 
5.000 1 1.37% 76.71% 
5.111 1 1.37% 78.08% 
5.222 1 1.37% 79.45% 
5.667 2 2.74% 82.19% 
5.778 2 2.74% 84.93% 
5.889 2 2.74% 87.67% 
6.222 1 1.37% 89.04% 
6.444 2 2.74% 91.78% 
6.556 2 2.74% 94.52% 
6.667 1 1.37% 95.89% 
6.889 1 1.37% 97.26% 
7.222 1 1.37% 98.63% 
7.333 1 1.37% 100.00% 
Total 73 100.00%   
      
Mean  3.5129376   
Median  3.2222222   
Std. Deviation   1.8050218   
      
 
 
a Participants’ mean AIS expertise scores were measured as their  
average response to the nine, eight-point scales listed in Appendix D.  
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Table 10: Testing of Hypothesis Set One 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Statistical Results   
      
    Low AIS High AIS Test  
Dependent Variablea   Expertise Group Expertise Group Statisticb p-value 
           
Inherent Risk Assessment Mean 39.86 54.17 -4.207 <.001 
 (SD) 13.15 15.74     
          
Control Risk Assessment Mean 46.70 60.14 12.266 <.001 
    (SD) 16.81 19.25     
          
Procedures Mean 12.00 12.97 5.211 0.013 
  (SD) 1.78 1.83     
          
Labor Mean 2.32 3.31 4.058 0.024 
  (SD) 1.75 2.46     
          
Timing Mean 4.89 5.67 1.351 0.125 
  (SD) 3.10 2.86     
          
Extent Mean 100.77 107.33 1.296 0.130 
 (SD) 22.49 25.85   
 
 
 
a Inherent and Control Risk Assessments were measured on scales ranging from 0 (“low 
risk”) to 100 (“high risk”) percent. Procedures was determined by the total number of 
procedures planned. Labor was computed as the total number of procedures assigned to a 
more senior level auditor than staff assistant. Timing was measured as the total number of 
procedures to be tested at fiscal year-end. Extent was determined by the total number of 
budgeted audit hours.  
b For Inherent Risk Assessment, the test statistic is the t statistic from the independent-
samples t test. For all other variables, the test statistic is the F statistic for the main effect of 
Auditor AIS Expertise from the overall 2X2 ANOVA. 
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Table 11: Testing of Hypothesis Set Two 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Independent-Samples t Test    
      
    Low CAS High CAS t  
Dependent Variablea   Competence Group Competence Group Statistic p-value 
          
Evidence Reliability Mean 3.69 7.15 -7.880 <.001 
   Judgment (SD) 1.58 2.09     
 
 
 
a Evidence Reliability Judgment was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (“not reliable”) to 10 (“very 
reliable”). 
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Table 12: Testing of Hypothesis Set Three 
 
Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA results 
      
Dependent 
Variablea   
Low CAS 
Competence Group 
High CAS 
Competence Group 
F 
Statisticb 
p-
value 
          
Control Risk 
Assessment Mean 58.21 47.21 7.851 0.004 
    (SD) 17.53 19.68     
         
Procedures Mean 12.64 12.29 .974 0.164 
  (SD) 1.97 1.73     
         
Labor Mean 3.15 2.41 2.753 0.051 
  (SD) 2.08 2.23     
         
Timing Mean 5.56 4.94 .922 0.170 
  (SD) 2.62 3.37     
         
Extent Mean 107.33 100.19 1.932 0.085 
  (SD) 25.30 22.79     
  
 
 
a Control Risk Assessment was measured on scale ranging from 0 (“low risk”) to 100 (“high risk”) 
percent. Procedures was determined by the total number of procedures planned. Labor was 
computed as the total number of procedures assigned to a more senior level auditor than staff 
assistant. Timing was measured as the total number of procedures to be tested at fiscal year-end. 
Extent was determined by the total number of budgeted audit hours.  
bThe F statistic is for the main effect of CAS competence from the overall 2X2 ANOVA. 
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Table 13: Testing of Hypothesis Set Four 
 
Panel A - Descriptive Statistics     
      
Dependent Variablea   
High 
AIS/Low 
CAS  
(Group 1) 
High 
AIS/High 
CAS   
(Group 2)  
Low 
AIS/Low 
CAS     
(Group 3) 
Low 
AIS/High 
CAS 
(Group 4)  
        
Control Risk Assessment Mean 65.28 55.00 52.14 39.56 
  (SD) 15.58 21.58 17.14 13.80 
        
Procedures Mean 13.44 12.50 11.95 12.06 
  (SD) 2.01 1.54 1.69 1.95 
        
Labor Mean 4.06 2.56 2.38 2.25 
  (SD) 2.29 2.46 1.56 2.02 
        
Timing Mean 6.00 5.33 5.19 4.50 
  (SD) 2.61 3.13 2.64 3.67 
        
Extent Mean 117.06 97.61 99.00 103.09 
  (SD) 29.12 18.09 18.36 27.47 
 
Panel B - Planned Contrasts    
     
Dependent 
Variablea Contrast Testedb 
Value of 
Contrast 
t 
Statistic 
p-
value 
        
Control Risk 
Assessment (65.28 - 52.14) - (55.00 - 39.56) -2.30 -0.282 0.780 
        
Procedures (13.44 - 11.95) - (12.50 - 12.06) 1.05 1.248 0.108 
        
Labor (4.06 - 2.38) - (2.56 - 2.25) 1.37 1.393 0.084 
        
Timing (6.00 - 5.19) - (5.33 - 4.50) -0.02 -0.016 0.988 
        
Extent (117.06 - 99.00) - (97.61 - 103.09) 23.54 2.131 0.019 
 
 
 
a Control Risk Assessment was measured on scale ranging from 0 (“low risk”) to 100 (“high risk”) 
percent. Procedures was determined by the total number of procedures planned. Labor was 
computed as the total number of procedures assigned to a more senior level auditor than staff 
assistant. Timing was measured as the total number of procedures to be tested at fiscal year-end. 
Extent was determined by the total number of budgeted audit hours. 
b Planned contrast tested = (Group 1 Mean – Group 3 Mean) > (Group 2 Mean – Group 4 Mean). 
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Table 14: Testing of Hypothesis Set Five 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Statistical Results    
      
    Low AIS High AIS F  
Dependent Variablea   Expertise Group Expertise Group Statisticb p-value 
          
Inherent Risk Assessment Mean 18.96 13.80 6.266 .008 
   Quality (SD) 9.67 7.65   
      
Control Risk Assessment Mean 19.69 15.60 2.840 .048 
   Quality (SD) 12.97 11.44   
      
Effectiveness of Planned Mean 5.15 5.71 1.809 .092 
   Substantive Procedures (SD) .92 1.03     
 
 
 
a Inherent Risk Assessment Quality was calculated as the absolute difference between participants’ 
inherent risk assessments and the overall mean expert inherent risk assessment. Control Risk 
Assessment Quality was computed as the absolute difference between participants’ control risk 
assessments and the mean expert control risk assessment for their CAS competence condition. 
Effectiveness of Planned Substantive Procedures was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (“very low”) 
to 10 (“very high”). 
b For Inherent Risk Assessment Quality and Control Risk Assessment Quality, the F statistic is for the 
main effect of auditor AIS Expertise from the overall 2X2 ANOVA. For Effectiveness of Planned 
Substantive Procedures, the F statistic is for the main effect of auditor AIS expertise from a 2X2 
ANCOVA that included participants’ inherent and control risk assessments as covariates. 
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